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Abstract 
 
 
Problem-solving courts appear to achieve outcomes that are not common in 
mainstream courts. There are increasing calls for the adoption of more 
therapeutic and problem-solving practices by mainstream judges in civil and 
criminal courts in a number of jurisdictions, most notably in the United States 
and Australia. Currently, a judge who sets out to exercise a significant 
therapeutic function is likely to be doing so in a specialist court or jurisdiction, 
outside the mainstream court system, and arguably, outside the adversarial 
paradigm itself. To some extent, this work is tolerated but marginalised. 
 
However, do therapeutic and problem-solving functions have the potential 
to help define, rather than simply complement, the role of judicial officers? 
The core question addressed in this thesis is whether the judicial role 
could evolve to be not just less adversarial, but fundamentally non-
adversarial. In other words, could we see—or are we seeing—a juristic 
paradigm shift not just in the colloquial, casual sense of the word, but in 
the strong, worldview changing sense meant by Thomas Kuhn? 
 
This thesis examines the current relationship between adversarialism and 
therapeutic jurisprudence in the context of Kuhn’s conception of the 
transition from periods of ‘normal science’, through periods of anomaly 
and disciplinary crises to paradigm shifts. It considers whether therapeutic 
jurisprudence and adversarialism are incommensurable in the Kuhnian 
sense, and if so, what this means for the relationship between the two, 
and for the agenda to mainstream therapeutic jurisprudence. 
 
The thesis asserts that Kuhnian incommensurability is, in fact, a 
characteristic of the relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic 
jurisprudence, but that the possibility of a therapeutic paradigm shift in law 
can be reconciled with many adversarial and due process principles by 
relating this incommensurability to a broader disciplinary matrix. 
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1.1 What This Thesis Is About 
 
According to Freiberg: 
Though still in their early stages, it has been argued that problem-
oriented courts have moved beyond the experimental mode and 
into the mainstream of justice. Some have gone as far as to 
suggest that a major paradigm shift has occurred. Though one 
may be sceptical about such a sweeping claim, it is clear that this 
phenomenon requires serious consideration.1 
The aim of this thesis is engage in just this consideration, an undertaking 
that is long overdue. Although a decade has passed since Freiberg issued 
this challenge to the legal profession and to the academy, very little formal 
study has been made of the nature of the fundamental relationship 
between therapeutic jurisprudence2 and the traditional adversarial court 
                                                 
1 
 Arie Freiberg, ‘Problem-Oriented Courts: Innovative Solutions To Intractable Problems?’ 
(2001) 11 Journal Of Judicial Administration 8. 
2 
 Freiberg notes that ‘the overlay of a philosophical basis on the problem-oriented court 
model came with the development of the concept of “therapeutic jurisprudence”‘, ibid 11. 
2 
 
system, and the implications (both theoretical and practical) of that 
relationship.3 The implications of a ‘paradigm shift’ would be especially 
significant. 
 
There are an increasing number of specialist criminal courts making use of 
practices that are informed by the principles and methods of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.4 These courts are often referred to collectively as problem-
solving courts, problem-oriented courts or less paternalistically as 
solutions-focused courts.5 The general goal of these courts is to facilitate 
and support offenders to act as autonomous solution agents or change 
agents in their lives, in order to reduce the likelihood of further offending by 
helping offenders to confront and evolve the issues in their lives that give 
rise to offending conduct. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, I consider in more depth the extent of the actual relationship 
between therapeutic jurisprudence and the operating philosophies and processes of a 
range of problem solving courts—a question about which there a number of views. 
3 
 Several quite recent publications have sought to initiate that study and conversation, 
but a thorough and rigorous analysis has yet to be conducted. The most relevant studies 
so far are: Nigel Stobbs, ‘The Nature of Juristic Paradigms: Exploring the Theoretical and 
Conceptual Relationship Between Adversarialism and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (2011) 
4(1) Washington University Jurisprudence Review 97; Michael King, Arie Freiberg, Becky 
Batagol and Ross Hyams Non-Adversarial Justice (2009). 
4 
 Specialist courts are those that are able to operate in less/non-adversarial ways as a 
result of modified rules of procedure, which suspend or limit adversarial practices. See, 
eg, Chief Justice Diana Bryant and Deputy Chief Justice John Faulks, ‘The “Helping 
Court” Comes Full Circle: The Application and Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the 
Family Court of Australia’ (2007) 17 Journal of Judicial Administration 93, in which the 
judicial authors explain the modified rules within the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) which 
allow for the use of LATs (less adversarial trials). In the US, these now include: drug 
courts, truancy courts, gambling courts, domestic violence courts, community courts, 
mental health courts, gun courts, homeless courts and veterans courts. For a description 
of each of these jurisdictions, see National Drug Resource Centre: 
<http://www.ndcrc.org/faq/types-problem-solving-courts>.  
5 
 Michael King, ‘Should Problem Solving Courts be Solution-Focused Courts?’ (2011) 80 
Revista Juridíca de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 1005. 
3 
 
The therapeutic jurisprudence movement was, as originally conceived, an 
attempt to apply research findings from the social sciences to legal 
processes in order to make those legal processes less damaging to the 
well-being of those involved with and affected by them. That well-being 
could encompass psychological physical, economic and social factors.6 
 
The normative rationale of the therapeutic jurisprudence movement is that 
there exists an obligation on the part of the legal system to promote 
therapeutic outcomes and reforms and to identify, limit and, where 
possible, ameliorate anti-therapeutic roles and processes.7 The influence 
of the movement in achieving these goals, especially through the 
operation of the problem-solving courts, has been widespread and 
significant.8  
 
More recently, however, the therapeutic jurisprudence movement, in what 
is sometimes referred to as its ‘maturation phase’, 9  has set itself a 
somewhat broader and more ambitious agenda in order to build on these 
successes. This agenda includes positively influencing the work and 
                                                 
6 
 David Wexler, ‘Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law’ (1992) 16(1) Law and 
Human Behaviour 27. King observes that although the sort of ‘well-being’ that therapeutic 
jurisprudence values and promotes was originally limited by Wexler and Winick to the 
physical and psychological contexts, it could conceivably ‘encompass physical, 
psychological, emotional, relational, social and economic dimensions’: Adrian Evans and 
Michael King, ‘Reflections on the Connection of Virtue Ethics to Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence’ (2011) 35(3) UNSW Law Journal 717, 722. 
7 
 A thorough unpacking and discussion of the meaning and ambit of the terms 
‘therapeutic’ and ‘anti-therapeutic’ is undertaken in Chapter 6, where I consider whether 
therapeutic jurisprudence is able to contribute paradigmatic exemplars to a juristic model. 
8 
 Apart from the expansion of the number and types of specialist courts applying 
therapeutic principles across jurisdictions, King also observes that: ‘Therapeutic 
jurisprudence has become one of the most significant influences in court practice and 
approaches to judging over the last decade or more’: Michael King, ‘Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence’s Challenge to the Judiciary’ (2011) 1 Alaska Journal of Dispute Resolution 
1. 
9 
 Ian Freckelton, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The 
Price and Risks of Influence’ (2006) 30(2) Thomas Jefferson Law Review, 575. 
4 
 
functions of judges and lawyers outside the specialist courts and among 
those who have not had significant experience or training in the principles 
of therapeutic jurisprudence. This influence that it seeks is more significant 
than the making of simple, ad hoc and isolated recommendations about 
how mainstream judges and courts 10  can be less anti-therapeutic in 
achieving their current (adversarially defined and validated) purposes and 
goals.11 
 
The judicial functions and techniques seen within the specialist courts 
appear to be able to achieve results that are not possible in courts that 
                                                 
10 
 ‘Mainstream’ is a term often used by therapeutic jurisprudence advocates and 
practitioners to refer to the more traditional, adversarial courts and style of legal practice 
that do not actively seek to make therapeutic reforms. See, eg, Donald Farole and 
Michael Rempel et al, ‘Applying Problem-Solving Principles in Mainstream Courts: 
Lessons for State Courts’ (2005) 26 Justice System Journal 57–76. Freiberg claims 
‘specialised courts may be problematic if they are seen as too narrow or become too 
isolated from the mainstream’: Freiberg, above n 1, 12. Discussing the future of 
therapeutic jurisprudence as part of what she conceives of as the ‘Comprehensive Law 
Movement’ Daicoff predicts that ‘[i]t will become incorporated into mainstream legal 
practice as part of the usual work that lawyers provide for their clients’: Susan Daicoff, 
‘Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law Movement”‘ (2006) 6(1) 
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 61. 
11 
 In a typical drug court, for instance, the judge is part of a statutory team whose main 
role is to guide and monitor an offender’s path through a very intensive rehabilitation 
program. Although the judge retains an adjudicative role in these courts, it is arguable 
that the main function and goal of the court is therapeutic. There are strong data to 
suggest that drug courts are, in fact, operating according to a theoretical model based on 
therapeutic jurisprudence. In one major empirical study, the authors analysed and tested 
therapeutic jurisprudence as the theory behind the drug court mission and its day-to-day 
operations. A logit model was used to assess the strength of specific theoretical 
components on an offender’s ability to complete the drug court program. They concluded 
that the manner of interactions between the judge and offenders can increase the 
likelihood of an offender’s ability to remain abstinent and stay engaged in treatment for 
the duration of the drug court program: Scott Senjo and Leslie Leip, ‘Testing and 
Developing Theory in Drug Court: A Four-Part Logit Model to Predict Program 
Completion’ (2001) 12 Criminal Justice Policy Review 66–87. This ad hoc influence has 
sometimes been referred to by therapeutic jurisprudence advocates as producing books 
of ‘handy hints’ for judges and lawyers. 
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operate solely according to adversarial principles and practices.12 There 
are calls for mainstream criminal courts (non-specialist courts) to migrate 
some of these successful practices from the specialist courts, in order to 
replicate these sorts of outcomes on a larger scale. If this migration 
occurs, it may be a strong indication that the criminal justice system (or at 
least the role of the criminal court) is undergoing, or about to undergo, 
paradigmatic change. As will be seen in Chapter 5, there is no shortage of 
rhetoric to this effect, but this thesis seeks to make a formal theoretical 
assessment about paradigm change. 
 
One of the strongest voices for this mainstreaming is that of one of the 
movement’s founders, David Wexler,13 who has recently noted that despite 
the fact that therapeutic jurisprudence did not evolve within the so-called 
problem-solving courts, it has always been closely associated and often 
identified with these specialist courts because the styles and functions of 
their judges are largely informed and endorsed by the therapeutic 
                                                 
12 
 Research suggests, for instance, that specialist drug courts are far more effective at 
preventing recidivism in individual offenders than are mainstream criminal courts. See, 
eg, Don Weatherburn, Craig Jones, Lucy Snowball and Jiuzhao Hua, ‘The NSW Drug 
Court: A Re-evaluation of its Effectiveness’ (2008) 121 Contemporary Issues in Crime and 
Justice, which found that offenders treated in the NSW Drug Court were 37 per cent less 
likely to offend than those given a custodial sentence by a mainstream court. 
13 
 Communicating with an international email discussion group established to study and 
promote therapeutic jurisprudence, Professor Wexler recently wrote to gauge and 
encourage interest in the formation of projects to mainstream:  
For a variety of reasons, there seems to be considerable interest at the 
moment in thinking about how therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) might better be 
used in mainstream courts, especially in a criminal law context. In other words, 
the experience with the use of TJ in problem-solving courts has led a number 
of us to ask how TJ might be used also in a broader context. So, we are writing 
today to see if we can encourage you to play a role -- however modest (or 
ambitious, of course!) in this overall project in any way. You may wish to just 
share ideas with us or you might like to undertake a local project alone or with 
a small team you might form.  
Email from Professor David Wexler to therapeutic jurisprudence listserv, 18 August 
2012—reprinted with the author’s permission. 
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jurisprudence literature.14 Wexler notes that economic pressures, such as 
those created by soaring prison populations and high rates of recidivism, 
have stimulated an interest from the legal mainstream in migrating some 
therapeutic jurisprudence techniques and functions into the general 
criminal courts. 
 
The interest from within the movement itself in mainstreaming is very 
significant. Many therapeutic jurisprudence advocates, most of whom are 
experienced judges and legal practitioners, are convinced that their 
successes in applying therapeutic principles in their own work and 
jurisdictions have the potential to enrich and improve the effectiveness of 
mainstream courts. Others, with an eye to the future of the movement, are 
concerned that the generation of interest, support and commitment to 
therapeutic jurisprudence within the mainstream of the profession is the 
best and only way to guarantee its future survival.15 
 
The received view is that the criminal justice system, and hence courts 
and judges within that system, currently operate pursuant to an adversarial 
paradigm. 16  This is no small claim or statement. This view about the 
paradigmatic status of adversarialism assumes that legal systems in 
general17 can be based on paradigms, which opens up a wide range of 
theoretical and practical questions, many of which are dealt with in this 
thesis. Despite the purported currency of an adversarial paradigm, many 
legal proceedings now appear unable to be explained in adversarial terms. 
                                                 
14 
 David Wexler, ‘New Wine in New Bottles: The Need to Sketch a Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence “Code” of Proposed Criminal Processes and Practices’ in Jane Donoghue 
(ed), Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem-Solving Justice (2013) (forthcoming). See 
also Michael Jones, ‘Mainstreaming Therapeutic Jurisprudence into the Traditional 
Courts: Suggestions for Judges and Practitioners’ (2012) 5(4) Phoenix Law Review. 
15 
David Rottman, ‘Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence Require Specialised Courts 
(And Do Specialised Courts Imply Specialist Judges)?’(2000) Spring Court Review 22. 
16 
 However, as will be explained in chapters 2 and 6, this does not imply that less 
adversarial or non-adversarial practices do not, or cannot, operate in the current system. 
17 
 Or what I will refer to in Chapter 3 as ‘juristic models’. 
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Mainstreaming therapeutic jurisprudence might significantly broaden this 
trend. 
 
Freiberg asked in 2003, and then again in 2007, whether the appearance 
of therapeutic jurisprudence in Australian courts was evidence of some 
sort of ‘paradigm shift’ in the criminal justice system, or whether it was just 
‘pragmatic incrementalism’.18 He asked whether we were we on the crest 
of a wave of fundamental reform in the court system or just witnessing a 
bit of tinkering at the edges. Freiberg asserts that adversarialism is the 
current paradigm at the heart of the criminal justice system but that its 
status is being increasingly eroded. 
 
He is of the view that therapeutic jurisprudence could provide a 
‘constructive alternative’ to what he identifies as the ‘flawed adversarial 
paradigm’, which he says presently dominates the criminal justice system. 
He observes that: 
Not only does the criminal justice system overall not function 
adversarially for the vast majority of cases, but changes in a 
number of areas have affected the adversarial paradigm in ways 
that require a fundamental re-examination of the operation of the 
courts, of the role of judicial officers and lawyers and, significantly, 
of the way in which lawyers of the future are educated.19  
Each of these ‘cases’, (to which Freiberg is referring) represents a 
problem for the explanatory power of the adversarial paradigm. If Freiberg 
is correct, this may suggest that the criminal justice system is entering a 
period of ontological and procedural crisis. 
 
Ought we to characterise these calls from Freiberg and the therapeutic 
jurisprudence advocates as recommendations for a more responsive and 
user-friendly version of our current adversarial courts, or are they evidence 
                                                 
18 
 Arie Freiberg, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Australia: Paradigm Shift or Pragmatic 
Incrementalism?’ (2003) 20(2) Law in Context 6, 19; Arie Freiberg, ‘Non-Adversarial 
Approaches to Criminal Justice’ (2007) 16 Journal of Judicial Administration 205, 221. 
19 
 Ibid 205. 
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of a felt need for a deeper transformation? 20  Does the accelerating 
adoption of therapeutic principles across and within jurisdictions indicate 
that the court system is just ‘mellowing’, or is it a system in crisis?21 Is the 
emergence of the drug court phenomenon (for example) evidence of an 
evolving adversarial system or of a withering or dying adversarial system? 
 
In response to these questions, this thesis asks whether a significant 
adoption of therapeutic jurisprudence principles and practices in 
mainstream courts would instigate, or even require, a shift away from the 
adversarial paradigm that currently forms the foundation of the justice 
system to a therapeutic paradigm (which would incorporate, but not 
necessarily be limited to, principles of therapeutic jurisprudence). Or, 
alternatively, whether therapeutic jurisprudence reforms are in fact 
compatible with, and hence able to be made explicable by, 
adversarialism.22 
 
This thesis argues that adversarialism cannot explain some key 
therapeutic jurisprudence principles and reforms and that, unlike a posited 
                                                 
20 
 Such as this assertion from Freiberg:  
My proposition is that the development of therapeutic jurisprudence since the 
late 1980s and non-adversarial justice over the last decade, have the potential 
to transform the justice system … My thesis is that whereas psychiatry, 
psychology and law tended to focus on bringing the perspectives of different 
disciplines to bear on a problem such as the treatment of offenders, therapeutic 
jurisprudence and non-adversarial justice have, and can lead to, institutional 
transformation: not just making the courts work better but changing the justice 
system itself. 
Arie Freiberg, ‘Psychiatry, Psychology and Non-Adversarial Justice: From Integration to 
Transformation’ (Faculty of Law, Monash University Research Paper No 2010/8, 2010) 4. 
21 
 ‘Crisis’ in the sense of a paradigm that is increasingly unable to explain phenomena, 
events or developments within a field or discipline. This is explained in much greater 
depth in Chapter 2. 
22 
The related normative question of whether a paradigm shift is not required, but may in 
fact be preferable is not a significant focus of this thesis. An answer to that question 
would involve assessing a very wide range of policy factors beyond the scope of the 
thesis. 
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therapeutic paradigm, the adversarial paradigm is unable to solve a 
number of intractable legal and social problems that represent intrinsic 
failings in our current approach to law and order.23 If adversarialism cannot 
explain these principles and reforms, it cannot exclude therapeutic 
exemplars from residing within law’s disciplinary paradigm. 
 
1.2 Why an Examination of the Relationship Between 
Adversarialism and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Is Important 
 
The most significant implication of the examination this thesis undertakes 
of the relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism 
is that they are incommensurable. This is because they are either 
themselves competing paradigms, or because therapeutic jurisprudence is 
part of a wider non-adversarial paradigm, which is itself incommensurable 
with adversarialism. The consequences of this purported 
incommensurability will also be analysed. 
 
If a shift from an adversarial to a therapeutic or non-adversarial paradigm 
is required to resolve this incommensurability, all stakeholders will need to 
be aware of which elements of the adversarial system may be retained 
and which will need to eventually be jettisoned. 24  If only incremental 
                                                 
23 
 Such as recidivism based on substance addition and abuse or gambling abuse, family 
and domestic violence, frivolous and vexatious litigation, criminal conduct and civil 
litigation linked to mental health issues, indigenous over-representation in the criminal 
justice system, inadequate access to justice for the poor or marginalised, critically low 
levels of public confidence in the judiciary, the legal profession and the courts, increasing 
levels of juvenile crime and increasing prison populations. Many, and perhaps all of these 
problems, are the targets of therapeutic- and solutions-focused innovations inspired by 
therapeutic jurisprudence. 
24 
This is not to suggest that a fundamental restructuring of the justice system would need 
to occur or that changes that are required could not be facilitated organically. Rapid 
change is almost certainly impossible. The UK Phillips Commission of 1981, investigating 
possible amendments to adversarial criminal trials, noted that converting Britain’s judicial 
system to one that was basically inquisitorial rather than adversarial would have effects 
that were so fundamental ‘upon institutions that had taken centuries to build that it would 
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changes are required (which do not include what will later in the thesis be 
referred to as ‘paradigmatic exemplars’), in order to resolve the 
incommensurability or to allow significant migration of therapeutic 
jurisprudence principles into the mainstream, then that may have serious 
consequences for the longevity of therapeutic jurisprudence as an 
influence on the court system.25 
 
A clarification of the theoretical and conceptual relationship between 
adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence would have important 
implications for our understanding of the evolving judicial role in 
mainstream courts. The most important of these implications have not yet 
been significantly explored by the academy, the judiciary or the legal 
profession.26 
 
1.3 Theoretical Background 
 
An important function of this thesis, as foreshadowed above, is to remedy 
the significant lack of rigour in addressing the nature of paradigms and 
paradigm shifts in the relevant legal literature. The critical methodological 
approach that will be used to achieve this, and to clear up any confusion 
                                                                                                                                     
be impossible on political and practical grounds’: Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure, Report, Cmnd 8092 (1981) [1.8]. 
25 
In Chapter 2 of the thesis, for example, I examine the assertion of Rottman (and others) 
that the long term fate of therapeutic jurisprudence in the courts depends on its migration 
from the specialist courts to the larger ‘trial court system’. This is due in part to the reality 
that court administrators and funding providers are loathe to fragment operations, 
jurisdiction and resources into too many specialised divisions: Rottman, above n 15. 
Several commentators express concerns that therapeutic jurisprudence may be seen as 
simply the latest juristic fad. At a broader level, a significant danger of a fading of 
therapeutic jurisprudence as a mechanism for reform and innovation could be a 
continued lack of a methodological and theoretical basis for fundamental and widespread 
law and justice reform. 
26 
 There is a well-recognised and significant lack of jurisprudential analysis, in the 
literature, of the role and meaning of therapeutic jurisprudence in the fundamental 
structure of the justice system. 
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as a result of the terms being used colloquially or casually27 rather than 
analytically, will be that pioneered and developed by philosopher of 
science Thomas Kuhn. 
 
The colloquial use of terms such as ‘paradigm’ and ‘paradigm shift’ are a 
significant confounding factor, in the absence of a clear, theoretical 
understanding of their meaning in scholarship, especially as applied to the 
social sciences and humanities. Such colloquial use tends to polarise 
opinion and create misconceptions as to what is expected of a paradigm 
and as to how much of a threat a purported new paradigm presents to the 
existing order within a professional discipline and/or a field of research. 
Despite colloquial use, analytical assumptions are, nevertheless, being 
made in the literature on the grounds of perceived or purported paradigm 
shifts. Although Freiberg, for example, uses the concept of a paradigm in a 
quite simple and general way in his works cited above, he concludes that 
a shifting paradigm requires ‘a fundamental re-examination of the 
operation of the courts’.28 
 
This thesis will attempt to redress the current lack of rigour in the 
theoretical discourse by subjecting the contemporary debates about the 
nature and functions of the criminal justice system, within the therapeutic 
jurisprudence literature (and the literature of its critics), to a Kuhnian 
analysis. Specifically, it will use Kuhn’s articulation of the theory and 
dynamics of the paradigm shift 29  to seek a clear statement of the 
relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence. 
                                                 
27 
 This is not a phenomenon confined only to therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship. A 
search of the AGIS Legal Publications Database returned 106 hits for articles containing 
a reference to ‘paradigm’ but 0 hits for those containing the words ‘Thomas Kuhn’. 
28 
 Many examples of the colloquial use of the terms in the relevant literature will be cited 
and discussed in Chapter 2. 
29 
 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3
rd
 ed, 1996), referred to as 
SSR, and as revised and expanded upon by both Kuhn in his later work and by social 
science researchers and legal theory scholars who attempt to adapt the concept(s) to 
other disciplines. 
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Apart from the relatively brief examination undertaken by Stobbs, as cited 
above, such an analysis has not previously been attempted, despite the 
frequency with which the paradigm concept is referred to in the therapeutic 
jurisprudence, and non-adversarial, literature.30 This is not necessary a 
fault on the part of researchers, but it has certainly, up until now, been a 
missed opportunity. The results of this analysis will provide practitioners 
and academics with a clearer picture of the nature of the relationship 
between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence, which is currently 
murky. If therapeutic jurisprudence practices are fully consistent with the 
current adversarial paradigm, then migration of these practices from 
specialist courts to mainstream courts should be relatively uncontroversial 
and not in need of further jurisprudential justification. 
 
If, however, there are paradigmatic inconsistencies between therapeutic 
jurisprudence practices and the adversarial paradigm, then there is a need 
to investigate whether this poses significant limits on how much migration 
can occur or whether the increasing level of migration is an indication of a 
paradigm shift at all. A Kuhnian assessment of the relationship between 
the two will also indicate the level of any incommensurability between 
them, which would have significant implications for how both therapeutic 
jurisprudence advocates and those who oppose it on adversarial grounds 
can meaningfully communicate. This is discussed in depth in Chapter 6. 
 
The implications of this research for legal professionals are that if there is 
indeed a shift away from an adversarial paradigm, then they can expect to 
experience an accelerating demand for skills and knowledge that are not 
usually in demand in adversarial proceedings. As Clarke and Neuhard 
observe: ‘For traditional lawyers, work in problem solving courts can 
require a difficult shift in attitude and advocacy strategy around what it 
                                                 
30 
 This could well be because relatively few academics and legal commentators have 
more than a rudimentary familiarity with the body of work that espouses and analyses the 
Kuhnian paradigm shift, and are therefore unaware of both the valuable theoretical 
insights and practical tools it offers. 
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means to provide ‘counsel’.31  Legal educators will also need to make 
significant changes to their curriculum.32 Additionally, law makers will need 
to consider significant changes to legislation that regulates everything from 
the rules of evidence and court procedure to the roles of, and ethical 
requirements that apply to, judges and lawyers.33 
 
This thesis will ultimately assert and defend the conclusion, in Chapter 6, 
that the criminal courts (and perhaps the criminal justice system as a 
whole) are in fact in a state of disciplinary crisis, in the sense meant by 
Kuhn, and that the resolution of this crisis is necessary in order to validate 
any fundamentally therapeutic role for judges in mainstream criminal 
courts. Without going through such a disciplinary crisis, no paradigm shift 
is possible and hence any significant therapeutic (or indeed non-
adversarial) roles for judges (such as those proposed by Wexler, Winick, 
Freiberg, King, Daicoff and others) would continue to be uncertain and 
subject to continued staunch criticism from those who are opposed to it. 
The Kuhnian method provides the best, and possibly only, credible 
                                                 
31 
 Cait Clarke and James Neuhat, ‘From Day One: Who’s in Control When Problem 
Solving and Client Centred Sentencing Take Centre Stage?’ 29(11) NYU Review of Law 
and Social Change 11. 
32 
 There is an increasing body of literature that discusses how legal education may need 
to evolve to cater for a changed legal paradigm. See, eg, David Wexler, ‘Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and Legal Education: Where Do We Go From Here?’ (2002) 71 Revista 
Juridica Universidad de Puerto Rico 177. 
33 
 Much work is already being done in relation to exploring the changed nature of the 
judicial role pursuant to a therapeutic or non-adversarial paradigm. King observes that 
courts will be characterised by:  
increased interaction between the judicial officer, participants, court team 
members and community members. Judging in these contexts is often 
informed by therapeutic jurisprudence principles … [and] that, properly done, 
judging in these courts and applying therapeutic jurisprudence in judging in 
mainstream lists does not violate the judicial function or judicial values of 
independence, impartiality and integrity … [and that] an ethic of care should not 
only underlie these newer forms of judging but also all other forms of judging.  
Michael King, ‘Judging, Judicial Values and Judicial Conduct in Problem-Solving Courts, 
Indigenous Sentencing Courts and Mainstream Courts’ (2010) 19 Journal of Judicial 
Administration 133. 
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method for detecting and analysing incommensurability and paradigm 
shifts. 
 
Wexler, in his foreword to King, Freiberg et al, both foreshadows the 
existence of a disciplinary incommensurability in law and highlights the 
danger of such a schism: 
One can question the value of an argument culture without calling 
into question the indisputable value of argumentation as a crucial 
component of disciplined thinking. Similarly, one can question the 
value of a legal culture of adversarialism without calling into 
question the value—indeed, sometimes even the therapeutic 
value of adversarial litigation as a crucial tool of the lawyer. The 
problem, instead, is with a legal culture that privileges 
argumentation which is dismissive of other approaches, that is at 
the heart of [non-adversarial justice in Australia].34 
 
1.4 The Value of a Kuhnian Analysis 
 
Kuhn’s theory of the paradigm shift is fundamentally concerned with the 
nature and dynamics of disciplinary change. He seeks to understand and 
explain why disciplines, or fields of study, change their core beliefs and 
practices over time, thus the title of his major work: The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (SSR). This thesis is concerned with extant, 
purported and possible changes in the legal system and specifically with 
changes in the roles of the judiciary and the courts at the most 
fundamental levels. To that end, and given the very frequent referencing of 
Kuhn in literature that focuses on change in the social sciences and 
humanities disciplines, his method is a good fit for this project. 
 
There is an extensive, and still growing body of literature, that seeks to 
unpack the real meaning of Kuhn, to trash or laud his theory of the 
paradigm, and to extend the theory. This thesis is not greatly concerned 
with that agenda. Although the thesis does devote some necessary time to 
explicating and justifying the credibility and utility of the Kuhnian paradigm 
                                                 
34 
 Michael King, Arie Freiberg, Becky Batagol and Ross Hyams Non-Adversarial Justice 
(2009). 
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shift, in order to set the conceptual scene for testing its applicability to 
legal systems, it makes no attempt to either significantly critique or defend 
it. Even if Kuhn’s explanations for how disciplines change and evolve are 
eventually rejected or displaced, testing the hypothesis that adversarialism 
and therapeutic jurisprudence are competing and incommensurable 
paradigms, in the Kuhnian sense, will help bring into focus the theoretical 
and conceptual differences between the two.35 
 
Kuhn’s work is among that most cited by scholars in the social sciences 
and the humanities.36 The applicability of his theory of paradigm shift and 
its influence on the social sciences and other fields outside of the natural 
sciences is virtually indisputable (although there remains the important 
task of establishing such applicability in the context of jurisprudence and to 
systems of law) is dealt with in Chapter 3 of the thesis.37 I do not begin 
with the assumption, as most of the literature does, that the concept of a 
paradigm has applicability outside of the natural sciences38 or to law in 
particular, but I make arguments for and defend that claim. 
 
Kuhn’s historic assertion is that acceptance of the central and defining 
theories and practices within a discipline are not simply a matter of 
evidence-based analysis, but largely dependent upon social, cultural and 
political forces within the discipline itself. This means that what is most 
                                                 
35 
 This means that I make no normative assumptions as to the contemporary or future 
role of either therapeutic jurisprudence or of adversarialism. Advocacy for any particular 
system is not a function of this work., despite the fact that I will make reference to what I 
believe are some powerfully utilitarian elements of both. 
36 
 Kathleen Loving and William Cobern, ‘Invoking Thomas Kuhn: What Citation Analysis 
Reveals about Science Education’ (2006) 9 Science Education 187–206. 
37 
 Kuhn’s work has also given rise to an entire new discipline: the Sociology of Science. 
See Barry Barnes, TS Kuhn and Social Science (1982). 
38 
 By natural sciences I mean those that are methodologically committed to the scientific 
method and rely for their data, almost exclusively, on observations and measurements of 
phenomena in the physical world. As will be discussed in some detail in chapters 2 and 3, 
Kuhn was initially of the view that the theory of paradigm shift had little to offer disciplines 
outside of the natural or ‘hard’ sciences. 
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critical to how a discipline defines its work is the vocational education, 
socialisation and consensus of members within that discipline and not a 
set of currently ‘proven’ yet potentially falsifiable hypotheses. What the 
members of a discipline believe, according to Kuhn, is largely determined 
by internal consensus and a shared worldview.39 Fundamental changes 
within a discipline rarely occur as sudden revolutions in response to some 
crucial new discoveries, but as long-term reactions to the accumulation of 
what increasing numbers of practitioner see as anomalies (or problems) 
based on their shared worldviews. 
 
Kuhn’s views caused wide-ranging and heated debate within the natural 
sciences. These disciplines have tended to see themselves as definitively 
Cartesian and positivist by nature. The very idea that science may develop 
as a result of anything other than totally objective and rational 
assessments of observations and fact has given rise to significant 
neuroses40 within the science academy, even to the extent of spawning 
the so-called ‘Science Wars’ in the US in the 1990s. 
 
The social sciences and the humanities (among which I will situate both 
the study and practice of law) are, perhaps unsurprisingly, less sensitive 
about being labelled subjective, or about assertions that rationality is not a 
simple construct. For that reason, Kuhn initially reacted with surprise that 
the greatest influence of his work was within the social sciences. He had 
                                                 
39 
 This is in strong opposition to what other philosophers of science, and many lay 
people, believe—that is, that practitioners within a certain discipline base their shared 
beliefs solely on empirical testing and analysis of data. This difference has largely been 
resolved in Kuhn’s favour—as will be discussed in the latter sections of Chapter 2. 
40 
 A full and detailed analysis of the nature and extent of this neurosis can be found in 
Nicholas Maxwell, Is Science Neurotic? (2004). Maxwell’s view is that: 
specialisation, and the resulting fragmentation of academia, has resulted in a 
situation in which hardly anyone takes responsibility for the overall ideals, the 
overall aims and methods, of academic inquiry. Academics, these days, are 
specialists, furiously trying to keep abreast of developments in their own 
specialist fields. 
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always assumed that the disciplines outside of the natural sciences 
revelled in fundamental disagreement about their core beliefs.41 
 
Although there is no doubt that disagreement about fundamental values, 
methods and objectives have been, and continue to be, central to 
jurisprudence (and to a lesser extent the practice of law), the social 
scientists (jurists among them) are enamoured with the paradigm concept. 
It is an unsurpassed tool for shining a critical light on the relationships 
between competing theories and approaches within a discipline, as this 
thesis hopes to demonstrate. 
 
1.5 Vagueness in the Current Theoretical Context 
 
There are conflicting agendas and trajectories within the literature as to 
the need for, and value of, engaging in a theoretical examination of 
therapeutic jurisprudence. Some commentators believe that a deeper 
theoretical analysis is essential as a means of paving the way for a take-
up of therapeutic principles in the mainstream courts,42 while others fear 
that advocating too strong a theoretical basis could marginalise the 
movement as attempting to be too broadly reformist and scare away 
                                                 
41 
 Kuhn’s academic and intellectual roots were in physics and his fascination with the 
apparently strict social order within the natural sciences, to a large extent, sparked his 
interest in the concept of the paradigm shift. When, in mid career, he spent a year as a 
research fellow at the Centre for Advanced Study in the Behavioural Sciences at Stanford 
University, he found it startling to discover that the leading social scientists in many fields 
seemed to disagree with each other about such core issues as the legitimate objects of 
study, the most credible methodologies and the criteria for evaluating research output. 
His assumption that this meant there were no conceptual paradigms, susceptible to 
revolution, at the heart of a social science discipline was a view he later ameliorated and 
that I reject in Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
42 
 See, eg, Richard Wiener, Bruce J Winick et al, ‘A Testable Theory of Problem Solving 
Courts: Avoiding Past Empirical and Legal Failures’ (2010) 33 International Journal of 
Law and Psychiatry 417; Scott Senjo and Leslie Leip, ‘Testing and Developing Theory in 
Drug Court: A Four Part Logit Model to Predict Program Completion’ (March 2001) 
Criminal Justice Policy Review 66. 
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potential ‘converts’ or lead to unacceptable misconceptions as to its 
principles and methods. 43  Still other commentators, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, seem to advocate both of these positions over time. This has 
added to the murkiness that I claimed above characterises the perceived 
relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism. 
 
Downplaying the jurisprudential status of a particular approach to law and 
legal practice often goes hand-in-hand with an effort to characterise that 
approach as a lens. Under that sort of analysis, therapeutic jurisprudence 
would not be conceived of as a work of jurisprudence in itself, but simply 
as a tool for improving techniques and practices within the existing 
adversarial system. There have been significant efforts to characterise 
therapeutic jurisprudence as a lens. The resulting reluctance to explore its 
potential jurisprudential parameters has not been without its detractors.44 
 
Neither Freiberg nor the other scholars referred to above who perceive, or 
call for, a paradigm shift in the criminal justice system have engaged in 
any thorough or rigorous theoretical consideration of what is meant by, or 
involved in, a paradigm shift, beyond use of the term as a convenient 
academic shorthand for describing and hypothesising some important and 
fundamental, but as yet uncertain, changes within a discipline. 
 
There are threads of concern apparent in the literature of therapeutic 
jurisprudence being misinterpreted, misapplied and too broadly 
conceptualised, to the extent that it might be dismissed as some sort of 
                                                 
43 
 Most notably Ian Freckelton, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and 
Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence’ (2006) 30(2) Thomas Jefferson Law 
Review 575. 
44 
 Satin opines that ‘[m]aybe until now it was enough for you to claim that TJ is “only” a 
sort of lens, “only” an additional way of looking at the law that’s in the end deferential to 
the adversary/mechanistic justice system, and leave it at that (with allies like Prof. 
Freckelton meanwhile signifying loyalty to the system by condemning “New Age” idealists 
in the TJ community)’: Mark Satin, ‘Healing First: Time for the US Justice System to Get 
Less Mechanistic and More Compassionate’ (2008) 119 Radical Middle Newsletter. 
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vague panacea or as an overambitious fringe of legal theory, which seems 
to have been the perceived fate of any number of brands of jurisprudence 
over recent decades. These are the theories, perspectives or movements 
that Freiberg has most recently described as the ‘law ands’—such as law 
and society, law and psychology, law and literature, law and economics, 
law and feminism and law and critical legal studies.45 
 
These ‘law and’ approaches to law generally have their genesis in the 
American Realist tradition46 of the 1930s, which took a general view that 
law did not exist as a body of rules in a social, political or economic 
vacuum but had an important role to play in shaping and working with 
those other (extra-legal) contexts.47 There is a thread of consequentialism 
flowing through these movements that takes the view that the social and 
wider effects of laws are important to determining their validity, rather than 
the traditional formalist view that what characterises good and valid laws 
are internal logic and consistency and the legitimacy of the source (such 
as legislatures and courts). Theories, movements and perspectives on law 
that are seen as seeking reforms that are too radical, political or ambitious 
attract the sort of attention that some within the therapeutic jurisprudence 
movement want to avoid. It is a movement that has strong ties with 
practicing judges and lawyers who are very conscious of maintaining the 
credibility of the movement as practice oriented and as not being 
perceived as in too much overt conflict with legal and political orthodoxy. 
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Law is an inherently conservative discipline. This phenomenon is dealt 
with in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
Considering the extensive body of knowledge and research concerning 
the nature of paradigms and paradigm shifts that exists in the theoretical 
writings across a wide range of other disciplines, there is a disappointing 
reluctance to engage with the concepts generally in law and jurisprudence. 
This reluctance is probably due in large part to the distrust that has 
historically characterised the relationship between the professional and 
academic arms of the legal and justice system. Legal academics and 
theorists are often seen as out-of-touch and overly concerned with factors 
that are seen as too removed from the day-to-day practice of law to be of 
much practical use. There is sometimes an undercurrent of fear, on the 
part of academic lawyers, that their work and suggestions might be 
dismissed or marginalised where it is seen as attempting to be too 
prescriptive or ambitious in scale. This is particularly so when the 
academic is also closely connected to the professions, or may be working 
within both the profession and the academy. Freckelton articulates this 
fear in this way: 
[I]n the maturation phase of therapeutic jurisprudence, those who 
identify its advantages have an intellectual responsibility to be 
clear about the parameters and limits of therapeutic 
jurisprudence. This will reduce its invocation in ways that will bring 
it into disrepute and result in outcomes inconsistent with its 
values.48 
 
This reluctance to engage with both the theoretical structure of therapeutic 
jurisprudence and the paradigm concept has risks and negative 
consequences that this thesis seeks to redress. The main risk of any 
failure to engage with a proper analysis of the status of a discipline 
(including law), in terms of paradigms, is that there may be no real attempt 
to define the legitimate problems and methods of a field for current and 
succeeding generations of researchers and practitioners. In the absence 
of that process, what is left to inform the mind-set of researchers and to 
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characterise the theoretical framework of a discipline are the largely ad 
hoc and somewhat taken for granted assertions of those commentators 
who merely dabble in theoretical analysis. It is possible to characterise 
Freiberg’s use of the paradigm terminology and the wider use of the 
somewhat sterile and two-dimensional model of an adversarial/non-
adversarial continuum in this way.49 However, we can also characterise it 
as a conceptual segue into the research agenda of this thesis. 
 
An associated risk is that avoiding the examination of disciplinary 
paradigms can lead to the assumption that finding solutions to any 
problem within a discipline is basically guaranteed within the parameters 
of the existing paradigm by simply moving the pieces around according to 
the rules of that existing paradigm. So that if, for example, we were to 
decide that the problem of recidivism among drug-addicted offenders was 
an intractable problem for the adversarial justice system (as many 
therapeutic jurisprudence scholars do), we would be obligated to look for 
solutions that make use of a court with amended rules of adversarial 
procedure, and be precluded from designing a court where adversarial 
rules and principles were actually subordinate to non-adversarial rules and 
principles. Today’s drug courts are still (legislatively) courts at their core, 
not collaborative institutions for addressing the law and order, and social 
problems caused by drug addiction. 
 
Avoiding an analysis of the existing and emerging paradigms within a 
discipline, therefore, may tend to distance and downplay suggestions of a 
discipline in crisis, in which intractable problems remain intractable, and in 
which progress is unnecessarily incremental. Only where problems are 
allowed to be canvassed as serious anomalies rather than as speed 
bumps (or as ‘problems’ rather than ‘puzzles’, as Kuhn expresses it), can 
there be a legitimate normative discourse about the future direction of a 
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discipline or field.50 Even if the analysis of paradigms reveals that there 
are not a significant number of anomalies and, therefore, no real 
disciplinary crisis, that in itself is an intrinsically valuable exercise.51 
 
If such an analysis does, however, demonstrate the existence of a 
disciplinary crisis, then it can result in the beginnings of a conversation 
about a valid alternative paradigm that might unite the revolutionary 
threads that have arisen in response to that crisis. I will assert, in fact, that 
such a conversation has already started but that it is tentative, vague and 
unfocused.52 Thus, by going beyond the use of ‘paradigm’ as a convenient 
academic shorthand, I hope to remedy some of that vagueness. 
 
Taking a Kuhnian approach to analysing the relationship between 
therapeutic jurisprudence and the current adversarial paradigm is also a 
credible way of highlighting the theoretical limits of the movement. This is 
because the analysis progresses according to a clear conceptual 
framework and is a method that has been used successfully to explore 
change in the hard sciences, in the social sciences and in other fields 
within the humanities. It is a method that goes beyond a simple review of 
literature and a search for consensus among commentators. 
 
There are at least three other reasons why an analysis of the theoretical 
limits of therapeutic jurisprudence, especially as it relates to the 
adversarial paradigm, is necessary. First, if we are satisfied to portray 
therapeutic jurisprudence as a lens, which does no more than suggest 
secondary and ancillary adjustments to court procedure, then the 
motivation for attempting to give it a full and coherent theoretical basis and 
explanation may never develop. There is no doubt that therapeutic 
jurisprudence does not have a properly explored theoretical basis, 
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regardless of whether we concede that it is itself ‘a theory’.53 The typical 
definitions of therapeutic jurisprudence are usually quite pragmatic and 
centre on the avoidance of anti-therapeutic consequences and the 
promotion of therapeutic consequences for those involved in a legal 
dispute. The current definitions avoid theoretical content and construct, 
simply because the work needed to fund that content has not been 
undertaken. Ironically there is no comprehensive and coherent theoretical 
basis that we can point to that informs the adversarial paradigm either. In 
Chapter 4, I will argue that adversarialism is the result of a chaotic series 
of ad hoc responses to social and political tensions, which evolved as a 
set of compromises rather than as an identifiable body of theory and 
practice. If that can be established, then the claim of adversarialism to 
paradigm status can be seen as organic and opportunistic, rather than the 
result of any process akin to the rigour of the scientific method—and, 
therefore, is all the more vulnerable to Kuhnian disciplinary crises. 
 
Second, if therapeutic jurisprudence cannot be established as part of an 
alternative therapeutic (or non-adversarial, or post-adversarial or problem-
solving) paradigm, then it is less likely to achieve a substantial and 
sustainable penetration of the courts and legal practice; it will only ever 
inform the work of its strongest advocates, and not the mainstream. As will 
be explained in Chapter 2, a paradigm provides the exemplars against 
which the validity of practices within a discipline are assessed. This fear 
resonates throughout  the literature.  Freiberg has pointed out that unless 
there is a significant culture change in the judiciary, a posting in the 
therapeutic jurisdiction will probably always be seen as a form of 
punishment or as a place to put those who are seen as a bit ‘soft’.54 
 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, if therapeutic jurisprudence does not 
belong to a different paradigm, it will only ever be (as Kuhn tells us) a 
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puzzle solver, rather than a problem solver. When a discipline is working 
within an accepted paradigm, practitioners only ever have to solve puzzles 
(according to Kuhn)—meaning that their work involves using the tools of 
that paradigm to find solutions. When a puzzle seems intractable then it 
becomes a problem, not just for the practitioners, but for the paradigm 
itself. The relative strengths of adversarialism and therapeutic 
jurisprudence as Kuhnian problem solvers will be assessed in chapters 5 
and 6. 
 
We might say that the intractable problem that offender recidivism poses 
for adversarial criminal courts is a good example of a puzzle becoming a 
problem. It has taken centuries for non-adversarial approaches to repeat 
offending to get some traction and now that they have, they are often seen 
as being outside the paradigm. We even give them outsider names, such 
as ‘problem-solving courts’ or ‘diversion programs’—we cannot simply call 
them ‘courts’ and allow them to solve problems. 
 
There is no doubt that adversarialism constitutes a Kuhnian paradigm (as 
will be established in Chapter 4) or that there is strong resistance to the 
emergence of any competing paradigms at the highest and deepest levels 
of the legal profession. 
 
1.6 The Theoretical Aims of the Thesis 
 
The position I will construct and defend in this thesis is that therapeutic 
jurisprudence is, in fact, part of a post-adversarial paradigm (which I will 
argue in Chapter 6 can be characterised as a therapeutic paradigm),55 and 
it is, therefore, incompatible (or as Kuhn would assert, ‘incommensurable’) 
with adversarialism. I will further argue that despite this 
incommensurability, therapeutic jurisprudence can continue to migrate to 
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the legal mainstream, but that this migration will always be significantly 
limited by adversarial principles until the paradigmatic core of exemplars, 
which defines legal and judicial practice, is modified to contain some 
therapeutic principles. If these therapeutic exemplars are considered to be 
non-adversarial, then we will be able to validly claim that a paradigm shift 
in the law has occurred. 
 
The most important implication of paradigmatic incommensurability would 
be that we can only allow judges in Australian courts to adopt a role that is 
paradigmatically therapeutic (rather than paradigmatically adjudicative) 
and that is, therefore, theoretically defensible, if there is a paradigm shift in 
the law in the Kuhnian sense (rather than in some generic or colloquial 
sense). The corollary being that if therapeutic jurisprudence is not part of 
some other (non-adversarial) paradigm, then it must comply with the 
requirements of the adversarial paradigm, which prescribes that the role of 
a judge must always be primarily adjudicative. The paramountcy of the 
adjudicative function in the adversarial paradigm will be explored and 
explained in Chapter 4. 
 
The contrary view, that the adversarial (adjudicative) function of courts and 
judges must always be what fundamentally defines them, even if they 
engage in some functions that appear to be less adversarial, I will identify 
as the central theoretical plank of the current adversarial paradigm. I will 
discuss the claim, in Chapter 4, that it is from this adversarial function that 
they derive their validity.56 The view that in order to be a valid statutory and 
constitutional institution, a court can only adopt a therapeutic function that 
is consistent with, and subordinate to, adjudication (adversarialism) is 
deeply ingrained in our current jurisprudential worldview and is one that 
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resonates through extrajudicial writing in particular. A number of these 
strong adversarial objections to the evolution of a therapeutic paradigm 
will be examined in the thesis, particularly in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, 
articulates just this antithetical position in asking: 
Have we come so far that we can now say that, in Australia, trials 
are ‘a mechanism of valued but last resort’? Such a statement 
seems to suggest that court adjudication is simply a back-stop to 
be invoked when all other expedients fail. That suggestion is 
scarcely consistent with the separation of powers and the vesting 
by the Australian Constitution of federal judicial power in Ch III 
courts. One can understand the view that other modes of dispute 
resolution are incidental to the exercise of judicial power … But to 
treat court adjudication as if it is something less than the main 
game … is to turn constitutional tradition on its head. 
 
Courts are courts; they are not general service providers who 
cater for ‘clients’ or ‘customers’ rather than litigants. And if courts 
describe themselves otherwise than as courts, they run the risk 
that their ‘clients’ and their ‘customers’ will regard them, correctly 
in my view, as something inferior to a court.57 
 
This polarising theoretical dimension to a Kuhnian analysis of disciplinary 
change is certainly reflected in some of the harsher criticisms of 
therapeutic jurisprudence. This thesis seeks not to gloss over or downplay 
this polarisation, but to clearly delineate it and to explain why it is 
important for the future survival and evolution of therapeutic jurisprudence 
beyond the specialist jurisdictions. 
 
1.7 Direct Comparison or Meta-Analysis? 
 
Freiberg, Wexler and other leading commentators in the field often prefer 
to emphasise the practical, rather than theoretical, importance of 
therapeutic jurisprudence, in an attempt to further encourage the creation 
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of tools and methods for assessing and remedying the purported anti-
therapeutic effects58 of legal rules, roles, institutions and processes on all 
those involved. Consequently, it is much more common to see principles 
or practices described as non-adversarial rather than therapeutic, and for 
therapeutic jurisprudence practices to be conceptualised as existing on a 
continuum demarcated by adversarial and non-adversarial poles. 
 
Adversarial              Non-adversarial 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Adversarialism and non-adversarialism on a continuum 
 
This continuum is a useful model to contrast with one that places 
therapeutic jurisprudence within a separate paradigm. Allowing the 
existence of a continuum where neither of the labels ‘adversarial’ nor ‘non-
adversarial’ are fundamentally definitive of some legal practice seems to 
deny paradigm status to both. 
 
To claim that a legal practice or institution (such as a court) can be both a 
bit adversarial and a bit non-adversarial, while probably quite true on a 
superficial or colloquial (perhaps phenotypical) level, can add to the 
confusion about what a paradigm actually is. That confusion arises from 
conflating two senses of ‘paradigm’. One sense is the casual use made of 
the term by most academics in the humanities and social sciences; the 
other is the more rigorous and theoretically useful sense as proposed by 
Kuhn. 
 
The contrast between these two conceptions of what a paradigm is—and 
of the respective models they generate—has not been dealt with or 
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advocates of therapeutic jurisprudence, but this debate will be examined in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
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reconciled in the relevant literature, and that will be an additional benefit of 
the work in this thesis. Namely, whether it is more valid to conceive of 
adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence as belonging to two 
incommensurable paradigms or as poles of a conceptual, legal and 
practical continuum. There have been some recent attempts to contrast 
the continuum model with one that assesses and describes adversarial 
processes with non-adversarial alternatives from an external, rather than 
lineal, perspective. These attempts are particularly useful for the purposes 
of this thesis when it comes to an analysis of the deeper practical 
implications of incommensurability, which I undertake in chapters 2 and 6, 
but they fall short of the depth of rigour that is involved in a Kuhnian 
analysis. 
 
Chapter 5 of the thesis examines whether therapeutic jurisprudence is 
able to provide possible paradigmatic exemplars for the law (or for a 
‘juristic paradigm’), and for criminal court procedures in particular. The 
method of therapeutic jurisprudence is fundamentally interdisciplinary, in 
that it applies social sciences research, knowledge and practices to 
create: 
an evidence-base that, conveyed through the theoretical 
framework of therapeutic jurisprudence, may have a gradually 
increasing influence on legal procedures, roles, and rules with 
particular reference to criminal justice. Studies are beginning to 
appear in which hypotheses generated from the convergence of 
these fields are being tested in court settings.59 
Although there is not yet a single unifying philosophy, method or 
theoretical framework underpinning and connecting the various non-
adversarial vectors and approaches to which therapeutic jurisprudence is 
related, progressing that agenda beyond establishing the relationship is 
not necessary for the purposes of this thesis. 
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So long as we can grant that there could be what I have referred to as a 
‘therapeutic paradigm’ that would subsume the principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence, that is all that is required to demonstrate that the 
adversarial paradigm may be incommensurable with those principles, in 
the sense meant by Kuhn. Some commentators, such as Dewhurst,60 
believe that the lack of a unifying theoretical framework underpinning the 
various non-adversarial approaches to law is a weaknesses, but as Kuhn 
has suggested, the contents or ‘disciplinary matrix’ of a new paradigm is 
not a totally new entity, but rather an extension of an existing one (see 
Figure 1.2). 
 
Dewhurst rightly observes that most recent scholarly works on non-
adversarial justice ‘do not resolve the concern about how the developing 
vectors interface with the adversarial system’.61 However, crucially, some 
influential recent scholarship seems to make the significant assumption 
that the full range of non-adversarial practices and principles can be 
placed on a conceptual continuum where these ‘processes’ are adversarial 
to either a greater or lesser extent. King et al assert, for example: 
we prefer to conceive of adversarialism and non-adversarialism 
as a continuum, a sliding scale upon which various legal 
processes sit, with most processes combining aspects of 
adversarial and non-adversarial practice to varying degrees.62 
The practical and pragmatic motivation for this sort of approach is 
understandable, but the problem with this analysis is that it seems to deny 
that there can be principles or practices within the legal system that are 
purely adversarial or indisputably non-adversarial. It avoids the need for a 
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precise definition of adversarialism and, more importantly for the purposes 
of this thesis, precludes that our current legal system operates pursuant to 
an adversarial paradigm. If the two ontological states of adversarial and 
non-adversarial represent either ends of a continuum, then they cannot 
represent paradigms in the Kuhnian sense, since they would then be 
incommensurable. I do not assert that this is a fully developed or inflexible 
position on the part of King and his fellow authors, but it does provide an 
excellent foil against which to make Kuhnian comparisons, even if we 
simply take it as one possible characterisation of the relationship. 
 
Dewhurst recognises the conceptual naivety in this notion of a continuum 
when he observes that: 
With this lack of specificity in mind the next step of identifying the 
new vectors [as identified by Daicoff] as ‘non-adversarial’ 
becomes doubly problematic. That is: (a) since we cannot 
precisely say what the adversarial system is; (b) it makes it almost 
impossible to firmly claim that the new vectors are not it; and (c) 
this is compounded by the fact that the non-adversarial system 
can embrace elements from the adversarial end of the buffet and 
the adversarial system can embrace elements from the non-
adversarial end of the buffet.63 
 
Daicoff claims that a number of new, alternative or evolving approaches to 
law and legal practice 64  (including to the role of the judicial officer) 
represent a new law/justice paradigm that is an inevitable response to 
what she calls the tripartite crisis in the legal profession—namely, poor 
public confidence in the law, stress and depression among lawyers and 
decreasing professional standards.65 The movement is comprehensive in 
that it is interdisciplinary, integrated, humanistic, restorative and 
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therapeutic. Each ‘vector’ recognises that it is a function of law to act as an 
agent for positive interpersonal or individual change in some way (such as 
healing, wholeness and restoration). 
 
This concern with extra-legal factors is something that most (if not all) 
adversarial processes seem to ignore, preclude or play down. Even where 
a court makes a decision based in part on factors other than a simple 
application of legal rules, the appeal to those factors is itself mandated or 
permitted pursuant to a formal legal rule, as is the enforcement of any 
adjudicatory consequences. In sentencing, for example, the social, 
demographic or physical environment of the offender may be relevant to 
the sentence, but only to the extent to which those factors are provided for 
in either legislation or common law. 
 
If, as Daicoff and virtually all other commentators assert, the institutions 
and officers of the law ought to have access to vectors that address this 
wider conception of the extra-legal, then we are not looking at processes 
that are simply less adversarial, but fundamentally non-adversarial. A 
deeper analysis of the differences between a less adversarial and a non-
adversarial paradigm will be undertaken in Chapter 3 in the discussion of 
juristic paradigms. To some extent, Dewhurst attempts such an analysis.66 
He articulates his main concern in this way: 
Is there a common underlying philosophical foundation that can 
unite the vectors within the Comprehensive Law Movement while 
ensuring that they remain separate and vibrant movements in 
their own right?67 
On one level his agenda converges with my own when he observes that: 
the one concern with Daicoff’s [argument] is that it is a 
contradiction to claim that the new vectors operate simply as tools 
within legal practice but from a different paradigm. If they are truly 
operating from a different paradigm then the vectors are no longer 
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simply tools of legal practice. Instead, if the new processes of the 
Comprehensive Law/Justice Movement are offering new 
paradigms then they must at least be critically engaged at the 
legal theory level if not at the legal order level.68 
 
This is then, a strong focus of the thesis and one that I undertake in much 
more detail than Dewhurst. If a vector (such as therapeutic jurisprudence 
as characterised by Daicoff) is truly a lens that allows the observation and 
evaluation of a legal rule, practice or principle from a different perspective, 
then the value of that lens may well be reduced if it operates from within 
the adversarial system (or on the sort of continuum suggested by King, 
Freiberg et al). If we conceive of the use of a particular vector as an 
alternative to the adversarial system, then we are admitting that the 
adversarial system itself is inadequate. Dewhurst articulates it in this way: 
[I]f we are dealing with choices between employing a particular 
vector as an alternative to the adversarial system, then a higher 
order norm is required. If our inquiry goes even higher, to 
question the validity of the legal theory itself, then a super-system 
of norms is mandatory.69 
 
Dewhurst then proceeds to posit an Aristotelian natural law virtue theory of 
justice as a philosophical foundation for the comprehensive law/justice 
movement. He prefers to refer to the need for a ‘Comprehensive Justice’ 
movement, since his agenda is to focus on law and legal processes and 
institutions as part of a wider system that seeks to ‘enable and sustain the 
material and social conditions that would enable each and every individual 
to achieve the highest level of human functioning that is consistent with a 
similar level of functioning for all’.70 
 
Although I will argue in chapters 2 and 3 that there are important and 
necessary links between social and political worldviews (Weltanschaung) 
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and legal systems, this thesis is concerned with the links between 
adversarialism and therapeutic principles within the context of what I refer 
to as ‘juristic paradigms’, rather than positing the nature of some higher-
order social paradigm based on some perceived basis for general human 
flourishing (such as Aristotelian virtue). To that extent, this current work is 
focused at least one level of abstraction lower than the Dewhurst agenda. 
A wider-ranging analysis is not necessary in order to test the Kuhnian 
commensurability of therapeutic jurisprudence with adversarialism. 
 
The Kuhnian paradigm shift is a valuable template for examining both 
disciplinary change and for deconstructing the relationship between 
alternate juristic views at this level of abstraction. It does not conceive of 
such alternate views as residing within a continuum. 
 
Adversarial paradigm            Therapeutic paradigm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Existing disciplinary matrix    New disciplinary matrix 
 
Figure 1.2: Paradigmatic exemplars in a paradigm shift (existing 
paradigm becomes part of expanded disciplinary matrix) 
 
Figure 1.2 depicts a simplified overview of the paradigm shift according to 
Kuhn. In this model, a pre-paradigmatic disciplinary matrix evolves to 
include all the accepted rules, practices and protocols within a given field 
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or profession. As the discipline evolves and is subjected to formal study 
(and perhaps professional regulation), it caters for the education and 
socialisation of new practitioners. The core benchmarks or principles 
against which any new hypothesis or phenomenon is tested to determine 
whether it is a legitimate subject of study for the discipline become the 
paradigmatic exemplars. During a period of ‘normal science, practitioners 
and researchers apply the exemplars at the core of the paradigm to new 
fact situations in order to explain them. This is what Kuhn refers to as 
‘puzzle solving’. If a new fact situation or observation cannot be explained 
or solved by these exemplars, then the discipline must either claim that it 
is not a valid area of study for them or that it represents a disciplinary 
anomaly. Kuhn says that such anomalies are ‘problems’ for the discipline. 
 
It could be that these problems are able to be addressed by new or 
innovative practices that are not based on the existing paradigmatic 
exemplars. These innovative solutions may begin to form an alternative 
disciplinary matrix, but one that does not yet provide any clear or formal 
exemplars of its own. Since there is no paradigmatic threat to the existing 
order, these innovations can be marginalised as being watered down 
versions of what is currently done within mainstream practice. 
 
However, given enough such problems, the discipline then moves into a 
time of crisis’ in which the paradigm is increasingly unable to explain the 
sorts of things in which practitioners are interested or what the rest of the 
world expects from the discipline. An alternative theoretical paradigm 
begins to form in response to the anomalies, in which some of its methods 
that are resilient and effective enough begin to acquire exemplar status, by 
force of simple acceptance by sufficiently influential practitioners. 
Elements of the old paradigmatic core (the existing exemplars) move into 
the new disciplinary matrix (which surround the new paradigmatic core) 
but do not retain their status as exemplars. There is no sudden shift and 
the shift may, in fact, look seamless from a historical perspective and to 
those who are schooled in the new paradigm. A ‘revolution’ will, therefore, 
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have occurred, which appears to be an inevitable, organic consequence of 
changing worldviews in a responsive profession or discipline. 
 
This thesis relies on a significant underlying assumption about the positive 
merit of the widespread migration of therapeutic jurisprudence practices to 
mainstream courts, but only for the purposes of framing the research 
question and not for the normative purpose of arguing such merit. Neither 
does it address the interesting but different question of whether, if it were 
possible to start from scratch and design the perfect judicial system, that 
system would be primarily adversarial in nature and function. 
 
Courts operating according to therapeutic jurisprudence principles (such 
as the so-called problem-solving, or solutions-focused courts) are 
generally distinguishable from the mainstream courts in terms of their 
focus on individual litigant improvement, their concern with outcomes and 
the relationship between litigants and judges (what I would refer to as 
‘therapeutic foci’). 71 A typical adversarial court, conversely, is usually 
characterised by an almost exclusive focus on the integrity of process as 
the benchmark for success. A trial or hearing that demonstrates adherence 
to due process, natural justice and, to some extent, what are usually 
regarded as the core principles of adversarialism would usually be 
regarded as procedurally and substantively fair—and, therefore, 
successfully serving its purpose. This may act to privilege efficiency above 
effectiveness. 
 
A therapeutic paradigm would ideally be compatible with, although not 
solely comprised of, all the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. For that 
reason, principles derived from therapeutic jurisprudence are a useful 
benchmarking set by which to test compatibility of a therapeutic paradigm 
with the adversarial paradigm. There is uncertainty and some 
disagreement (as outlined above) about the status of therapeutic 
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 Peggy Hora and Deborah Chase, ‘Judicial Satisfaction When Judging in a Therapeutic 
Key’ (2004) Contemporary Issues in Law 8. 
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jurisprudence, which seems to be most recently characterised by a retreat 
from affording it the quality of a theory, despite very strong evidence that it 
is much more than simply a way of making legal processes more user-
friendly. The key question of how the therapeutic jurisprudence sees itself, 
as one method of testing its status as a paradigm, is considered in detail in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Although there is little or no disagreement in the literature that therapeutic 
jurisprudence has developed an identifiable and distinct conceptual 
framework, it is currently more likely to be described as a lens, vector or 
heuristic than as a theory. The conceptual framework consists of the 
interdisciplinary knowledge and the ideas about law having both 
therapeutic and anti-therapeutic effects. As a heuristic, the literature 
continually refers to the iterative approach to judging, whereby the 
therapeutic judge will endeavour to solve problems by an iterative process 
of trial and error in applying the relevant social science knowledge to the 
scenario or litigants they are working with. 
 
Wexler reminds us that the genesis of therapeutic jurisprudence did not lie 
in an attempt to construct a theoretical explanation for the court system or 
legal system, but more in an attempt to create tools and methods for 
assessing and remedying the effects of legal rules, roles and processes in 
the legal system.72 In this regard, the movement has been extraordinarily 
successful, which partly explains calls from within for its mainstreaming. 
This gives practitioners and the judiciary a very strong sense of ownership 
over therapeutic jurisprudence, and perhaps a perceived sense of 
responsibility to monitor how it is characterised and how it develops. 
Wexler also conceives of therapeutic jurisprudence as a process for 
developing research questions and practical solutions to seemingly 
intractable problems in how the legal system functions, which is a role 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
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 Marilyn McMahon and David Wexler, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Developments and 
Applications in Australia and New Zealand’ (2003) 20(2) Law in Context 1, 2.  
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Daicoff, as discussed above, situates therapeutic jurisprudence within 
what she refers to as the comprehensive law movement. However, others, 
such as Freckelton, warn against referring to it as movement at all. His 
position appears, to some extent at least, to be a matter of political 
preference rather than jurisprudential analysis, as it is motivated by 
concerns that labelling a field as a ‘movement’ has unwanted overtones of 
a cult or a fad.73 
 
In Chapter 5, I argue that this reluctance and disagreement is motivated 
more by a fear of marginalising therapeutic jurisprudence in ways similar 
to a host of other jurisprudential movements of recent decades, and by a 
heavy preponderance of members of the judiciary and legal practitioners 
working in the field. In that chapter I also examine the reluctance in the 
therapeutic jurisprudence literature to settle on any convincing or well-
thought-out explanation of therapeutic jurisprudence’s ontological status. 
 
One of the attempts to engage in meta-analysis of the status and 
relationships that exist between the various therapeutic and restorative 
innovations (although not their relationship to adversarial principles) within 
the legal and justice systems, as mentioned above, is Daicoff’s positing of 
the comprehensive law movement. Daicoff identifies nine converging 
vectors that are said to comprise the movement. They are: collaborative 
law, creative problem solving, holistic justice, preventive law, problem-
solving courts, procedural justice, restorative justice, therapeutic 
jurisprudence and transformative mediation.74 In trying to describe what it 
is that these vectors have in common, she says that they are ‘a movement 
towards law as a healing profession … [that] takes an explicitly 
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 Freckelton, above n 43, 598.  
74 
 Daicoff, above n 64. See also Susan Daicoff, ‘Afterword: The Role of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence within the Comprehensive Law Movement’ in DP Stolle, DB Wexler and BJ 
Winick (eds), Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence Law as a Helping Profession (2000); 
Susan Daicoff, ‘The Comprehensive Law Movement: An Emerging Approach to Legal 
Problems’ (2006) 49 Scandinavian Studies in Law 109−29. 
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comprehensive, integrated, humanistic, interdisciplinary, restorative, and 
often therapeutic approach to law and lawyering’.75 
 
Both Daicoff and some other commentators express concerns that despite 
having some common elements and aspirations, we ought to respect their 
individual differences so as (presumably) not to dilute or marginalise their 
individual development and contributions. There seems to be an implicit 
view that the importance of separate evolution trumps too serious an 
attempt at conceptual and theoretical amalgamation. Thus, despite the 
undoubted importance of Daicoff’s initial attempt at meta-analysis, little 
has been done to extend this work.76 
 
Although the thesis will assert and defend the position that therapeutic 
jurisprudence does, in fact, meet many of the requirements we would 
expect of a theory in the social sciences or humanities, and in 
jurisprudence, it does not rely on an assertion that therapeutic 
jurisprudence itself is a self-contained and comprehensive juristic 
paradigm. This thesis does not set out to examine what barriers there 
might be to constructing a legal system based primarily on therapeutic 
jurisprudence (regardless of whether we accept or deny that it is a theory). 
However, the thesis does, in part (mainly in the Chapter 6 discussion of 
incommensurability) examine whether the adoption of a significant number 
of therapeutic jurisprudence principles into the mainstream court system 
would require a new juristic paradigm based on therapeutic principles. This 
purported set of therapeutic principles could subsume those that have to 
date been developed and pursued by the therapeutic jurisprudence 
movement. 
 
This is an absolutely critical point. This thesis should not be seen as an 
attempt to furnish therapeutic jurisprudence with an unreasonably broad 
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 Especially when combined with the political context and sensitivity implied in 
Freckelton’s concerns noted above. 
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purview, but to ultimately characterise it as part of a wider theoretical and 
practical trend towards the abandonment of some long-standing 
adversarial principles in favour of therapeutic principles, which may lead to 
a fundamentally transformed legal system. 77  The primary function of a 
court is traditionally (and often legislatively) mandated to be dispute 
resolution, so naturally those appearing in a court are constructed as 
disputants. 78  Granted, in most civil jurisdictions there is significant 
provision for the utilisation of alternative dispute resolution where a formal 
hearing or trial is not deemed appropriate or optimal. There are even some 
equivalent criminal procedures.79 Nevertheless, when a trial is unavoidable 
or where the litigants choose a formal hearing, a declaration of the legal 
rights and positions of the parties or a statement of a resolution in terms of 
the relevant law is, paradigmatically, the ultimate focus of the proceedings. 
That is the essential outcome traditionally required of civil litigation—a 
statement of the parties’ relative legal positions, a statement that the 
parties request themselves and that they are responsible for resourcing (in 
the sense that the parties lead the evidence they choose). 
                                                 
77 
 As will be seen in Chapter 5, however, a number of commentators who are both 
supportive and critical of therapeutic jurisprudence do examine and champion this wider 
purview. 
78 
For example, r5(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) provides that the 
underlying philosophy on which the rules about civil litigation in Queensland are based 
relates to the resolution of disputes that have a legal solution: ‘The purpose of these rules 
is to facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues in civil proceedings at 
a minimum of expense.’ 
79 
 Various court-enabling statutes in Queensland provide for voluntary mediation in some 
criminal matters. ‘Justice mediation’ is a face-to-face meeting between a person who has 
been harmed in an incident and the person accused of the act or omission alleged to 
have caused the harm. The complainant has an opportunity to ventilate how they were 
affected by the defendant’s actions and the defendant has an opportunity to try to repair 
the harm their actions have caused. A resolution may involve agreeing to do something 
for the complainant, such as paying money or repairing damage or making an apology, or 
agreeing to attend counselling or enrol in special courses. A judge may then take into 
consideration these outcomes when determining how to proceed with the matter. See 
Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 53, and the relevant policy available online: 
<<http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/justice-services/dispute-resolution/justice-mediation>. 
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This traditional conception of the purpose of litigation and court 
procedures presupposes the existence of a justiciable dispute and of 
parties who pursue their matters competently and, at least to some extent, 
in good faith. It largely assumes that a focus on individual litigant 
improvement, non-legal outcomes and relationships between judges and 
litigants would be either irrelevant, of minor or secondary importance or 
even inconsistent with procedural integrity in an adversarial forum. Limiting 
a court in any particular proceeding to the declaration of a legal resolution 
seems to either marginalise or preclude engagement (by judges) with the 
litigants that is overtly therapeutic. 
 
The relatively slow up-take of therapeutic jurisprudence in the mainstream 
civil court could be due, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, to a perception 
among some judges that engaging with the root causes of disputes or 
offending behaviour are not (for practical or other reasons) part of their 
legitimate and valid role.80 This is particularly so in the United States (US) 
jurisdictions. However, there is recent precedent in Australia for attempts 
to reduce the adverse effect of adversarial civil litigation on litigants 
outside of the problem-solving courts, especially the legislated changes to 
the conduct of child-related proceedings in the Family Court of Australia.81 
 
One assumption, to be explored throughout the thesis, is that therapeutic 
jurisprudence foci are intrinsically worthwhile, an assumption rooted in the 
central therapeutic jurisprudence claim that where due process, legal 
rights and fairness are not compromised, court processes that promote 
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 In R v Peterson (1984) WAR 329, 332, Burt CJ is often cited as an example of a 
judicial attitude that regards the wider social and personal causes of criminal behaviour 
involving drugs or alcohol (for example) to be ‘beyond the reach of any court’. 
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 Pt VII div 12(a) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) was amended in 2006 to require that, 
in a child-related proceeding, the judge must control and direct the proceedings in such a 
way as to minimise the effect of the proceedings on the child. The Act requires that the 
judge conduct the manner as informally as possible and in ways that will promote 
cooperative and child-centred parenting. See Bryant and Faulks, above n 4. 
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individual autonomy and psychological well-being are objectively to be 
preferred to processes that do not. This assumption is sometimes held up 
as being axiomatic by key therapeutic jurisprudence proponents, who 
often argue that researchers should avoid too precise a definition of 
therapeutic, for example.82 
 
There is a theme within this thesis, then, that by integrating certain 
therapeutic jurisprudence practices pioneered in the problem-solving 
courts into the way judges deal with some particular mainstream civil 
proceedings, there will be an intrinsic benefit that does not compromise 
due process and fairness and that provides scope for the three therapeutic 
jurisprudence foci of: individual litigant improvement, a greater concern 
with outcomes (as a benchmark of success) and the relationship between 
litigants and judges. This seems like a more realistic and defensible 
agenda than advocating for rapid and radical change, not just in reforming 
how the law operates to reduce its negative effects, but to radically 
transform the law into a healing profession.83 As will be seen in Chapter 2, 
true paradigm shifts are rarely rapid, neither are they seen at the time as 
particularly radical in scope or nature. The language and method of one 
paradigm morphs into the next and the evolution of the discipline appears 
to have been smooth, natural and inevitable. 
 
                                                 
82 
 David Wexler, ‘Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (1995) 1 
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competing societal interests’: Dennis Fox, ‘Social Science’s Limited Role in Resolving 
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The successes of the problem-solving courts (measured by such criteria 
as reduced recidivism rates, judicial satisfaction, community support for 
the reforms and increased engagement of the offender) are due, in part, to 
the fact that they are not so much concerned with the adjudication of 
disputes as with confronting and facilitating the resolution of the problems 
and the recognition of the social and psychological contexts that are 
thought to give rise to disputes and unlawful conduct.84 That is the sense 
in which these particular courts are usually conceived of as being 
therapeutic.85 One therapeutic jurisprudence practitioner suggests that an 
important reason why the problem-solving courts ‘work’ is that: ‘They [the 
courts] seize upon a moment when people are open to changing 
dysfunctional behaviour—the crisis of coming to court—to give them the 
opportunity to change’. 86  In Australia, current attempts to implement 
therapeutic jurisprudence practices into mainstream courts (from within the 
mainstream jurisdictions themselves) seem mostly limited to particular 
proceedings in the Family Court (as indicated above). 
 
Mason’s position 87  neatly encapsulates the antithesis to the thesis I 
advance here. My thesis is that we are, in fact, at a point of Kuhnian crisis 
where courts are increasingly seen as a backstop to be invoked where 
other attempts at resolution fail or where therapeutic processes are not 
possible. Some courts (and especially court precincts such as the 
Victorian neighbourhood justice centres88  or the Red Hook Community 
Justice Centre)89 are becoming general service providers and will probably 
continue to do so. The fear of courts becoming somehow inferior under a 
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changed paradigm goes a long way to identifying the source of judicial 
resistance to a therapeutic paradigm and another illustration of a need for 
this thesis. The fear that a paradigm shift involves the jettisoning of 
everything of importance associated with the displaced paradigm is 
misplaced because it is incorrect. A Kuhnian paradigm shift rarely involves 
wholesale change. It would be counterintuitive to conceive of as inferior a 
court system that continues to perform its current job, but is also able to 
perform that job in a less damaging way and then resolve problems that 
have been seen as intractable. 
 
Thus, if a shift to a therapeutic paradigm would not spell the end for our 
current court and legal systems, we need to consider what then would be 
at stake in deciding if therapeutic jurisprudence really is part of an 
alternative to the adversarial paradigm and not just set of pragmatically 
incremental changes within the adversarial paradigm. Again, the answer to 
this question, if we accept the Kuhnian analysis undertaken in this thesis, 
is to be found in the incommensurability concept. If adversarialism and 
therapeutic jurisprudence really are separate and competing theoretical 
paradigms, then the roles of the adversarial judge and the therapeutic 
judge are what Kuhn described as incommensurable. This means that not 
only would an adversarial judge and a therapeutic judge often disagree 
about what the bottom line is, they would have no common language to 
use to debate the issue and not even any common exemplars that they 
could both agree on as being examples of best practice. 
 
If they are not competing paradigms—in that they can somehow co-
exist90—then our basic task as researchers and practitioners is to work out 
which elements of each are compatible and whether all that is required to 
mainstream therapeutic jurisprudence is simply some non-paradigmatic 
fine-tuning of the adversarial system or the creation of some form of hybrid 
paradigm. Thus, another outcome from this thesis would be to recommend 
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to non-adversarial practitioners that this is their role, rather than to achieve 
anything more fundamental. 
 
One of the very real risks of the casual use of terms such as ‘paradigm’ 
and ‘paradigm shift’ is that it can be too easy to read too much into a 
question. Such use can quickly turn members of a discipline away from 
fundamental debate by giving the impression that advocates for change 
are being too ambitious, too general or advocating some sort of popular 
revolution. This thesis, however, adopts a formal Kuhnian (and neo-
Kuhnian) conception of those phenomena, following on from a long 
tradition of applying the concept of a paradigm shift to the social sciences 
and to the humanities. 
 
Such rigorous application of the formal concepts, rather than their 
colloquial counterparts, will often ameliorate some of the fears and 
reservations about allowing an innovation paradigm status. This process is 
undertaken in depth in chapters 4, 5 and 6. The reason why a reasonable 
jurist who is concerned about the preservation of due process rights, and 
other hallmarks of adversarialism, should not be afraid of a paradigm shift 
in our current juristic model is that a shift does not entail a total 
replacement of principles, rules or values. A Kuhnian paradigm shift to a 
therapeutic juristic model would not entail the loss of adversarial principles 
or processes altogether. In fact, Kuhn is at pains to emphasise that a new 
paradigm has to retain virtually all of the replaced paradigm’s ability to 
solve quantitative or doctrinal problems within the discipline. What the old 
paradigm loses, in effect, is some of its qualitative and explanatory power. 
Of course, therapeutic jurisprudence is seen by many of its advocates as a 
lens that provides a different qualitative perspective on what the law, legal 
institutions and legal actors ought to be doing in many instances. A 
Kuhnian paradigm shift is about the evolution of disciplines, not about 
progress by the total rejection of the cumulative disciplinary matrix that has 
developed over time. 
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Although the outcomes and achievements of practitioners within a 
discipline might be permanent, the theoretical positions that purport to 
describe and explain those outcomes are not. What matters to litigants in 
a civil dispute is that the dispute is settled, not the theory or juristic values 
that describe how the process worked. It is only the number of explicable 
practices and methods that grow and evolve; there is no similar growth in 
the number of paradigmatic theoretical explanations for practices within 
the discipline. If there is a shift to a therapeutic paradigm, adversarial 
courts would almost certainly still be recognised as having achieved their 
(then) objectives to a large degree, but there is no guarantee that similar 
outcomes would be viewed as successful if they eventuated under the 
newer paradigm. 
 
1.8 Significance and Original Contribution to Knowledge 
 
The key significance of this research is that it addresses and tests what 
may be the most difficult obstacle to the implementation of therapeutic 
judging in mainstream civil courts. That obstacle is the perception (and 
perhaps the reality) that the interventionist style of the therapeutic judge is 
incompatible with the formal and legal requirements of an adversarial 
court. Unless this perceived incompatibility can be thoroughly articulated 
and tested, before Australian superior court judges attempt to implement 
elements of therapeutic jurisprudence in their courts, any encouragement 
for them to do so may be premature and even irresponsible. 
 
A superior court judge who attempts to implement therapeutic 
jurisprudence practices will likely be relying on different juristic principles 
than those that traditionally inform the adversarial court. Warren 
summarises some of these principles in this way: 
1. An emphasis on problem-solving dispute avoidance rather 
than on simple dispute resolution on the basis of a legal 
ruling 
2. An emphasis on collaboration rather than adversarialism 
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3. The judge as a coach who looks forward, rather than as an 
arbiter who looks only backward for precedent 
4. A commitment to being informal and effective, rather than 
formal and efficient 
5. An emphasis on the needs and interests of the litigants 
rather than a sole emphasis on their legal rights 
6. An interpretation and application of social science findings 
and principles rather than a total reliance on the 
interpretation and application of law.91 
 
Clearly, these principles could be seen as paradigmatically different to 
those that would normally define the operation of a superior civil court and 
are unlikely to be embraced by judges solely on the grounds that they are 
proving to be effective in some specialised criminal courts, or in the 
specialised jurisdiction of the Family Court. King observes that:  
therapeutic jurisprudence has not become a dominant paradigm 
in legal practice and in the justice system in Australia … yet its 
impact on the justice system has been rapid over the past five or 
six years … we may well be in the process of a paradigm shift in 
the way in which courts, lawyers and other justice system 
professionals approach their work towards a more humane and 
psychologically optimal way of handling legal matters.92 
 
A paradigm as intimately connected to social and political norms as the 
adversarial legal system is not likely to change as the result of the 
emergence and success of a single or even limited number of alternative 
theories or practices. As Kuhn suggests, most professionals are narrowly 
trained specialists who work entirely within their paradigms until the 
number of problems, anomalies and failings of the paradigm reach a 
critical mass and the paradigm is recognised as being in crisis.93 Once the 
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crisis is widely acknowledged, only then does the relevant group of 
professionals have a serious normative discourse about comprehensive 
future directions (rather than about ad hoc or jurisdiction specific 
developments). This may lead to a relatively rapid revolution in the 
adoption of a new paradigm in which previous academic explanations are 
integrated with the new paradigm to make it appear as if the new way of 
doing things is a logical and rational evolution of all prior research and 
practices. 
 
I take the work of King, Freiberg and others as suggesting that there is at 
least a need for a shift in the juristic paradigm to a non-adversarialism 
focus in response to a growing number of anomalies. The significance of 
this thesis is that it will contribute, in part, to the body of work that seeks to 
determine whether there really is scope (as these researchers seem to 
suggest) for a broad-based shift in focus from a dispute resolution 
paradigm to a problem-solving paradigm in the Australian legal system. 
Freiberg has asked the question of whether therapeutic jurisprudence in 
Australia represents a paradigm shift or whether it is more a case of 
pragmatic incrementalism,94 but that question has not been significantly 
explored until dealt with in this thesis. The central implication is that if 
therapeutic jurisprudence reforms are limited to incremental and 
uncoordinated changes, without a sound theoretical base, then the 
relevant reforms may well become dependent upon individual judges, 
lawyers and legal academics and a watershed opportunity for reshaping 
the justice system may be lost. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Interestingly, if we were to accept Kuhn’s view of the way paradigms change some of the 
theoretical and empirical criticisms of therapeutic jurisprudence (such as the claim that 
the concept of ‘therapeutic’ is indeterminate) it may ultimately be of only academic 
interest—as whether or not the new paradigm is accepted depends more on its ability to 
reflect shared contemporary values, emotional and psychological satisfaction and its 
ability to generate new predictions, rather than on theoretical rigour alone. 
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 Arie Freiberg, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Australia: Paradigm Shift or Pragmatic 
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1.9 Conclusion 
 
In order to achieve the conceptual and analytical agenda foreshadowed 
above, the rest of the thesis will adopt the following structure. Chapter 2 
explains the nature of Kuhnian paradigms, with particular attention to their 
theoretical and conceptual relevance to changes in the legal system. In 
Chapter 3, I assert and defend the claim that juristic models are 
appropriate phenomena to conceive of as being susceptible to paradigm 
shifts. Once this is established, I argue in Chapter 4 that the current juristic 
model (both in Australia and in similar common law jurisdictions) is clearly 
defined by an adversarial paradigm. 
 
To enable a Kuhnian comparison of therapeutic jurisprudence with 
adversarialism, I then embark in Chapter 5 on an analysis of the 
ontological status of therapeutic jurisprudence, asking whether it can be 
conceived of as either itself paradigmatic of some juristic model, or as part 
of a wider therapeutic paradigm. In the penultimate chapter, Chapter 6, I 
ask, if we so grant that therapeutic jurisprudence can be conceived of as a 
paradigm or as an integral part of some therapeutic paradigm, whether it is 
then incommensurable with the adversarial paradigm and what the 
implications of such incommensurability might be. 
 
In the conclusion to the thesis, Chapter 7, I draw the analytical and 
conceptual threads of the thesis together by confirming that there are, 
indeed, issues of incommensurability between adversarialism and 
therapeutic jurisprudence, but that these issues, to some extent, drive the 
integration and mainstreaming process rather than prevent it. When 
confronted by Kuhnian problems, rather than by mere puzzles, the 
adversarial paradigm has adopted some non-adversarial exemplars. The 
adversarial disciplinary matrix exists, therefore, within a normatively 
malleable environment and does not exclude the adoption of therapeutic 
principles and practices at more than a superficial level. 
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The Nature of Kuhnian Paradigms—The Theoretical 
and Conceptual Relevance for Law 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates and explains the paradigm construct and the 
process of paradigm shifts. It provides the groundwork for applying these 
concepts to law as a discipline that sits within the social sciences and 
humanities. In order to establish whether a Kuhnian analysis of legal 
systems is valid, we need to first clearly articulate what Kuhn’s conception 
of the paradigm shift is, and to then consider whether this process can be 
validly applied to disciplines outside of the natural sciences. The more 
specific question of whether a legal system can be conceived of as 
operating pursuant to a Kuhnian paradigm is explored in Chapter 3. 
 
In order to explain the concept of the paradigm shift, the chapter draws on 
Kuhn’s original source material and later publications as they evolved in 
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response both to Kuhn’s critics and his own later reflections. 1  One 
consequence of the widespread, shallow application of the paradigm shift 
concept (touched on in Chapter 1 and in section 2.4) is that it is very often 
applied by academics and researchers with a lack of attention to the 
primary Kuhn material and as such is a superficial application of the 
methodology. This chapter seeks to avoid that pitfall.2 
 
The concept of a paradigm3 is used very often in academic writing, across 
a wide range of disciplines4 and with a number of meanings.5 In most 
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 Kuhn began his career as a scientist and his academic work initially focused on his PhD 
physics project. When he was awarded a three-year research fellowship at Harvard, 
however, he switched his attention to the history and philosophy of science, which he 
then taught at Harvard until moving to UC Berkley, where he was Professor of the History 
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2 
 The major source for this chapter is the 3
rd
 edition of SSR, published in 1996. SSR was 
originally a long article in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. This was a 
publication of the Vienna Circle of philosophers aimed at constructing a single theory to 
explain change and development within sciences and academic disciplines (a 
fundamental belief of the logical positivist school being that such a theory was possible). 
SSR was first published as a monograph by the University of Chicago Press in 1962. In 
the 1969 2
nd
 edition, Kuhn added a vital postscript that addressed many of the objections 
that arose as to the apparent vagueness of the paradigm concept and the perception that 
he was claiming science to be a predominantly subjective enterprise. He deals in more 
detail in the 3
rd
 edition with incommensurability, which has significant influence on the 
analysis in this thesis, countering the claim that if rival paradigms are incommensurable 
then they are purely relative, since a choice between the two could not be made since 
one paradigm cannot be explicated in the terms of the other.  
3 
 The etymology of the word comes from the Greek paradeiknunai meaning to compare, 
composite from para and the verb deiknunai, ‘to show’. Prior to the 1960s, it was mainly a 
literary term referring to an illustrative parable or fable. It was also used in the discipline 
of linguistics to refer to a class of vocal elements with similarities. 
4 
Note that for the purposes of this thesis, the terms ‘science’ and ‘discipline’ are used 
interchangeably, as are terms ‘scientist’ and ‘practitioner’, which is consistent with the 
attempt to apply Kuhnian concepts to disciplines other than the natural sciences. 
5 
Including at least education, law, sociology, linguistics, political science, economics, 
marketing and psychology. A broad quantitative analysis of how widely Kuhn is cited 
across disciplines can be found in Kathleen Loving and William Cobern, ‘Invoking 
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instances, what is alluded to by use of the term ‘paradigm’ is not simply a 
colloquial concept of convenience, but the defining core that informs the 
theoretical framework of a discipline in the sense postulated by Kuhn, so 
the various authors assert (either expressly or implicitly). One significant 
reason for the popularity of Kuhn’s work is that it seems to give some 
support and vocabulary to academics and researchers who are rebelling 
against tradition (what Loving and Cobern refer to as ‘the thrill of 
revisionism’),6 and rebels tend to cluster together. They often refer to their 
collective work as movements or communities. For that reason, adherents 
to innovative or alternative challenges to orthodoxy often tend to talk about 
the need for a paradigm shift (away from the existing paradigm and 
towards the paradigm for which they advocate). However, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, it is very rare for any significant effort to be made to properly 
align the use of the paradigm and paradigm shift concepts to the Kuhnian 
method. The risk of this omission is that this thrill of revisionism can 
displace academic rigour. 
 
There is also a risk that the evangelical fervour associated with the rise of 
a new academic movement can lead to intellectual hubris at the expense 
of objectivity.7 Given that many versions of, or references to, the paradigm 
phenomenon in academic writing lack analytical or conceptual depth, they 
are often vague to the point of being colloquial. Vagueness is antithetical 
to the concept of a paradigm, and for that reason, the following sections of 
this chapter attempt to be analytical and precise in the mapping of both 
adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence with the paradigm concept. 
 
It is also true that one criticism of the Kuhnian concept of the paradigm is 
that it is, itself, conceptually vague and that it is not realistic to conceive of 
                                                                                                                                     
Thomas Kuhn: What Citation Analysis Reveals about Science Education’ (2000) 9(2) 
Science and Education 187. 
6 
 Loving and Cobern, above n 5, 191. 
7 
 Most therapeutic jurisprudence advocates are well aware of the risk of hubris: Ian 
Freckelton, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price 
and Risk of Influence’ (2008) 30 Thomas Jefferson Law Review 575, 576.  
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an entire discipline as operating with reference to a single paradigm. This 
is largely a misinterpretation of Kuhn, however. A paradigm can allow for a 
range of methodologies and theoretical positions. Its greatest value, 
though, is that it provides a mutually agreed point of reference for the 
comparison of all theoretical positions within a discipline. Regardless of 
how the concept is defined, the role and function of a paradigm is 
fundamental and precisely delineated. 
 
Paradigms, for Kuhn, explain the reality that practitioners within a 
discipline always seem to have a capacity to come to a collective 
agreement on the facts. This is not to suggest that what Kuhn proposes is 
simply a sociological description or explanation of changes within 
disciplines based on why practitioners within a discipline believe what they 
believe. A sociologist might attempt to explain, for example, why a 
particular paradigm is accepted in terms of the beliefs of its practitioners 
about what constitutes validity, or about their attitudes, but not in terms of 
validity itself. Kuhn’s conception of the paradigm and of paradigm shift 
certainly does contain important sociological elements, but he also 
attempts to prescribe what validity in a discipline actually is, by comparing 
the content of different (historical) paradigms within a discipline, rather 
than simply the beliefs and attitudes of the discipline’s practitioners in 
isolation from that content.8 Paradigms, according to Kuhn, shift as a result 
of the beliefs and attitudes of practitioners, but paradigms must have a 
validity that is referable to something more than those beliefs and 
attitudes.9 
                                                 
8 
This is in contrast to the more analytical and positivist stance of other philosophers of 
science, most notably Karl Popper, who argued that a science or discipline undergoes 
fundamental change only as a result of key theories or hypotheses being falsified by later 
data. 
9 
 At SSR 11, for example, Kuhn traces the evolution of paradigms in optics. Physicists 
now work on the core postulate that light is composed of photons. However, less than 50 
years earlier, light was characterised as a transverse wave motion, and fifty years before 
that as ‘material corpuscles’. The beliefs and attitudes of physicists working within each 
paradigm was essential to the content of the paradigm, but they were not arbitrary beliefs 
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2.2 The Nature of Paradigms 
 
Kuhn acknowledges in the 1969 postscript to SSR that his work alludes to 
two major conceptions of paradigm, one broad and the other narrow. The 
broader of the two conceptions of the paradigm was one that, he says, 
‘stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on 
shared by the members of a given community’.10 That conception seems 
amply broad enough to draw various conceptions of the law within its 
ambit. 
 
The narrower and more analytical conception of the paradigm, similarly 
articulated in the postscript, holds that a paradigm is ‘one sort of element 
in that constellation, the concrete puzzle solutions which, employed as 
models or examples, can replace explicit rules as the basis for the solution 
of the remaining puzzles of normal science’.11 The following sections seek 
to explain the content of both of those definitions in ways that lend 
assistance to a conceptual comparison of adversarialism and therapeutic 
jurisprudence.12 It is the narrower of these two conceptions, however, that 
provides the sharpest focus for the incommensurability phenomenon, 
which, as I argue in Chapter 6, is the best analytical tool for delineating the 
relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
and attitudes, they were referable to observation and the results of hypothesis testing. 
The question Kuhn focuses on is: ‘In what sense is the shared paradigm a fundamental 
unit for the student of a discipline, a unit that cannot be fully reduced to logically atomic 
components which might function in its stead?’ 
10 
 SSR 175. 
11 
 Ibid.  
12 
 Paradigms are first described by Kuhn (in the 1
st
 edition of SSR) as ‘models from 
which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research’. An emphasis on cultural 
factors is made more explicit when he later suggests a paradigm is ‘what the members of 
a scientific community share’ or ‘a scientific community consists of men who share a 
paradigm’. 
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2.2.1 Historical and Conceptual Background—Bachelard and Kelsen 
2.2.1.1 Bachelard 
 
Conceptual precursors to the anti-positivist theme in Kuhn’s view of 
disciplinary evolution can be found in the work of Gaston Bachelard.13 A 
basic outline of the conceptual forerunners to Kuhn is essential to 
understanding both how the concept of the paradigm shift revolutionised 
how we conceive of disciplinary change, and how it was a natural outcome 
of existing changes in worldview. This is especially in the sense that the 
intense faith in the objectivity and rationalism of science spurred by the 
Enlightenment (epitomised by the dominance of the logical positivists in 
the early 20th Century) began to come under attack from those who 
recognised and experienced the effect that subjective views, personalities 
and group dynamics had on what an academic discipline held as its core 
doctrine.14 
 
Bachelard is of interest due to his attempts to assert and explain the idea 
that there are discontinuities in the history and development of a 
field/discipline. These discontinuities are sometimes ‘breaks’ in the way 
science formulates its concepts compared to the common-sense or lay 
conception. Breaks for Bachelard may also be those that occur between 
                                                 
13 
 Primarily in Gaston Bachelard, The Psychoanalysis of Fire (1938). 
14 
 Logical positivism is an approach to knowledge founded on empiricism and rationality. 
It holds that all knowledge, regardless of what field it comes from, can be reduced to a 
single scientific language. All knowledge is based on observation and the subjective 
properties of the observer are irrelevant to its truth. Thus, what establishes the core 
doctrine of a discipline is public experimentation and verification of empirically produced 
data, not the experiences or personal beliefs of any one practitioner or group of 
practitioners within the field. This single scientific language is supposed to be then 
reducible to the script of formal logic. According to positivists, knowledge must be true for 
all times and all places, it is never relative to any particular time, place or persons. This is 
very different to the Kuhnian version of disciplinary change, which holds that what counts 
as ‘knowledge’ changes as the beliefs and values of practitioners within a given field 
reach a critical mass of dissent (even in the absence of a single, critical counterexample 
to what is currently believed). 
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different scientific or academic conceptions of a phenomenon—such as 
between different historical conceptions in science as to what an atom is. 
Bachelard claimed that these breaks, qua scientific progress, are not 
usually determined by collating, in some jigsaw pattern, the established 
truths of science. For him the epistemological acts that produced these 
breaks were guided not by science but by something akin to poetry—by 
art and imagination. For Bachelard, scientific progress depends on the 
epistemological ruptures inspired by creativity rather than by strict 
application of the scientific method and incrementalised hypothesis 
testing. Science for him cannot, therefore, be seen as progressing linearly 
or necessarily rationally, and this is why he ought to be seen as a 
theoretical precursor to Kuhn. 
 
Bachelard was self-educated in the fields of chemistry and philosophy so 
that, although he eventually wrote a PhD dissertation that enabled him to 
lecture at the Sorbonne, he developed as an academic largely outside the 
academy. This, together with his fascination, shared by many of his 
contemporaries, with the fundamental worldview changes inherent in 
advancements in particle physics in the early 20th century, explains the 
anti-positivist stance he took in relation to the philosophy of science and 
his contributions to the development of post-structuralism. 
 
Bachelard asserted a number of positions in relation to an anti-positivist 
explanation of the development of scientific disciplines and knowledge that 
foreshadowed the work and conclusions of Kuhn, although his 
contributions to, and influence on, Kuhn’s work are rarely acknowledged or 
explored. According to Marshall: 
[Bachelard’s] work involved a constant polemic against 
philosophers because, according to him, philosophy wanted to 
cover up, hide and occlude ‘the real historical conditions of the 
production of scientific knowledges’. Indeed, the idea that the 
history of science could be a fruitful source, even a source, for 
logical analyses was quite alien to analytic philosophy of science. 
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Also he believed that physical theories were not divorced from 
metaphysical commitments, though they might claim to be so.15 
 
Bachelard was concerned with the process of scientific change and 
scientific progress as illustrations of his view that epistemology was more 
than an analytical phenomenon. He held that the development of 
knowledge within a particular scientific discipline was best understood not 
by studying that discipline now, but by studying its history—especially the 
history of the changing psychology of people within a given field. 
Bachelard described and illustrated how the apparent linear progress of 
science can be blocked by ingrained psychological patterns among key 
members of a discipline. Such a pattern literally affected how these 
practitioners conceived of knowledge itself, hence the concept of the 
obstacle épistémologique or ‘epistemological obstacle’.16 
 
We can best find the reasoning processes within a discipline, according to 
Bachelard, by looking at how those involved in its practical application are 
reasoning (presumably in journals and other scholarly publications), rather 
than by accepting what the abstract theories within a discipline claim. He 
further suggested that when abstract theory was overturned, it happened 
as the result of the practical work of scientists within that discipline. By 
analogy, we might argue that major changes in jurisprudence are initially 
stimulated by the work and experience of lawyers and judges rather than 
the work of later theorists. 
 
Bachelard found discontinuities in the history and development of science 
that were not, in principle, capable of logical reconstruction. He referred to 
these discontinuities as epistemological ruptures, meaning breaks in the 
way people within the discipline actually thought. His method was to talk 
about discontinuity leading to ruptures and changes in concepts. However, 
                                                 
15 
 Mary Tiles, Gaston Bachelard: Science and Objectivity (1984) 3. 
16 
 Gaston Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind (2002) [trans of La formation 
de l’esprit scientifique (first published 1938)]; Gaston Bachelard, The New Scientific Spirit 
(1934) [trans of Le nouvel esprit scientifique]. 
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the foreshadowing of Kuhn’s reference to the comparable ideas of normal 
science, revolution and paradigm shift are there and there is a body of 
literature that examines the links.17 
 
A rupture, according to Bachelard, is characterised by four epistemological 
characteristics that he refers to as breaks, obstacles, profiles and acts.18 
Breaks are concerned with: (i) how science breaks away from common-
sense in formulating its concepts and with (ii) breaks between scientific 
concepts. Korner suggests that an example of (i) would be the shift from 
common-sense notions of intelligence as concerned with a person’s ability 
to solve problems in the real world to intelligence abstracted as a score on 
an intelligence test (the so-called IQ). 19  The latter is a quantified 
phenomenon that is, therefore, amendable to experimentation within 
disciplines such as psychology and education. An example of sense (ii) 
would be the changes that have occurred historically in the scientific 
concepts of the atom (from, say, the 460 BC work of Democritus 
suggesting that atoms were the smallest indivisible bits of matter, through 
to Max Planck’s theory of quanta to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle). 
 
Breaks are resisted by obstacles, which can be construed as residues 
from earlier concepts (or as Kuhn would later suggest, paradigms) that 
tend to block changes to new concepts. Here common-sense may be a 
major obstacle, operating as it does as an implicit assumption of the way 
the world is. This is reflected in Kuhnian theory, as discussed later in this 
chapter, with reference to the relationship between paradigms and 
worldviews or Weltanschauung. 
 
                                                 
17 
 An excellent review and analysis of this literature has been undertaken by Teressa 
Castaleo-Lawless, ‘Kuhn’s Missed Opportunity and the Multifaceted Lives of Bachelard: 
Mythical, Institutional, Historical, Philosophical, Literary, Scientific’ (2004) 35 Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science. 
18 
Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason (1989). 
19 
Stephan Korner, Experience and Theory: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science 
(1966). 
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Bachelard proposed a set of techniques to make these implicit 
assumptions explicit. He suggested, for example, that we could compile an 
‘epistemological profile’ of any given member of a discipline; that is, an 
analysis of that person’s understanding of a particular scientific concept. 
This analysis would, in turn, illustrate where the individual stood in relation 
to the historical development of a concept (paradigm)—and the extent to 
which residues were retained or breaks maximised. 
 
Residues are challenged by breaks that are demonstrated by an act on 
the part of the scientist concerned. An act is a definitive movement in the 
direction of the break or of progress (as determined historically). Thus, 
Bachelard’s work was counter to the orthodox (positivist) view that 
progress within a scientific discipline or field was determined by ‘collating 
in a jigsaw type pattern the established truths of science’.20 Kuhn diverges, 
however, in terms of the emphasis Bachelard places on the role played by 
imagination and reverie (or self-reflection) in motivating and informing 
breaks. Bachelard’s view was that the epistemological acts that produced 
breaks were guided not by the failures of what Kuhn would come to call 
periods of normal science to deal with anomalies in practice, but by 
creative reflections similar to those found in poetry and art. For Bachelard, 
scientific progress depended upon epistemological breaks stimulated by 
particular acts of imagination and reflection. Nevertheless, Bachelard 
claimed that these breaks were distinctive and easily discernible. That is 
the sense in which he saw science as not progressing linearly or 
necessarily rationally. However, for Kuhn (as discussed below,) there 
comes a tipping point, only identifiable post priori, where the bulk of 
practitioners within a discipline seem to naturally align themselves with a 
new paradigm. Progress is a wider cultural effect for him, but it also has a 
normative effect. 
 
                                                 
20 
 James Marshall, ‘Bachelard and Philosophy of Education’ in Encyclopedia of the 
Philosophy of Education (1999). 
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2.2.1.2 Kelsen 
 
A paradigm is, in one sense, a similar sort of phenomenon to the 
Grundnorm proposed by Hans Kelsen as the fundamental norm or meta-
rule at the heart of a legal system. Grundnorms for Kuhn are the 
disciplinary exemplars within the core of the paradigm. Kelsen’s Pure 
Theory of law conceives of a legal system as a hierarchical structure of 
rules and norms, and the hypothetical Grundnorm is said to have a 
necessary existence because of the need to find a point of origin for these 
rules and norms. It is the existence of this point of origin that ultimately 
validates the whole system of laws. This is analogous to the way in which 
legal positivists assert that what validates a particular law is the validity of 
its source (such as a properly constituted legislature or court). Kelsen 
posits a first authoritative source of law whose validity does not depend on 
the validity of any previous enacting body.21 
 
It is difficult or even impossible to precisely define the nature or conceptual 
parameters of Grundnorm that does not detract from the importance of or 
invalidate the role it plays in the Pure Theory of Law. If we analyse any 
formal legal system in terms of the Pure Theory, we start from the 
assumption that that system stems from a particular Grundnorm. Similarly, 
if we were to analyse actual or potential changes (at the most fundamental 
level) within any formal legal system from a Kuhnian perspective, we start 
from the assumption that the legal system operates by reference to a 
particular paradigm. 
 
The Grundnorm, though, is necessarily a hypothetical and fictional 
phenomenon. This is because, as Kelsen eventually conceded, a 
                                                 
21 
According to Kelsen:  
The basic norm is not created in a legal procedure by a law-creating organ. It is 
not—as a positive legal norm is—valid because it is created in a certain way by 
a legal act, but it is valid because it is presupposed to be valid; and it is 
presupposed to be valid because without this pre-supposition, no human act 
could be interpreted as a legal, especially as a norm-creating, act.  
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1946). 
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Grundnorm cannot be both fundamental (or actual) and have a normative 
effect. If that were the case, then we would be stuck with asserting that a 
Grundnorm was normative because it was fundamental (or original), and 
fundamental because it was normative. However, a particular paradigm 
that lies at the heart of a discipline, even if it cannot be precisely or 
exhaustively described, does (and must) have actual existence.22 It is not 
a hypothetical construct.23  Therefore, as discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter 3, if we are to analyse changes in legal systems in terms of 
paradigm shift, then it is important to acknowledge that we are referring to 
something more than changes in hypothetical constructs. A paradigm is 
fundamentally normative in the sense that it sets the standard against 
which all other assertions and practices within the particular discipline can 
(and ought to be) measured or validated. It derives its status as a 
paradigm by a mixture of practical success and the political and social 
acceptance of practitioners within the discipline. 
 
2.2.2 Kuhn on the Nature of the Paradigm 
 
Kuhn uses the term ‘paradigm’ in a number of different senses over time, 
as his views crystallise and evolve. At least 20 varying articulations of the 
concept can be found in his work, although the core meaning and the role 
played by the paradigm in disciplinary evolution seem to remain consistent 
                                                 
22 
 In section 2.4 I discuss Kuhn’s belief that the cultural dimension to the paradigm 
phenomenon entails that practitioners who subscribe to a particular paradigm may even 
disagree about some of its core rules. 
23 
 I do not seek, in this thesis, to defend Kuhnian theory, but rather to tease out and lay 
bare the implications of a Kuhnian analysis of the relationship between adversarialism 
and therapeutic jurisprudence. The classic attempt to critique Kuhnian theory on the 
grounds that either the vagueness or multiplicity of definitions of the ‘paradigm’ are done 
at the cost of coherence is Margaret Masterman, ‘The Nature of a Paradigm’ in Imre 
Lakatos and Michael Musgrave (eds), Criticism and Growth of Knowledge (1970) 59–79. 
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enough—these different articulations are neither ‘incoherent nor arbitrary, 
and to some degree even necessary’.24 
 
Kuhn initially used the ambiguous illusion of the duck and rabbit (see 
Figure 2.1) to illustrate the nature of different paradigms in relation to the 
same discipline. In this illusion, there is a perceptual ‘switch’ between the 
alternative interpretations of what the observer is seeing, giving different 
interpretations of the incoming sense data. He later realised the limitations 
of this analogy because the nature of a paradigm is that it is not eradicated 
once it is replaced, but its findings and theories are redefined in the 
language of the new paradigm. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Kuhn’s illusion of the duck and rabbit 
 
Sharrock and Read point out that the natural sciences are generally held 
up by their practitioners to be precise areas of human investigation, 
characterised by clearly delineated methods and concepts. In this context 
it is unsurprising that discourse within the philosophy and history of 
science that occurs at a different level of abstraction and lacks this sort of 
precision (perhaps necessarily) often seems frustrating and ambiguous to 
those engaged in applied research or practice. Discussions about the 
overall nature of science and of other disciplines are necessarily carried 
out at a gross (abstract) level consisting of ‘wide-ranging and largely 
unavoidably unsubstantiated generalizations’.25  These authors offer the 
                                                 
24 
Many of these different articulations are collected and reconciled by Arkady Poltnitsky, 
‘Thomas Kuhn’ in H Bertens and J Natoli (eds), Postmodernism: The Key Figures (2002) 
201–10; Masterman, above n 23. 
25 
Wes Sharrock and Rupert Read, Kuhn: Philosopher of Scientific Revolution (2002) 34. 
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following view of both the general nature of the paradigm concept and its 
sociological dimension: 
We do not think that Kuhn’s use of the notion of ‘paradigm’ is 
really meant to set out on the meticulous classification of the 
different kinds of and degrees of agreement that there might be 
within science, across and within disciplines. It is not a 
sociological term of art. The notion of paradigms is, in the first 
instance, meant to highlight a very stark contrast, between early 
stages in the development and later ones.26 
 
Paradigms are first described by Kuhn as ‘models from which spring 
particular coherent traditions of scientific research’. An emphasis on 
cultural factors is made more explicit when Kuhn later suggests a 
paradigm is ‘what the members of a scientific community share’ or ‘a 
scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm’. The 
definition narrows to ‘a constellation of group commitments’ and the 
community to ‘those who share a disciplinary matrix’ 27  or a ‘shared 
example’ from which a member of that community derives their 
understanding of the field. This notion of the paradigm as an exemplar (or 
of a group of shared/agreed examples) is probably that which makes its 
way most often into broader academic discourse—we hear and read very 
often of practitioners pointing to something as a ‘paradigm example’.28 A 
phenomenon within a field that is held to be paradigmatic is meant to be a 
classic example against which all other contenders for inclusion in that set 
                                                 
26 
Ibid 34.  
27 
 The concept of the disciplinary matrix and of shared exemplars will be quite important 
and useful in later chapters as the thesis narrows down on the nature of the differences 
between therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism. 
28 
 Ostensive definitions of ‘paradigm’ are very common. Kuhn and other authors 
frequently point to obvious and widely known disciplinary changes that characterise the 
phenomenon—such as the shift from Newtonian physicist to quantum physics or from 
behavioural to cognitive psychology or from monetarist to Keynesian economic theory. As 
will be discuses later in this chapter, these changes within disciplinary paradigms are 
often (perhaps always) associated with changes in worldview. Kuhn’s most commonly 
used examples were Aristotle’s analysis of motion, Ptolemy’s computations of planetary 
position, Lavoisier’s application of the balance and Maxwell’s mathematisation of the 
electromagnetic field: SSR 23. 
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of phenomena can be assessed (rather than by, for example, assessing 
inclusion on the basis of a list of criteria). Thus, in the sense that we can 
point to exemplars that define the paradigm of a discipline, the paradigm 
for Kuhn does have a strongly analytical dimension: 
Close historical investigation of a given specialty at a given time 
discloses a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of 
various theories in their conceptual, observational and 
instrumental applications. These are the community’s paradigms, 
revealed in its textbooks, lectures and laboratory exercises. By 
studying them and by practicing with them, the members of the 
corresponding community learn their trade.29  
 
For Kuhn, this analytical element of the paradigm is composed largely of 
rules and doctrine, both of which would be readily identifiable and familiar 
to students and practitioners in the disciple of law (the legal community). 
However, there is also, Kuhn argues, a strong and necessary cultural 
element to a paradigm. We should not conclude that just because a 
paradigm is hypothesised to have set of definitive and shared exemplars 
or rules at its core, that this guarantees paradigm status. 
 
Kuhn argues that practitioners will often work with the agreed analytical 
framework of their field or discipline without a full understanding of how 
that framework came to be paradigmatic. Some may even disagree about 
a precise formulation of the rules, although they agree on how they apply. 
Kuhn says that: 
They can agree that [the rules of a paradigm] have produced an 
apparently permanent solution to a group of outstanding problems 
and still disagree, sometimes without being aware of it, about the 
particular abstract characteristics that make those solutions 
permanent. They can, that is, agree in their identification of a 
paradigm without agreeing on, or even attempting to produce, a 
full interpretation or rationalization of it.30  
 
In this sense, claims Kuhn, the existence of a paradigm assumes a set of 
defining rules or exemplars, but the justification for those exemplars, or an 
                                                 
29 
 Ibid 43. 
30 
 Ibid 44. 
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understanding of their historical development, is not required.31 In fact, the 
historical development of a field will usually appear smooth, as if there 
have been no really fundamental changes at all, but simply a few 
incremental and pragmatic developments to cater for new data. He 
observes that the fact that scientists do not routinely seem to ask or 
debate what makes a particular problem or solution legitimate (particularly 
during a time of normal science) gives the impression that they know the 
answer to that critical question (regardless of whether they do or not). As 
will be discussed in Chapter 4, it is probably the case that many (or most) 
lawyers have little knowledge of how the rules of adversarialism evolved in 
either a historical or analytic sense.32 They argue about exactly what the 
legal rules are in a given matter, or how they ought to be applied, but they 
largely agree that whatever the outcome, the rules must conform with the 
adversarial exemplars of due process, compliance with existing legislation 
and common law, and the primacy of individual legal rights.33 
 
                                                 
31 
 Although there is strong focus on theory in SSR, there is a consistent thread of 
emphasis on the day-to-day practice within a discipline in Kuhn’s analysis of disciplinary 
change. Kuhn often uses the phrase ‘scientific practitioner’ and he consistently articulates 
the processes of both normal science and revolution on terms of practice, of what 
individuals are doing. Thus, although ‘paradigm’ is often used by others to refer to large 
theoretical constructs or to a whole research agenda, Kuhn sees this wider framework as 
determined by, and not determinative of, practice. That is a good fit for the obvious 
dichotomy in law between those doing jurisprudence, those practicing law and those 
making it. See Joseph Rouse, ‘Kuhn’s Philosophy of Scientific Practice’ in Thomas 
Nickles (ed), Thomas Kuhn (2010). 
32 
 There is no doubt that Kuhn intended the paradigm concept to apply to academic 
disciplines, specifically the natural sciences. However, it is, as we shall see, equally 
applicable to pure/theoretical strands of a discipline. Lawyers and judges are, by 
necessity, students of both the substantive law and of legal theory. 
33 
 Whereas, in Chapter 5, a posited therapeutic paradigm might require compliance with 
therapeutic exemplars, such as the healthiest outcome for a particular person, in addition 
to the traditional forms of due process. In other words, therapeutic and adversarial 
exemplars would each be necessary but neither would always be sufficient to ensure 
compliance with the paradigm. 
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Kuhn believed that the cultural dimension to the paradigm concept was 
both the least understood and most important sense of the term. He is 
more recently (but not uncontroversially) being interpreted as a 
postmodern theorist, in that he sees culture as having a constitutive rather 
than auxiliary role in the defining of a discipline. The relative importance of 
culture compared to other constitutive factors is emphasised but not 
precisely quantified by Kuhn. According to Poltnitsky: 
No paradigm, no shift of paradigm and no incommensurability of 
paradigms can be rigorously considered outside their constitutive 
cultural frameworks, even though Kuhn may not have taken this 
point to its ultimate limits.34  
 
By far the most commonly cited and applied of Kuhn’s articulations of the 
concept is that: ‘A paradigm is what members of a scientific community, 
and they alone, share’. 35  This means that the paradigm is discipline-
specific and unique to that particular discipline. An adversarial system of 
litigation, for example, if it is referable to a paradigm, is something different 
to any other adversarial system or to any other system of litigation. Since a 
paradigm is discipline-specific and unique, it is also exclusive of any other 
proposed paradigm. Kuhn suggests that the canonical literature, 
methodologies and practices of a paradigm serve for a time (meaning for 
the life of the paradigm) to implicitly ‘define the legitimate problems and 
methods of a research field for succeeding generations of practitioners’.36 
Paradigms have done this, Kuhn observes, because they share two 
essential characteristics: 
Their achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an 
enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of 
scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to 
leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners 
to resolve.37 
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Poltnitsky, above n 24, 204. 
35 
 Thomas Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and 
Change (1977). 
36 
Note that in SSR, Kuhn frequently refers to those who work in a particular science or 
discipline as ‘practitioners’, a protocol that will be followed here. 
37 
 SSR 10.  
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One popular online dictionary gives a useful definition of paradigm (and 
one that captures the sense that is alluded to in this canonical articulation) 
as: ‘A set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that constitutes 
a way of viewing reality for the community that shares them, especially in 
an intellectual discipline’.38 That set of assumptions, concepts, values and 
practices becomes paradigmatic when it is able to solve problems that the 
current set cannot. That is, what really defines a paradigm is its ability to 
convince the members of a discipline or profession to look at the world in a 
different way, as a result of an increased ability to solve intractable 
problems within the discipline. As explained in the next section, we cannot 
fully explain what a Kuhnian paradigm is without understanding how they 
change or ‘shift’ within a discipline. 
 
2.3 The Nature of Paradigm Shifts—Normal Science, Crisis 
and Revolution 
 
The true nature of a Kuhnian paradigm is best revealed by an examination 
of how paradigms change or shift. Kuhn believes that crises are a 
necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for the emergence of new 
theories. They are not sufficient because the mere appearance of 
anomalies does not spur the rejection of a paradigm. Practitioners do not, 
according to Kuhn, renounce a paradigm that led them into a crisis, even 
as they lose faith in it and consider others. A paradigm is only rejected if 
                                                 
38 
 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed, 2009). This is a 
useful definition in that it highlights both the idea of shared, assumed practices and of the 
need for paradigmatic exemplars that are used as benchmarks for proposed problem 
solutions. Another useful common use definition is ‘an intellectual framework of shared 
preconceptions and governing ideas which shapes research and analysis’: The 
Macquarie Dictionary Online. Yet another non-academic definition that does, however, 
capture some of the flavour of the importance of worldview: ‘A mind-set. A formed 
opinion. A way of seeing the world. A particular way of thinking. A fixed pattern or model. 
Your current viewpoint and process from which your mind analyses information’: 
<http://www.brainstorming.co.uk/tutorials/definitions.html>. 
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there is an alternative paradigm ready to take its place. The critical feature 
of this reality, according to Kuhn, is that the decision to reject a paradigm 
is not made solely on the basis of a failure to explain observations, 
experimental data or experience, but also on how it compares to the 
potential replacement paradigm. 
 
Kuhn uses the so-called Copernican Revolution as an illustration. This was 
the shift away from the Ptolemaic model of the movement of stars and 
planets, which was based on the assertion that the Earth was the centre of 
the observable universe, to the Copernican model, which held that the 
planets in our solar system orbited the sun. This fundamental change in 
worldview did not provide for greater accuracy in predicting the position 
and movement of heavenly bodies for practical purposes, such as 
navigation. In fact, the Ptolemaic system is still used to some extent today 
for some engineering approximations. However, the practical value of the 
Ptolemaic system masked small errors and discrepancies in predicting 
planetary position and motion so that they never quite matched exactly 
with the most careful observations. Kuhn describes the way those 
discrepancies were dealt with in this way: 
Given a particular discrepancy, astronomers were invariably able 
to eliminate it by making some particular adjustment to Ptolemy’s 
system … but as time went on, a man looking at the net result of 
the normal research effort of many astronomers could observe 
that astronomy’s complexity was increasing far more rapidly than 
its accuracy and that a discrepancy corrected in one place was 
likely to show up in another … because the astronomical 
discipline was repeatedly interrupted from outside … and in the 
absence of printing, communications between astronomers was 
restricted, these difficulties were only slowly recognised.39 
 
It would be difficult for a replacement paradigm to gain traction, because 
the natural response to anomalies, among practitioners within a given 
field, is to try and make ad hoc adjustments to the theory/paradigm to 
attempt to cater for the anomalies. Kuhn discusses individual scientists 
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 SSR 68. Kuhn cites John Dreyer, A History of Astronomy from Thales to Kepler (2
nd
 ed, 
1955) chs XI–XII, as his source for this assessment. 
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who have left their vocation because of a perception that the discipline is 
unable to tolerate crisis or to acknowledge true anomalies. That, says 
Kuhn, is the only sort of paradigm rejection that can occur where the only 
stimulus for paradigm change is the emergence of counter-instances.40 
 
Most of the so-called theoretical research related to a discipline, according 
to Kuhn, is simply a process of fine-tuning the blueprint of the field—a 
period that Kuhn refers to as normal science. This involves what he calls 
puzzle solving. Kuhn deliberately avoids calling it problem solving, 
because the finding of a solution is basically guaranteed within the 
parameters of the current paradigm, it is just a matter of moving the pieces 
around according to those methods and techniques that are consistent 
with the existing paradigmatic method. A puzzle-solving practitioner during 
a period of normal science is never working in completely novel or 
uncharted territory. 
 
A judge sentencing a drug offender in a mainstream court, for example, 
tries to construct the appropriate penalty based on existing precedents 
and legislative principles—they are not expected to design a judicially 
supervised program that will address the offender’s substance abuse. The 
latter function would not be a puzzle-solving duty that can be informed by 
the usual adversarial principles of sentencing. During a period of normal 
science, a cumulative body of knowledge and precedent develops, but the 
cumulative pool is of little use to the practitioner facing novel problems that 
appear anomalous under the existing paradigm. Thus, a mainstream judge 
who was expected, as their primary duty, to try and promote change in an 
offender would represent an anomaly (according to Kuhn) and thereby 
contributing to a crisis within the discipline.41 
                                                 
40 
 SSR ch VIII ‘The Response to Crisis’. 
41 
Recall the warning of Anthony Mason, for example, cited in Chapter 1, to the effect that:  
to treat court adjudication as if it is something less than the main game … is to 
turn constitutional tradition on its head. Courts are courts; they are not general 
service providers who cater for ‘clients’ or ‘customers’ rather than litigants. And 
if courts describe themselves otherwise than as courts, they run the risk that 
their ‘clients’ and their ‘customers’ will regard them, correctly in my view, as 
something inferior to a court.  
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The fact that judges within the various drug court jurisdictions in Australia 
do adopt this as their primary role, and do so with legislative sanction and 
approval,42 represents an anomaly within what we might call a period of 
normal science (adversarially informed judging), to the extent that 
adversarialism cannot explain what it is that the drug court judge is 
actually doing. Kuhn asserts that: 
Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful 
than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of 
practitioners has come to recognise as acute. To be more 
successful is not, however, to be either completely successful 
with a single problem or notably successful with any large 
number. The success of a paradigm is … largely a promise of 
success discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples.43 
 
Copernicus held that no system as cumbersome and inaccurate as the 
Ptolemaic could possibly be a true representation of nature. This crisis, the 
increasing discrepancy between theory and observation that was 
accelerated by the invention of more accurate and sophisticated 
telescopes and measuring instruments, was a prerequisite to Copernicus’ 
rejection of the Ptolemaic paradigm and his search for a new one.44 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Anthony Mason, ‘The Future of Adversarial Justice’ (Paper presented at the 17th Annual 
AIJA Conference, Adelaide, Spring 1999) 5 <http://www.aija.org.au/online/mason.rtf>. 
42 
 Drug Court Act 2000 (Qld) s 3 provides, for example, that the objects of the Act are 
mostly to do with issues of public health and ‘treatment’ of those who appear before the 
court. These include: (a) to reduce the level of drug dependency in the community and 
the drug dependency of eligible persons; (b) to reduce the level of criminal activity 
associated with drug dependency; (c) to reduce the health risks associated with drug 
dependency of eligible persons and (d) to promote the rehabilitation of eligible persons 
and their re-integration into the community. 
43 
 SSR 24. 
44 
 The existence of an alternative paradigm, as will be discussed in later sections, is in 
and of itself not a sufficient condition for paradigm shift; sociological and cultural factors 
both within and outside the discipline are, according to Kuhn, necessary precursors to 
change. 
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Kuhn rejects, however, the image of the lone scientific revolutionary (like 
Galileo or Copernicus) who turns orthodox worldviews on their heads. 
Most scientists (and practitioners of a discipline) are narrowly trained 
experts who focus on solving the puzzles they are confronted with until too 
many anomalies appear. A problem for a discipline, according to Kuhn, is 
that which appears to be just like any other puzzle to be solved by 
applying current methods, but which over time proves to be resistant to 
solution. Where a solution does appear to be found, it is unable to be 
explained according to those existing methods and their informing 
principles—hence, it is anomalous. Once too many such anomalies 
appear, then the paradigm is in crisis—and only at that point will there be 
a legitimate normative discourse about the future direction of the field.45 
 
The paradigm moves from crisis to revolution when a viable alternative 
paradigm is found to unite the revolutionary threads that have arisen in 
response to the crisis, and a generation of practitioners accepts the 
exemplars of the new paradigm as orthodoxy. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Paradigm shifts 
 
                                                 
45 
 This is how the current relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic 
jurisprudence (either of itself or as part of a wider non-adversarial agenda) is 
characterised by this thesis. The therapeutic jurisprudence literature indisputably 
represents an extensive normative discourse about the future of the legal system. 
Paradigm Shifts 
Pre-scientific phase—production of disciplinary exemplars 
Period of normal science—paradigm cemented and accepted, puzzles solved 
Problems arise that cannot be resolved or solutions explained by current exemplars 
Problems constitute anomalies within the paradigm 
Disciplinary crisis—critical mass of anomalies leads to a discipline in crisis 
Appearance of new exemplars—non-paradigmatic solutions to problems provide exemplars 
for an alternate paradigm 
Incommensurability—the differences between the old and new paradigm cannot be resolved 
or explained by either paradigm 
Revolutionary science—the paradigm begins to shift as more practitioners and new 
graduates adhere to the newer exemplars 
Paradigm shift—exemplars within the core of the disciplinary matrix are now either displaced 
by, or allow entry to, the exemplars of the new paradigm 
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This process is not (and probably cannot be) sudden. We do not see any 
demarcation lines where one paradigm ended and another emerged. A 
key explanation for that, asserts Kuhn, is an observed cultural reality that 
people who are generally new to the field, or whose work has previously 
been in a different or related field, often make the breakthroughs that solve 
problems and, therefore, resolve anomalies. However, these are not the 
people who sway the culture of an entire field, at least not in a short time. 
In examining some examples of those who have made breakthroughs that 
have eventually led to changed worldviews and paradigms, Kuhn says: 
obviously these are the men who, being little committed by prior 
practice to the traditional rules of normal science, and are 
particularly likely to see that those rules no longer define a 
playable game and to conceive another set that can replace 
them.46, 47 
 
In this vein, we could ask whether a therapeutic paradigm could unite (or 
provide exemplars for) some divergent strategies that have arisen in 
response to some seemingly intractable problems with adversarialism 
(such as its perceived inability to meaningfully address problems of 
recidivism among criminal offenders).48 Fuller describes the process in this 
way: 
In practice, this means that an inter-generational shift occurs, 
whereby new scientific recruits are presented with a history that 
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 As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the founders of the therapeutic jurisprudence 
movement, David Wexler and Bruce Winick, came from a psychiatry background and 
were initially concerned with advocating for change in how the courts dealt with people 
suffering from psychiatric problems. Neither of these men would claim that therapeutic 
jurisprudence represents a set of rules that can replace the adversarial system, but this is 
not required for paradigm shift. Much of the existing disciplinary matrix is usually retained 
when paradigm shifts, but the key exemplars change. 
48 
 The literature on the extent, nature, causes and history of recidivism is legion. For a 
relatively recent indication of the extent and intractability of the problem see Talina 
Drabsch, ‘Reducing the Risk of Recidivism’ (Briefing Paper 15/06, NSW Parliamentary 
Library Research Service, 2006), in which the author finds that approximately 60 per cent 
of people currently in custody in Australia have previously served a period of 
imprisonment. 
72 
 
has been rewritten to make the new paradigm look like the logical 
outgrowth of all prior research in the field.49 
 
Indeed, when it comes to therapeutic jurisprudence, this process is 
probably already quite visible in the calls, not for more problem-solving 
courts, but for the morphing of existing mainstream courts from 
adjudication to problem-solving tribunals. 50  A Kuhnian analysis would 
characterise a problem-solving process or practice in a specialist court, 
informed by therapeutic jurisprudence as an exemplar. 
 
Practitioners within a discipline need to see themselves as more than just 
applicators of a particular puzzle-solving method. They are prepared by 
their educators and mentors to contribute to the completion of the 
worldview that is assumed by their current paradigm. Interestingly, 
although SSR was written by use of examples from the physical sciences, 
these disciplines are those that have paid least attention to Kuhn. The 
most vigorous attempts to integrate Kuhn’s views into the analyses of the 
structure and dynamics of particular disciplines have come from the social 
sciences and the humanities.51 
 
As noted above, Kuhn held that an epistemological paradigm shift52 occurs 
when sufficient anomalies arise that cannot be explained by the existing 
paradigm within which the relevant field of enquiry or discipline has so far 
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Steven Fuller, Kuhn vs Popper (2003). 
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 Although the more recent therapeutic jurisprudence literature would probably prefer the 
descriptors of ‘solutions-focused’ or ‘outcomes-focused’. This theme is largely driven by 
Michael King, ‘Should Problem Solving Courts be Solution-Focused Courts?’ (2011) 80 
Revista Juridíca de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. The essential difference in terms, 
according to King, is that a ‘solution-focused’ approach supports participants’ own change 
processes, facilitating their involvement with treatment and support agencies as needed. 
51 
Fuller, above n 49, 21. Fuller is not particularly sanguine about the process of applying 
the Kuhnian principles of the social sciences, as is discussed (and responded to) further 
below. 
52 
 This he popularised as ‘a scientific revolution’. The shift is epistemological because the 
fundamental change is about what we consider to be the core knowledge of the system. 
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progressed. A shift to a therapeutic paradigm, therefore, could occur at the 
point where the adversarial paradigm is no longer able to cope with the 
number of anomalous practices occurring in the courts (in the sense of not 
providing a satisfactory explanation in the form of accepted exemplars for 
these practices). As will be discussed in Chapter 5, there are a growing 
number of non-adversarial practices currently appearing in mainstream 
civil courts, many of which expressly claim to be based on therapeutic 
principles and which cannot be explained by reference to adversarial 
exemplars. 
 
This thesis will argue (in Chapter 6) that these practices and responses 
are not yet widespread enough to constitute an identifiable paradigm shift, 
although they do provide some evidence of a Kuhnian crisis within the 
discipline, which may lead to a revolution.53 A revolution within a discipline 
is not, according to Kuhn, a dispute between an obviously right group on 
one side and an obviously mistaken group on the other. This is because 
the paradigm itself is in dispute and since the paradigm provides the only 
method accepted by the discipline for resolving disagreements about the 
meaning of data, results or methods, a quick and objective judgment about 
which paradigm should succeed is impossible.54 
 
This revolutionary period in the discipline (and this thesis characterises the 
confrontation of adversarial justice with therapeutic justice as at least 
approaching a revolution in the Kuhnian sense) is more akin to the pre-
paradigmatic phase in the early days of a science or discipline than to a 
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See, eg, Chief Justice Diana Bryant and Deputy Chief Justice John Faulks, ‘The 
“Helping Court” Comes Full Circle: The Application and Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
in the Family Court of Australia’ (2007) 17 Journal of Judicial Administration 93. 
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For example, a disagreement about the relative effectiveness of a particular court that 
has a high clearance rate and low appeal rate for criminal matters, but that seems to 
have negligible effect on recidivism rates, or in addressing the underlying causes of 
individual offending in the community within which it operates, cannot really be objectively 
settled at the moment, according to the position taken in this chapter and in Chapter 6, 
because the adversarial paradigm is under dispute.  
74 
 
period of normal science. 55  In the pre-paradigmatic phase, ‘the 
fundamentals are in question, there are meaningful possibilities of 
fundamental novelty, there is a lack of focus and a sense of casting about 
within the community’.56 As will be discussed in Chapter 4, however, the 
genesis of the common law legal system in the Western world as a 
fundamentally pragmatic institution implies that there was no sharply 
identifiable pre-paradigmatic phase. 
 
We ought not to take too far the analogy of a dispute between groups of 
practitioners and theoreticians within a discipline about a fundamental 
theoretical framework being akin to a political revolution. Although Kuhn 
himself uses the term ‘revolution’ cautiously, a few contemporary critics 
claim that he used this rhetoric a little too enthusiastically and hence 
promoted some misunderstanding. Revolutions within an academic 
discipline that lead to paradigmatic change are not quick, clearly defined 
or conceptually neat. The analogy simply reminds us that the debate or 
conflict between advocates of a theoretical status quo (in our case of the 
adversarial system) and their revolutionary counterparts (the more 
ambitious advocates of therapeutic jurisprudence and non-adversarial 
justice, if we agree to provisionally characterise them as such) cannot be 
resolved by a neutral and authoritative adjudicator according to Kuhn. 
 
Indeed, it may not even be obvious that there are distinct groups of 
opposed individuals. This is a crucial caveat from Kuhn. In a revolutionary 
phase, where members of the judiciary, the legal academy and the legal 
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 However, in the revolutionary stage there is no returning to a pre-paradigmatic stage 
that involves some sense of starting completely afresh and redefining the whole 
discipline. This is obviously always going to be the case with something as entrenched as 
the juristic model, which is so intimately linked with other major public institutions. 
56 
 Sharrock and Rupert, above n 25, 46. It is not too much of a stretch, I suggest, to how 
in recent years the fundamentals of the adversarial system are increasingly questioned, 
how we are seeing some meaningful and novel alternatives in legal practice and how 
there is some obvious casting about for new ways to resolve intractable problems in the 
legal and justice system.  
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profession are arguably split with government policy makers as to the 
future of adversarialism as the dominant paradigm, there is nobody left to 
referee. This is the phenomenon that Kuhn labels incommensurability. All 
have a vested interest and, in any case, a paradigm shift is only really 
recognised in a historical sense. To those operating within a paradigm, 
during a period of normal science, the current paradigm will appear to be 
the culmination of all that came before it, rather than as a split with the 
past. 
 
Kuhn is at pains to point out that unlike a political revolution, a revolution in 
an academic discipline is not ultimately a matter of individual choice. 
Although individual practitioners can and do change perspectives, a 
paradigm shift is not fundamentally driven by individuals changing 
allegiances or being convinced that the new paradigm is preferable. In 
fact, many practitioners never switch sides at all. The groundswell of 
change needed to truly shift a paradigm comes from those who are trained 
in the new paradigm and who shape their careers according to it.57 Those 
who do drive innovation are not likely to be changing allegiances or 
worldviews as they are likely to have never been committed to the 
orthodox paradigm in the first place. It is entirely possible that the pioneers 
of a new paradigm might be unaware, or even resistant to, the 
fundamental status of their work. I consider this possibility in more depth in 
Chapter 5. 
 
By way of example, the founders of quantum theory—Planck, Einstein and 
Schrodinger—never fully accepted that quantum theory represented a new 
paradigm or worldview. They maintained that the uncertainty principle was 
a characteristic of observation rather than of the physical universe. 
Einstein was never satisfied by what he perceived to be quantum theory’s 
intrinsically incomplete description of nature, even making attempts in his 
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Kuhn often cites the observation of Max Planck that ‘a new scientific truth does not 
triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because 
its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it’: Max 
Planck, Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers (Frank Gaynor trans, 1949) 33. 
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earlier work to disprove the uncertainty principle.58 He proposed that it 
ought to be possible, in principle, to determine both the velocity and 
direction of movement of a subatomic particle without thereby disturbing 
the particle, and for that reason the particle would have ‘real’ values of 
position or momentum. However, experiments have continually shown that 
this principle is inconsistent with the behaviour of subatomic particles. 
Einstein was arguing that quantum mechanics could not possibly be a 
complete, realistic and local representation of phenomena, given specific 
definitions of ‘realism’, ‘locality’, and ‘completeness’. 
 
If one examines the transcripts of the regular public debates between 
Einstein and Bohr about the extent to which the physical universe is in fact 
subject to quantum principles, it is clear that Einstein was so steeped in 
the existing scientific culture and worldview in which he was educated that 
it was impossible for him to accept the ultimate implications of the 
paradigm-changing research that he largely pioneered. His conceptions of 
realism and completeness were deeply entrenched in modernity.59 The 
worldviews of modernity and liberalism have, similarly, strongly influenced 
the character of the normative debates about the shelf life of 
adversarialism. 
 
Kuhn’s view is that theories (as distinct from paradigms) 60  are 
comprehensive models of reality that give meaning to facts or 
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Gerald Holton, Einstein, History, and Other Passions (1996) 177–93. 
59 
 This is why in the discussion of ‘how therapeutic jurisprudence sees itself’ in Chapter 5 
we should not arbitrarily limit the potential of therapeutic jurisprudence to provide at least 
some paradigmatic exemplars to the disciplinary matrix of a possible non-adversarial 
paradigm, simply on the basis that some key therapeutic jurisprudence advocates do not 
yet see them as such. 
60 
 Kuhn preferred to use the term ‘disciplinary matrix’ instead of ‘theory’. He held that 
‘theory connotes a more limited structure than what he had in mind as the larger 
conceptual framework within which paradigms sit. At SSR 182 he notes that: ‘I suggest 
“disciplinary” because it refers to the common possession of the practitioners of a 
particular discipline; “matrix” because it is composed of ordered elements of various sort, 
each requiring further specification’.  
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observations—a theory operates to retrospectively explain a system rather 
than being something that is a natural outcome of the system or 
observations. This means that we would see a science, or in this case, the 
legal system, as a succession of self-contained paradigms that operate to 
serve the needs of the community rather than as a series of gradually 
more accurate approximations of what the legal system ought to be in 
order to be closer to an ideal or truth. 
 
One implication of this view is that a shift from an adversarial to a 
therapeutic paradigm would likely involve a change of balance in the 
composition of the legal profession rather than a set of rational choices by 
existing practitioners or a decision by the profession as a whole to change 
paradigms. Paradigm shift is not the manifestation or end result of a set of 
rational and conclusive debates. To that extent, research (such as that 
undertaken in part in this thesis) about the dynamics of a purported 
paradigm shift will not be designed to try and sway opinion about the value 
of a new paradigm; rather, it will describe how the fundamental theoretical 
framework might change as a result of a shift and what the implications 
are for the practice of law. In other words, it detects and analyses change 
rather than advocating for it.61 
 
Kuhn certainly allows that debate will abound during a revolutionary 
phase, but claims that the new paradigm succeeds because those who 
adopt it are systemically influential and end up dominating the academic 
discourse and, therefore, indoctrinating the new generation of practitioners 
with the new paradigm. In the 1969 postscript, he makes this observation: 
Both normal science and revolutions are, however, community-
based activities. To discover and analyse them, one must first 
unravel the changing community structure of the sciences over 
time. A paradigm governs, in the first instance, not a subject 
matter but rather a group of practitioners. Any study of paradigm-
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See, eg, Christopher Slobogin, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder’ 
(1995) 1 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 193. 
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directed or paradigm-shifting research must begin by locating the 
responsible group or groups.62 
This is why Kuhn eventually describes a paradigm as a ‘constellation of 
group commitments’. 
 
Further, Kuhn was sceptical of the extent to which debates during a 
paradigm shift involved actual and direct, rational disagreement compared 
to something more akin to a religious dispute involving talking over each 
other, arguing in circles and begging the question.63 We see the circular 
nature of some arguments between therapeutic jurisprudence advocates 
and their critics quite often, since each side appeals to principles and 
goals that the other rejects as being fundamental or definitive in some 
way.64 For example, it is hard to find common ground about an argument 
that a particular legal practice ought to be reformed on the grounds that it 
has anti-therapeutic consequences if the other party disputes the 
meaningfulness of the anti-therapeutic descriptor. In this vein, Roderick 
and Krumholz assert that: 
We contend that therapeutic jurisprudence, as a ‘school of social 
enquiry’ must establish specific and precise conceptual and 
theoretical constructs prior to the application of its principles to 
‘therapeutic’ movements in the criminal justice and overall legal 
systems. One cannot ascertain the benefits of problem-solving 
courts or therapeutic lawyering techniques if one has not 
established the validity of therapeutic jurisprudence as a 
theoretical construct.65 
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 I consider this assertion in terms of some of the harsh judicial criticisms of therapeutic 
jurisprudence and problem-solving courts in Chapter 6. 
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 Dennis Roderick and Susan Krumholz, ‘Much Ado About Nothing? A Critical 
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This assertion is somewhat ironic given that there is certainly a lack of 
evidence for any coherent or systematic attempt to ‘establish specific and 
precise conceptual and theoretical constructs prior to the application of its 
principles’ in relation to the adversarial paradigm, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. If that is to be the relevant benchmark, then adversarialism 
could well be seen as lacking this same sense of validity. The adversarial 
system of litigation seems to have developed according to quite pragmatic 
imperatives rather than as the manifestation of some carefully considered 
theoretical position. Such debates, based on mutual assertions of a lack of 
‘precise conceptual and theoretical constructs’, appear to be exactly what 
Kuhn suggests characterise the revolutionary stage that occurs during a 
paradigm shift within a discipline. 
 
2.4 Paradigms in the Social Sciences and Humanities—The 
Importance of Worldview 
 
In this thesis I conceive of, and refer to, law primarily as a discipline. The 
‘discipline of law’, for the purposes of the thesis, refers primarily to the way 
law operates in application or practice, but also in conjunction with the 
academy. Kuhn himself uses the terms ‘field’ and ‘discipline’ 
interchangeably. 66  As indicated in Chapter 1, not much hangs on the 
parameters of what we refer to as the law for the purposes of the thesis, 
                                                                                                                                     
such as happiness, well-being, and quality-of-life are undeniable, but partly as a result of 
this appeal, a perplexing array of theories of well-being have evolved, each with different 
biases, core concepts, and purposes’. They acknowledge that this is not unique to 
psychology by stating that ‘[t]his is true not only across the social sciences and the 
humanities, but also within psychology’. Most usefully, they offer this:  
Indeed, there is a major dilemma for theorizing about well-being. On the one 
hand, the study of well-being has been hampered by the multiplicity of theory 
leading to a blurred and overly broad definition of well-being … we present the 
engine model of well-being, a framework that aims to make sense of the 
multiplicity of theory by organizing the constructs at hand around inputs, 
processes, and outcomes. 
66 
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so long as we acknowledge that when we talk about possible legal 
paradigms we are referring to paradigms of the same discipline or field. 
 
As discussed earlier, Kuhn acknowledged in the 1969 postscript to SSR 
that the broader of the two conceptions of the paradigm that he had 
articulated was one that ‘stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, 
values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given 
community’. 67  That conception seems amply broad enough to draw 
various conceptions of the law within its ambit. Chapter 3 makes the case 
that the discipline of law (referred to later in the thesis with more analytic 
precision as a ‘juristic model’) operates pursuant to a Kuhnian paradigm, 
but in this section I deal with the more fundamental question of whether it 
is valid to use the Kuhnian paradigm to describe the structure of 
disciplines outside of the natural sciences. 
 
In the first edition of SSR, all Kuhn’s examples of paradigm shift involve 
the natural sciences (such as physics, chemistry and biology). This is 
unsurprising, given that his work is almost exclusively concerned with the 
history and internal dynamics of science as a discipline. However, there is 
a threshold issue of whether his exclusive reference to the natural 
sciences entails that they, and only they, are disciplines capable of 
operating pursuant to a Kuhnian paradigm. 
 
Academic disciplines (and the professions they are aligned with) are 
usually clustered into groups based on commonalities of what is studied 
and how it is studied. This is both a pragmatically and conceptually 
reasonable approach given that various disciplines both complement and 
compete against each other when it comes to attracting students and 
funding. Some broad groups of disciplines are the natural sciences, the 
social sciences, the humanities, the professional sciences and the formal 
                                                 
67 
 Ibid 175. 
81 
 
sciences. Although these clusters are widely accepted and made use of, 
they are somewhat ad hoc.68 
 
In their analysis of the extent to which Kuhn has been cited in academic 
literature, Loving and Cobern found that only 8 per cent of citations of SSR 
occur in natural science journals. Significant numbers of citations come 
from law (14 per cent), psychology (13 per cent) and political science (10 
per cent).69 Their study also revealed that one of the seminal handbooks 
of qualitative research in science disciplines70 indexes ‘paradigm’ on 51 
pages but ‘Kuhn’ on only six, suggesting that the concept of the paradigm 
has moved on with a life after Kuhn. In fact, the authors indicate: 
We note that well known figures in the research community of the 
social sciences whose earlier, foundational work cited Kuhn 
heavily as providing the very context and justification for their 
views are now themselves cited heavily rather than their 
philosophical mentor Kuhn. 
 
According to Garfield, SSR was the most cited source in the arts and 
humanities between 1976 and 1983. Given that it was first published in 
1962, the 14-year gap illustrates the delay in the take-up of the paradigm 
concept from the natural sciences to the other disciplines.71 Although Kuhn 
originally intended the concept of the paradigm to apply solely to the hard 
(physical) sciences, he and subsequent philosophers of science72 have to 
some degree approved of its use in other disciplines and fields. This 
broader context will be discussed in Chapter 3 as the thesis attempts to 
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establish that it is legitimate to conceive of juristic models as paradigms in 
the Kuhnian sense.73 
 
Unsurprisingly, Kuhn’s thesis of disciplinary change as articulated in SSR 
garnered some support from the postmodern and poststructuralist 
academic communities due to its emphasis on the cultural dynamics and 
worldviews of those within the discipline, rather than on rigorous 
application of the internal (and ostensibly) objective methodology of the 
discipline. Once the drivers of disciplinary change are isolated from the 
workings of the scientific method, a deep enough wedge is driven into 
traditionally conceived conceptual differences between the sciences and 
other academic disciplines, this chapter argues, to allow Kuhn’s work to be 
applied outside the natural sciences. 
 
Kuhn conceived of the development of disciplinary knowledge as occurring 
in periodic, spasmodic ‘revolutions’, which was not a process of more 
refined theory converging on some sort of truth, but one of the 
replacement of an older order within the discipline with new ones. These 
orders are what he conceives of as paradigms. That is, within a discipline, 
social and political acceptance is as important as the viability of the 
practical theorems and exemplars that they use to solve puzzles within the 
discipline. A lone researcher who comes across a startling new discovery 
that answers seemingly intractable problems in a given field will have little 
or no effect, according to Kuhn, unless other (influential) colleagues 
champion the discovery. Revolutionary discoveries in science, he argues, 
are rarely recognised as such at the time they are made. Ingrained logical 
structures within a discipline are what practitioners see when they look at 
the history of their field, but the interaction and professional goals of the 
practitioners themselves are crucial. 
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Kuhn does not go so far as to suggest that theories in science are mere 
social constructs or that science, therefore, cannot claim to have good 
insights into objective reality. Science generally works and has produced 
myriad practical benefits. It would be wrong, for instance, to hold that Kuhn 
was a postmodernist. He does not assert that what is real or objective for 
a scientist depends wholly or even largely on political and economic 
conditions or on the worldview of the practitioner. We do not find an 
agenda, within Kuhnian scholarship, for assessing leading scientists who 
have made breakthroughs to look for their connections to issues of 
gender, sexual orientation, race or class. As will be seen near the end of 
this chapter, later philosophers of science more closely aligned with the 
postmodern movement, such as Paul Feyerabend, argued that scientific 
theories were incoherent and that other forms of knowledge production, 
such as religion and popular consensus, could be as valid in addressing 
the material and spiritual needs of their practitioners as scientific doctrine. 
 
Given that the logical positivists objected to Kuhn’s denial of the internal 
logical and structural consistency of a discipline’s content as the primary 
driver of change, and the poststructuralists’ charge that SSR is 
indefensibly eurocentric (in that its focus on the personalities and cultural 
milieu of a discipline allegedly marginalises the scientific traditions of other 
cultures as necessarily incommensurable with those of the West), there is 
clearly intellectual scope to at least attempt an application to disciplines 
outside of science.74 
 
The overuse of the terms ‘paradigm’ and ‘paradigm shift’ in popular 
culture, in academic journals and in fields of human endeavour that bear 
little procedural resemblance to the sciences with which Kuhn mostly 
concerned himself, warns against a simple assertion that SSR is relevant 
outside the hard sciences. These terms are so often used in shallow and 
clichéd ways that their use imports virtually nothing from Kuhn. A paradigm 
is more than the currently dominant exemplar underpinning a discipline: it 
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is a reflection of a particular worldview within which that exemplar 
connects to other disciplines and other types of human experience (such 
as politics, economics and ethics) and from which it draws its authority and 
normative force. Given the interrelatedness and symbiotic nature of the 
relationship between the common law legal system and other liberal 
institutions of governance, there is little point, therefore, in trying to 
conceive of a legal paradigm being a standalone phenomenon either. 
 
Kuhn devotes a whole chapter of SSR to the importance of worldview in 
paradigm shifts.75 He claims that led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt 
new instruments to look in new places and ‘the historian of science may 
be tempted to exclaim that when paradigms change, the world itself 
changes with them’.76 Since scientists see the world through the lenses of 
their disciplines, so the argument goes, this is understandable. This is 
why, Kuhn suggests, the familiar demonstrations of a switch in visual 
gestalts prove so compelling or novel (such as that of the duck and the 
rabbit excerpted above). 
 
Social science has enthusiastically adopted the relationship between a 
paradigm and a worldview. In the relevant literature, the nature of a 
worldview is often discussed by reference to the Weltanschauung—‘the 
fundamental cognitive orientation of an individual or society encompassing 
natural philosophy, fundamental existential and normative postulates or 
themes, values, emotions, and ethics’. 77  This can be more simply 
expressed as the set of experiences, beliefs and values that affect the way 
an individual or community perceives reality and responds to that 
perception. In the social sciences, and in some jurisprudential research, 
paradigm shifts within a particular discipline are said to be inevitably 
related to shifts in how a community or society goes about organising and 
understanding reality. 
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Since multiple paradigms within a given discipline would be, by definition, 
incompatible, one must be dominant at any given time. A dominant 
paradigm is usually recognised by reference to a number of essential 
characteristics. In Chapter 4, for instance, the argument is made that 
adversarialism represents the current legal (juristic model) paradigm in 
Australia. Social scientists suggest that paradigms that are either 
dominant, or approaching dominance, can be identified according to 
characteristics and indicators such as: 
 Professional organisations that give legitimacy to the 
paradigm. 
 Dynamic leaders who introduce and purport the paradigm. 
 Journals and editors who write about the system of 
thought. They both disseminate the information essential to 
the paradigm and give the paradigm legitimacy. 
 Government agencies who give credence to the paradigm. 
 Educators who propagate the paradigm’s ideas by teaching 
it to students. 
 Conferences conducted that are devoted to discussing 
ideas central to the paradigm. 
 Media coverage. 
 Lay groups, or groups based around the concerns of lay 
persons, that embrace the beliefs central to the paradigm. 
 Sources of funding to further research on the paradigm.78, 79 
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As will be further asserted and discussed in Chapter 4, the adversarial 
paradigm, if there is such a thing, is grounded in a long-established 
political and economic, liberal worldview, which holds that personal liberty 
and well-being are best obtained and maintained by competition, freedom 
to contract and the enforcement of personal rights as the primary means 
of dispute resolution and of promoting social cohesion. Within this 
worldview, some scholars argue that legal adversarialism and a culture of 
conflict have become seen as not only endemic but as paradigmatic, to 
the extent that to question them is to attack the very core of modern liberal 
society.80 
[A]dversarialism has become the predominant strand in 
contemporary western-liberal societies … Throughout the 
contemporary public sphere, competitive and conflictual practices 
have become institutionalized norms … Because of this it is often 
difficult for people to envision alternatives … a proper accounting 
should reveal that while oppositional strategies have reached a 
point of diminishing returns, non-adversarial strategies are 
emerging as the most effective methods for lasting social change 
in an age of heightened social and ecological interdependence.81 
This worldview manifests itself in the legal system, asserts Karlberg, due 
to the prevalence of a ‘normative adversarialism’—the assumption that 
contests are ‘normal and necessary models of social organization’. 
 
Similarly, Anand argues that a liberal Weltanschauung underpins the 
adversarial legal system to such an extent that no sense can be made of it 
outside of the traditional liberalist political philosophy and that the 
assumption is that the liberal political order, with its almost exclusive focus 
on the rights and liberties of the individual as the benchmark for human 
flourishing, is the most natural for human societies.82 Because it is the 
                                                 
80 
An analysis of the relationship between legal adversarialism and laissez faire liberal 
worldviews can be found in Michael Karlberg, Beyond the Culture of Contest From 
Adversarialism to Mutualism in an Age of Interdependence (2004)  
81 
Ibid 18. 
82 
Rakesh Anand, ‘Legal Ethics, Jurisprudence, And The Cultural Study Of The Lawyer’ 
(2008) 81(3) Temple Law Review 737. 
87 
 
most natural, it then assumes an aura of inevitability.83 The extent to which 
this represents a significant difficulty for those who advocate a shift away 
from an adversarial legal paradigm is something that will be addressed in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
 
An indication of the depth of concern that some judicial critics have about 
the extent to which therapeutic jurisprudence purportedly diverges from 
broader liberal principles is evident in statements such as this from US 
District Court Judge Morris Hoffman: 
If therapeutic jurisprudence were just a trendy idea that did not 
work, we could let it die a natural death. But it is not just trendy 
and ineffective, it is profoundly dangerous. Its vary axioms depend 
on the rejection of fundamental constitutional principles that have 
protected us for 200 years. Those constitutional principles, based 
on founders’ profound mistrust of government, and including the 
commands that judges must be fiercely independent, and that the 
three branches of government remain scrupulously separate, are 
being jettisoned for what we are led to believe is an entirely new 
approach to punishment.84 
 
Anand indicates that a liberal worldview is contingent rather than inevitable 
and that the sort of social and political framework for legal thought 
developed by the social contractarian scholars in early jurisprudence (such 
as Rawles) is far less compelling now than in their day: 
A particular Weltanschauung speaks to a specific understanding 
about the nature of man, the nature of the world … As the term 
itself implies, and as is perhaps immediately evident, a particular 
worldview is both historically and culturally contingent in character 
… liberalism begins with a belief in the primacy of the individual 
and in the goodness and inevitability of change. It is only within 
the context of this Weltanschauung that one can really take hold 
of liberalism’s various arguments and claims. For example [liberal 
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legal and political philosophy] … is intelligible only if one assumes 
[emphasis added] the liberal commitment to the individual as a 
truly autonomous subject and an accompanying political theoretic 
idealism. Without this perspective (which is certainly not shared 
by all), the resulting [liberal] principles of justice have limited 
intelligibility or appeal. If one grasps this state of affairs, one sees 
that liberalism is conditional, not objective, in nature. Its 
manifestation requires an epistemic commitment.85 
 
In arguing that the liberal democracies have a long history of 
proselytisation 86  and a belief that their political, and therefore legal, 
systems are inherently best practice for human well-being, Anand 
suggests that there is a deeply held faith within liberal institutions, such as 
the court system, that alternatives are unnecessary. If the paradigm is not 
broken, so to speak, then do not fix it. Her claim is that: 
Only if we acknowledge this condition can we really make sense 
of liberalism. Once we do recognize that liberal politics begins 
with a belief system, however, we can push in the direction of an 
even richer understanding of liberalism, one that places it in the 
broad, anthropological context of human cultural activity. This 
picture of liberalism, which captures its essence, in turn generates 
a powerful account of law, one that, in parallel to the 
anthropological portrait drawn of liberalism, denotes its 
fundamental nature.87 
 
There is no doubting that the common law legal and judicial system is 
mired in liberal ideology. There has always been a desire among social 
scientists to portray and define their fields as mature disciplines akin to the 
natural sciences, and to characterise them as being currently involved in 
some sort of paradigm-shifting phase where there is a struggle between 
whatever theoretical forces are currently publishing their views in that 
                                                 
85 
 Anand, above n 82, 755. As will be discussed in later chapters, the most trenchant 
liberalist criticism of therapeutic jurisprudence tends to come from members of the US 
judiciary who take quite conservative views of the constitutional limits of the judicial role. 
The extent to which these criticisms may apply in the Australian jurisdiction (in respect of 
Chapter III courts at least) will be specifically addressed in Chapter 5. 
86 
 Proselytising is the act of attempting to convert people to another opinion and, 
particularly, another religion. 
87 
Anand, above n 82, 760. 
89 
 
discipline’s journals. 88  In many instances, these competing theoretical 
forces are ideologically driven. The problem with ideologically driven 
theory in the social sciences and their associated professional disciplines 
is that the ideologies, according to Kuhn, claim to represent not just 
orthodoxy, but truth.89 For that reason, their methodologies, models and 
techniques are based on an assumption of validity—it is only the results 
and data that may be suspect. Science, according to Kuhn, involves 
methods, models and conjectures that are always tentative. 
 
The upshot of this analysis, for the purpose of the thesis, is that in a 
discipline such as law, based on ideology, those who suggest, or advocate 
for, a paradigm shift may become politically powerful (appealing to those 
who experience the ‘thrill of revisionism’) but are condemned to be 
rationally and instrumentally impotent in the long run. This means that 
without a shift in underlying ideology, paradigms cannot change.90 
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Kuhn allows that all paradigms are faced with some level of anomaly, but 
that these are usually dealt with as ‘acceptable levels of error’ or just 
marginalised, rejected out of hand or ignored (as was the case in 
astronomy before the rise of the Copernican model). However, the 
significance of anomalies varies between practitioners within a discipline. 
It is as yet unclear, for example, whether the majority of mainstream 
judges and jurists in Australia, and in other jurisdictions that convene 
specialist courts, treat therapeutic courts and problem-solving courts as 
anomalies that are either outside the real court system or as mistaken 
applications of policy—in effect, as acceptable levels of error. That would 
allow at least some of these courts to exist91 without being perceived as an 
unacceptable ideological indulgence or as a threat to the 
liberal/adversarial paradigm. 
 
It could well be that the continuation of an adversarial paradigm requires 
no particular awareness of any alternative. The acceptance and promotion 
of a paradigm at an individual level does not require that the individual is 
actually well versed in the underlying orthodoxy of the paradigm. In fact, 
the relationship between paradigms and worldviews invites either a non-
critical meta-perspective or acceptance of the paradigm as a default 
position. It would not be surprising to hear judges or lawyers declare that 
they do not operate within any particular theoretical paradigm or from any 
specific worldview. Northrop explains that reality in this way: 
To be sure there are lawyers, judges and even law professors 
who tell us they have no legal philosophy. In law as in other 
things, we shall find that the only difference between a person 
‘without a philosophy’ and someone with a philosophy is that the 
latter knows what his philosophy is, and is, therefore, more able to 
make clear and justify the premises that are implicit in his 
statement of the facts of his experience and his judgment about 
those facts.92 
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Lawyers and judges educated without reference to any overt theoretical 
perspective,93 or who have avoided reflecting on any theoretical material in 
their formal study, may well react sceptically to theoretical discussion in 
general and make the (invalid) assumption that the practice of law is a 
purely pragmatic affair.94 If that is the case, then the aim of Chapter 4 of 
this thesis, to establish that there is an adversarial juristic paradigm 
consisting of more than simply expedient and traditional pragmatism, is 
even more important to pursue. 
 
It seems self-evident that there is a strong quality of pragmatism in the 
law. Jurisprudence has a long and fecund tradition and is a continually 
developing field, but purely theoretical analyses of law and legal 
institutions may not be as influential on the real world justice and legal 
systems as may be the case with the theoretical contexts of other 
disciplines and professions. Pragmatism, in this sense, means the belief 
that an ideology, theory or proposition is true if it works satisfactorily, that 
the meaning of a proposition is to be found in the practical consequences 
of accepting it and that unpractical ideas should be rejected. The reasons 
for this are probably two-fold.95 
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First, the law exists to regulate human conduct and human relationships 
and interactions. For this reason, the law is expected to come up with 
solutions and resolutions that work in practice and that are not just 
intellectually tidy or satisfying. 96  Second, the consequences of legal 
decisions and actions being impractical can be very grave—the lives, 
liberty and well-being of people and other legal entities are intrinsically 
connected with legal outcomes and the public are perhaps more 
concerned with the practical outcomes of the legal system than theoretical 
coherence. 
 
Claims that Kuhn intended that disciplines outside the natural sciences 
ought not to be brought within the rubric of the paradigm are misplaced 
and simply wrong. Kuhn did express puzzlement that academics from 
disciplines within the arts and the humanities had taken an interest in the 
concept of the paradigm shift, and he was at pains in the original SSR text 
to identify what distinguished the natural sciences from other disciplines. 
However, in the 1969 postscript, Kuhn makes clear that his puzzlement is 
due to a belief that the process of paradigm change in these other 
disciplines seems obvious. His claim is that to the extent that SSR 
portrays scientific development as a succession of tradition bound periods 
punctuated by ‘non-cumulative breaks’, its theses are of ‘undoubted wide 
applicability’. He adds that: 
Historians of literature, of music, of the arts, of political 
development, and of many other human activities have long 
described their subjects in the same way. Periodization in terms of 
revolutionary breaks in style, taste and institutional structure have 
been among their standard tools. If I have been original with 
respect to concepts like these, it has mainly been by applying 
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them to the sciences, fields which have been widely thought to 
develop in a different way.97 
This claim that the evolution of disciplines within the natural sciences 
might occur for similarly subjective, political and human reasons as those 
in the social sciences and humanities goes a long way to explaining both 
the stern resistance towards Kuhn from the hard sciences and the logical 
positivists, and the excitement with which his work was heralded from 
without. 
 
This is not to say that Kuhn would have lumped all the academic 
disciplines together in terms of methodology or development and change 
processes. He did emphasise that there were elements of the natural 
science disciplines that seemed to set them apart. He commented on both 
the apparent lack of competing schools of thought in the ‘developed 
sciences’, for example.98 He also noted that within the natural sciences, 
the only real audience for a scientist’s work were other scientists, and that 
members of the scientific community were the only real judges of a 
scientist’s work. 99  He does not claim that these factors make science 
unique, but he does claim that they set those disciplines apart to some 
extent. Given the extent to which modern communication and publishing 
modes disseminate information rapidly and widely, especially via digital 
media, these features of the natural sciences seem much less unique 
today. Further, there is no claim in SSR that this perceived distance ought 
to preclude an application of his work to other disciplines, including law. As 
seen above, quite the opposite is true. 
 
The extent to which the wider academy has (albeit shallowly in most 
cases) adopted Kuhn’s terminology and concepts, and Kuhn’s own 
surprise that practitioners in the social sciences and humanities should 
think that paradigm shift is not integral to evolution within their own fields, 
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is ample evidence that looking for proof of Kuhnian paradigms and 
paradigm shifts outside the natural sciences is valid. 
 
2.5 Incommensurability 
 
In terms of changes in scientific paradigms, Kuhn concluded that history 
shows that a lengthy period of conflict and instability within a discipline 
follows the breakthrough and it can take centuries for the new worldview to 
dominate within culture at large. This sort of revolutionary change is rarely 
tidy and painless in any sphere of human enterprise or academic 
discipline. According to Kuhn, a student becomes a scientist or practitioner 
when they are socialised by the academy into accepting four 
characteristics of the current paradigm (rather than by learning a collection 
of formal rules about the discipline). They are: 
1. A set of shared symbolic generalisations 
2. A common model of reality 
3. Shared values as to standards and legitimate procedures 
4. Shared exemplars in the form of concrete problem 
solutions typical of the approach of the relevant 
scientific/academic community.100 
 
When a new paradigm is established, the practitioners behave and think 
(at least professionally) as though the new worldview is objective reality—
an attitude bordering on dogma. It is in this context that the period of 
normal science, involving mostly puzzle solving, takes place. As will be 
discussed later, others, most notably Karl Popper, disagreed with this 
characterisation of disciplinary change. Popper’s view was that the best 
practitioners accept that their conjectures are tentative and that they will 
be superseded in time. He argued that the Kuhnian model was only a 
relatively recent explanation of what constituted normal science. 
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Kuhn acknowledged that the pursuit of this normal science might inhibit 
some doubt and originality from the work of the typical practitioner, but that 
this freed them up to dispense with questions of definition and 
philosophical assumptions and allowed them to focus on puzzle solving. 
Later in the thesis, it will be asserted that this is precisely the environment 
in which many lawyers and judges prefer to work. They may accept that 
particular laws are tentative, but prefer to assume that the theoretical 
adversarial framework is inviolate. When a paradigm is truly entrenched, it 
is resistant to fads and transitory radical perspectives that could derail it. 
 
As observed earlier, Kuhn holds that competing paradigms are 
incommensurable—meaning that we cannot comprehend a new paradigm 
by application of the terminology and the theoretical framework of the old 
paradigm, because in some sense, when paradigms change, the world 
changes with them. Understanding the nature and effect of 
incommensurability is critical to assessing the value of looking at the 
adversarialism/therapeutic jurisprudence divide in the context of Kuhnian 
paradigms. Determining whether each may be part of some juristic 
paradigm is necessary. However, the implication of most effect, if they are 
competing paradigms (or if each is part of a larger competing paradigm), is 
that they cannot then be compared according to some terms of common 
measure or analysis. They can still be compared, but not by using each 
other’s method. 
 
That is not to say that a discipline would come to an insurmountable 
barrier and suffer developmental paralysis because advocates of different 
approaches suddenly realise that they have no basis for common 
communication and do not understand each other. It does not imply that 
real progress can only be made once advocates of competing paradigms 
learn each other’s core methods and values. That is so, claims Kuhn, 
because they generally do not even realise that they are talking at cross-
purposes. They believe that they are just in ‘straightforward disagreement, 
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that they understand each other’s position well enough, and that they can 
see just what is wrong with it’.101 Kuhn observes that: 
[the] most fundamental aspect of the incommensurability of 
competing paradigms is that there is a sense in which the 
proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in 
different worlds. One contains bodies that fall slowly, the other 
pendulums that repeat their motions again and again. In one, 
solutions 102  are compounds, in the other mixtures. One is 
embedded in a flat, the other in a curved, matrix of space. 
Practicing in two different worlds, the two groups of scientists see 
different things when they look from the same point in the same 
direction … That is not to say they see anything they please. Both 
are looking at the world and what they look at has not changed. 
But in some areas they see different things and they see them in 
different relations one to the other. 103  That is why a law that 
cannot even be demonstrated to one group of scientists may 
occasionally seem intuitively obvious to another. Equally it is why, 
before they can hope to communicate fully, one group or the other 
must experience the conversion that we have been calling a 
paradigm shift.104 
 
Chapter 6 of the thesis considers in detail whether adversarialism and 
therapeutic jurisprudence are in fact incommensurable, but it is worth 
flagging here that the property of incommensurability might well be a 
conceptual hurdle for those who advocate for a change to therapeutic (or 
any version of a post-adversarial) paradigm. Therapeutic jurisprudence 
scholars and practitioners, as we shall see, are typically very careful to 
claim that the promotion of therapeutic outcomes and processes should 
never trump or displace due process or legal rules. A naïve interpretation 
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Sharrock and Read, above n 25. This becomes evident in the current context when I 
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more substances, where one substance is dissolved in another. 
103 
 From a personal perspective, this phenomenon seems real to me when I attend 
therapeutic jurisprudence or non-adversarial justice conferences, at which the speakers 
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of paradigm theory and scholarship might well result in an incorrect 
conclusion that if therapeutic and adversarial paradigms are, in fact, 
incommensurable, then the values and principles of therapeutic wellness 
and due process are somehow unable to be balanced. I consider that 
addressing and refuting this concern and misapplication of Kuhn to be one 
of the most important outcomes of the thesis. 
 
To paraphrase and apply Kuhn’s position, advocates for competing juristic 
paradigms could not fully comprehend the other’s perspective because 
they are observing elements of a literally different legal and social world. 
Kuhn would assert three supporting hypotheses for this conclusion: 
1. Proponents of competing paradigms have different ideas about the 
importance of solving various legal problems, and about the 
standards that a solution should satisfy. 
2. The vocabulary and problem-solving methods that the paradigms 
use can be different: the advocates of competing paradigms 
subscribe to a different conceptual network. 
3. The advocates of different paradigms see the world in a different 
way because of their legal and academic training and prior 
experience as legal practitioners.105 
 
This position is sometimes criticised as being radically relativistic, in that it 
would mean that we cannot make a rational choice between competing 
paradigms if there is no common descriptive or theoretical basis by which 
to compare them. In the 1969 postscript, Kuhn addresses this criticism. He 
points out that, regardless of the content of a disciplinary paradigm, 
practitioners within other fields, or intelligent readers or academics in 
general, ought to be able to recognise both the observable data that is 
claimed to underpin the principles of the paradigm and to assess its logical 
structure according to some meta-paradigm. In that sense, there is some 
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Ibid ch XII. It is particularly noticeable that the strongest advocates and most 
successful proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence seem to be those who have had, and 
who continue to have, significant experience in courts as judges and/or lawyers. 
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process or set of holistic benchmarks external to individual paradigms by 
which they can be validated or invalidated (at least in terms of their claims 
to be a paradigm) and we need not be limited to the claim that any 
particular paradigm is right according to some criteria unique to that 
paradigm, or wrong according to criteria unique to one of its rival 
paradigms. 
 
Kuhn seems to have mellowed in his conception of incommensurability 
over time, though not the consequences of accepting the doctrine. In his 
later work, he has emphasised less the notion of some essential 
incommensurability between paradigm content and more the 
incommensurability of theories, terms, vocabularies and languages. He 
most recently referred to the concept of ‘untranslatability’ to explain the 
inevitable bind that advocates of competing paradigms are placed in.106 
He asserts that two theories would be incommensurable where there is no 
‘language into which at least the empirical consequences of both can be 
translated without loss or change’.107 There can never be such a neutral 
observation language because: 
In the transition from theory to the next, words change their 
meanings or conditions of applicability in subtle ways. Though 
most of the same signs are used before and after a revolution—
e.g. force, mass, element, compound, cell—the ways in which 
some of them attach to nature has somehow changed.108 
 
Thus, even if we were to go so far as to say that adversarialism and 
therapeutic jurisprudence have different and incompatible languages and 
theoretical frameworks (that is, that they incommensurable), assessments 
can still be made by people outside of either paradigm about their relative 
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 Kuhn develops this line of thought in Thomas Kuhn, Proceedings of the 1982 Biennial 
Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (1983) 712–16. Also in Thomas Kuhn, 
‘Dubbing and Redubbing: the Vulnerability of Rigid Designation in Scientific Theories’ 
(1990) 14 Minessota Studies in Philosophy of Science 298–318. 
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 Thomas Kuhn, ‘Reflections on My Critics’ in Imre Lakatos and Andrew Musgrave 
(eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970) 270. 
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strengths. This seems to be a reasonable position if we accept the nature 
of the relationship between a disciplinary paradigm and a wider worldview. 
That is the position that seems to have gained general, although not total, 
acceptance in the post-Kuhnian literature. Meynell explains it in this way: 
To understand a paradigm which is a rival to the one held by 
oneself is to apprehend how it accounts for a certain amount of 
observable evidence. Not to accept a paradigm, which one 
understands, is to believe that there is other evidence which tells 
against it, that is, this evidence supports some other paradigm, 
and that this other paradigm explains at least a high proportion of 
the observable evidence explained by the first.109 
 
If we accept this analysis, it is not possible for practitioners within each 
competing paradigm to engage in a true comparative discourse, because 
the principles they have learned have been acquired by the use of (and 
exposure to) exemplars rather than by the use of suitably analytical 
definitions. This gap cannot be closed by use of some common or neutral 
language, although each ought to be able to at least realise that the other 
has the status of a paradigm. That is not to say that debate or discussion 
between advocates is useless or a non sequitor (they can, of course, 
indirectly compare the relative merits of the relevant paradigms via the sort 
of meta-paradigm mooted by Kuhn above), but it does mean that a shift 
between paradigms will not occur as a result of the disciplinary content of 
such debate. 
 
2.6 Alternatives to Kuhn—Continued Relevance 
 
Although for the purposes of the social sciences and other disciplines 
(such as law and jurisprudence) that are apart from the natural sciences, 
the concepts of the paradigm, paradigm shift and incommensurability are 
obviously of great benefit in understanding how the disciplines change and 
evolve, the more technical aspects of the debate between Kuhn and later 
philosophers of science such as Popper, Lakatos and Feyerabend are of 
less benefit. 
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This chapter does not, for that reason, make any detailed assessment or 
application of the relative merits, for example, of the debate between Kuhn 
and his critics on the relative values of the concepts of verification and 
falsifiability in either proving or disproving theories. 110  However, it is 
necessary to briefly examine why Kuhn’s model of disciplinary change is 
still relevant and valid in the face of some of its major critics. It would be 
somewhat pointless to propose or examine a Kuhnian model of change 
within law if the Kuhnian model did not continue to attract support among 
theorists or to resonate for practitioners. 
 
We can assert, at least, that disciplines such as law are based on 
theoretical frameworks informed by a range of observable phenomena, 
policies, practices and principles—and it seems counterintuitive to argue 
about whether a single anomalous result or observation in the practice of 
law or the running of a court program invalidates that theoretical 
framework. A non-falsifiable theory or hypothesis (in the sense meant by 
Popper) can usually be expressed as a simple statement, such as: ‘there 
exists an offender who completed a drug court program but then re-
offended’. It is a simple matter to verify whether or not this statement is 
true by producing the recidivist offender. However, since this statement 
does not specify who the alleged recidivist is or in which court the program 
took place, it is not possible to prove that the recidivist does not exist. In 
other words, it is impossible to falsify the statement. 
 
However, just because that statement cannot be falsified does not mean 
that it is necessarily true. Of course, it would be extraordinary if there was 
not some person for whom a drug court program did not ‘work’. The point 
is that law is not a natural science and within the discipline we do not 
really make claims and devise theories based on hypotheses that can be 
easily tested by simple observations. To that extent, Popper’s criticism that 
a theory can be rejected in the presence of one simple counter-example is 
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Popper suggested that a theory can never be fully verified, but only falsified.  
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of even less relevance to the agenda of the social sciences and 
humanities. 
 
According to Popper, a theory is only of legitimate use to a discipline if it is 
falsifiable, and should be rejected as soon as it is falsified. A theory is 
falsified if even one single and reproducible contrary experience or result 
is detected. It is arguable that this criticism is too narrow to fit even the 
concept of a theory in the natural sciences and that it conflates a theory 
with a hypothesis. If we hypothesised that no mainstream court has ever 
applied a principle derived from the therapeutic jurisprudence movement, 
for example, then that hypothesis could be falsified if we observed a court 
that did this. However, if we were to reject the theory that the adversarial 
sentence hearing is the best method of achieving the objectives for 
imposing a sentence, on the basis of observing one successful drug court, 
that would seem highly premature.111 
 
Kuhn conceives of the paradigm as existing within a disciplinary matrix, 
meaning the set or theoretical principles, values, methods and techniques 
that the members of a discipline collectively commit to. Unless a 
practitioner commits to the current disciplinary matrix, they cannot work 
within the existing paradigm. This conservative thread to Kuhnian theory is 
what fundamentally separates him from Popper and some latter theorists 
who claim that an important quality in any scientist/practitioner is a desire 
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A number of commentators have observed that if Popper’s position about falsification 
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metal, there is a temperature at which it will melt’ does not seem to be necessarily 
capable of falsification. There must always be a higher temperature than the one used in 
any test, at which temperature the metal might actually melt. Whether we had the means 
to generate that temperature would be irrelevant for the purposes of the falsification 
principle. 
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to continually attempt to disprove their core positions (by looking for 
falsifying examples).112 
 
Popper would hold that just a single anomaly (provided that it can be 
reproduced) is enough of a basis to reject any theory/paradigm. Kuhn 
would claim that during periods of normal science, practitioners do not 
make attempts to prove or disprove paradigms/theories. Anomalies are 
either explained away or ignored until that critical point at which too many 
have arisen (as illustrated by the way in which anomalies within the 
Ptolemaic system were dealt with). For many years, for example, the 
Family Court of Australia operated primarily according to orthodox 
adversarial principles despite the fact that this caused well-recognised 
anti-therapeutic effects for litigants. These were either ignored or 
explained away as the price we pay for objective justice.113 
 
Popper’s conception of the processes of change in the theoretical 
framework of a discipline does seem excessively positivist and pragmatic, 
and for this reason the Kuhnian position has prevailed among the majority 
of theorists in both the sciences and the social sciences. According to 
Popper, a paradigm change would be compelled by a single reproducible 
anomaly, but Kuhn asserts that there is no real or identifiable decision to 
change to a new paradigm and during a revolutionary phase there may be 
a number of new competing paradigms to choose from. Later analysis of 
the Kuhnian paradigm shift has strongly supported the view that the 
adoption of new disciplinary matrices are heavily influenced by socio-
political factors. In the legal sphere, a decision to fundamentally change 
the style of mainstream judging to anything but an adversarial process 
would need to be political and to have widespread community approval. 
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It is also worth noting that Popper has a wider normative agenda than 
Kuhn and would accuse Kuhn of taking an authoritarian view of academic 
progress that mandates some sort of blueprint for change. He sees a 
practitioner’s receptiveness to criticism and then to possible change rather 
as a personal ethic or civic duty.114 In his first major work, Popper claims 
that progress in a discipline is just one element of a wider process or 
program of social and political change in which we search for an ideal 
through a system of approximations by trial and error. Popper claims that 
the key problem with the Kuhnian concept of the paradigm shift is that a 
new paradigm subsumes the existing paradigm and, therefore, the 
assumption that the process of trial and error brings us close to the ideal 
regardless of the outcome of the trial; that is, that a new paradigm is 
necessarily progress. 
 
Although it might be appealing to contextualise therapeutic jurisprudence 
reforms as being part of a wider social trend, this is not necessarily the 
case, and it could be argued that such reforms are contrary to some 
measureable social dynamics (such as the rise or at least maintenance of 
levels of public punitiveness towards issues of law and order and 
sentencing).115 The extent to which contemporary academics (including 
legal researchers) apply Kuhnian concepts to such a wide range of 
disciplines mitigates against any need for a deeper study of the criticisms 
of Kuhn’s work in relation to paradigms and paradigm shifts.116 However, 
two other lines of general research are also worth a brief mention. Imre 
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Lakatos, a student of Popper’s, has made attempts to reconcile Kuhn’s 
position with the requirements of falsification by claiming that it is the 
falsification of programs of research that progress a discipline, rather than 
simply the falsification of universal statements.117 
 
Of perhaps more interest are the claims by Paul Feyerabend that there are 
no methodological rules that all practitioners use. He objected to the idea 
of any unique and prescriptive methodological rules on the grounds that 
this would act to limit what constituted research and stymie progress within 
a field. His concern with the notion of a paradigm was, therefore, that it 
prescribes certain methodology(s). He recommended that there ought to 
be tolerance within any discipline for a certain amount of theoretical and 
methodological anarchy, to encourage diverse and innovative research. 
 
One of the criteria for evaluating scientific theories that Feyerabend 
attacks is the consistency criterion. He points out that to insist that new 
theories be consistent with old theories gives an unreasonable advantage 
to the older theory. He makes the logical point that being compatible with a 
defunct older theory does not increase the validity or truth of a new theory 
over an alternative covering the same content. That is, if one had to 
choose between two theories of equal explanatory power, to choose the 
one that is compatible with an older, falsified theory is to make an 
aesthetic rather than a rational choice. The familiarity of such a theory 
might also make it more appealing to practitioners, since they will not have 
to disregard as many cherished prejudices. Hence, that theory can be said 
to have an unfair advantage. Feyerabend observed (paraphrasing 
Kierkegaard) that: 
For is it not possible that science as we know it today, or a 
‘search for the truth’ in the style of traditional philosophy, will 
create a monster? Is it not possible that an objective approach 
that frowns upon personal connections between the entities 
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examined will harm people, turn them into miserable, unfriendly, 
self-righteous mechanisms without charm or humour? ‘Is it not 
possible,’ asks Kierkegaard, ‘that my activity as an objective [or 
critico-rational] observer of nature will weaken my strength as a 
human being?’ I suspect the answer to many of these questions is 
affirmative and I believe that a reform of the sciences that makes 
them more anarchic and more subjective (in Kierkegaard’s sense) 
is urgently needed.118 
 
It is not easy to respond to Feyerabend’s concern that such an incremental 
succession of paradigms may lead to undesirable conservatism and, 
perhaps, to a degree of self-legitimisation.119 We can observe, though, that 
the legal system has seen very few (if any) paradigm changes and that if 
we were to reject the possibility of a shift from an adversarial to a 
therapeutic paradigm simply on the grounds that the therapeutic paradigm 
had an unfair advantage over other possible contenders (on the grounds it 
was to some extent reconcilable with such institutions as, say, the existing 
common law), then the other contending paradigms would almost certainly 
have no chance of success in any case. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
The broader of Kuhn’s two conceptions of the paradigm discussed in this 
chapter, which equates it with the entire constellation of beliefs, values 
and techniques shared by the members of discipline, is of little use in 
terms of analysing the relationship between adversarialism and 
therapeutic jurisprudence. As will be seen in Chapter 4, it would simply be 
wrong to conceive of our current legal system as being wholly referable to 
an adversarial ethos in this way. There are many processes and roles in 
the practice of law that are clearly not adversarial. 
 
The narrower and more clearly thought out conception of the paradigm 
from the 1969 postscript is that which has fascinated a range of disciplines 
                                                 
118 
Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (1975) 154. 
119 
 However, Kuhn could well share similar concerns. Kuhn was not concerned to defend 
the process of change in science but to explain it. 
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across the social sciences and humanities, and is what will concern us for 
the purposes of this thesis. The idea of a paradigm that stands as one sort 
of element in that constellation, comprising a set of concrete puzzle 
solutions that act as exemplars against which to assess principles and 
practices within the wider disciplinary matrix is the Kuhnian phenomenon 
that provides the most powerful mechanism for examining the relationship 
between two significant schools of thought in a professional and academic 
discipline. 
 
Thus, the narrower of these two conceptions provides the sharpest focus 
for measuring the degree of incommensurability between purported 
paradigms and hence offers the best analytical tool for delineating the 
relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism. The 
next step in that process is to consider whether legal systems (juristic 
models) can be validly conceived of as entities that operate pursuant to a 
Kuhnian paradigm. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, I undertook a brief analysis of the trend in which Kuhnian 
principles seem to have migrated from the hard sciences into the social 
sciences and humanities,1 perhaps as part of the wider focus on social 
and political worldviews as contexts for change in the intellectual and 
academic trajectory from modernity to postmodernism. I will not consider 
in any detail possible postmodern criticisms of Kuhn. However, I note that 
the Kuhnian paradigm is not equivalent to the phenomenon of the 
modernist grand narrative of which postmodernism is so critical. Indeed, 
Kuhn would not claim that a paradigm is somehow a product of nature but 
is a product of the collective will of those who propose and practice it. He 
argued that new paradigms are no more valid (in the sense that they are 
somehow truer representations of some natural order of things) than the 
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 ‘Law’ is most often situated within the humanities, given its concern with analytical 
statements and research (the so-called doctrinal method) rather than with social fact that 
informs the methods of the social sciences. For the purposes of this chapter, the 
distinction is moot. 
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older ones they replace—they are simply more useful and more widely 
accepted. 
 
Kuhn was deeply suspicious of intellectual and scientific progress. He 
characterises scientists as a self-regulated guild that banishes and 
marginalises those who dissent, spends its time almost exclusively with 
the practical minutiae of disciplinary practice (puzzle solving) and 
‘sometimes drastically distorts the discipline’s past’. 2  Thus, when 
discussing the history and structure of change in the legal system, which is 
an important theme in the thesis, I do not conceive of the task as 
analysing and explaining some grand narrative of law. However, in 
analysing the legal system in terms of Kuhnian paradigms, there is an 
obvious threshold question as to whether it is a system capable of such 
(Kuhnian) analysis. 
 
In this chapter, therefore, I consider whether legal systems (which I will 
conceive of as the professional and practical manifestations of juristic 
models) can be validly conceived of as the sort of disciplinary matrices 
that Kuhn held operated pursuant to a paradigm. It is necessary to 
establish this first in order to then progress to the question of whether 
adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence comprise, or are situated 
within, different paradigms (in chapters 4 and 5) and what they are then 
paradigmatic of—and finally to investigate (in Chapter 6) whether they are, 
therefore, incommensurable. 
 
Thus, I will not assert here that a juristic model is the paradigm that 
underpins the operation of a particular legal system, but that legal systems 
are informed by juristic models, which can be dependent upon a set of 
paradigmatic exemplars shared by practitioners who act in accordance 
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 At SSR 167, he says that ‘a member of a scientific community is like the typical 
character of Orwell’s 1984, the victim of a history written rewritten by the powers that be’. 
If there were to be any grand narrative of a discipline, according to Kuhn, then it would be 
written by those working pursuant to the current paradigm and hence written as a 
distorted description of ‘progress’. 
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with, and acceptance of, that model. If law as a discipline (in the Kuhnian 
sense) is a social science or humanity, then based on the discussion in 
Chapter 2, that should be possible.3 
 
3.2 Disciplinary Maturity 
 
Kuhn makes some interesting observations about the emergence of an 
initial (or foundational) paradigm in new disciplines, or professions, within 
science—as opposed to the initial paradigms that may have informed 
other fields. He says: 
In the sciences (though not in fields like medicine, technology, 
and the law, of which the principal raison d’etre is an external 
social need), the formation of specialised journals, the formation 
of specialists societies, and the claim for a special place in the 
curriculum have usually been associated with a group’s first 
reception of a single paradigm.4 
 
Once a paradigm is operant and accepted, practitioners within the relevant 
discipline no longer feel it necessary to attempt to start from first principles 
whenever they publish, offer definitions of the field or delineate it in their 
writings. That work is left for textbooks.5 Practitioners start to write mainly 
for other professionals within the paradigm whose knowledge can be 
assumed. The original research becomes more inaccessible to the general 
reader. Kuhn expressly allowed, writing in the mid 1970s, that this 
inaccessibility is beginning to characterise some of the social sciences. 
Indeed, a practitioner within a field that operates according to an 
established paradigm is more likely to see his reputation tarnished by 
writing foundational works such as textbooks—the basic exemplars in the 
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 ‘Discipline’ can refer to both the pure academic process or to the academic process and 
the relevant professional and social activities linked to it. For example, theoretical physics 
and applied physics are both parts of the discipline of physics according to Kuhn.  
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 Ibid 20. Here Kuhn argues that ‘[g]iven a textbook, the creative scientist can begin his 
research where it leaves off and thus concentrate exclusively upon the subtlest and most 
esoteric aspects … that concern his group … his work only expressed to professional 
colleagues … whose knowledge of a shared paradigm can be assumed’. 
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field need no explanation or justification for those actually working within 
it.6 Kuhn observes that once a field reaches the point where its practical 
functions and applications are happening smoothly, to the extent that a 
coherent core of received principles seems to be informing day-to-day 
work, then meta-analysis and theoretical reflection can take place: 
Acquisition of a paradigm and of the more esoteric type of 
research it permits is a sign of maturity in the development of any 
given scientific field.7 
 
If we grant then, that disciplines outside the hard sciences are capable of 
being conceived of as subject to Kuhnian paradigms (as was argued in 
Chapter 2), then it is necessary to establish whether within the rubric of 
the law there is something that can be coherently and analytically 
articulated as such a discipline. An obviously important consideration and 
challenge is to delineate with sufficient clarity what is meant by concepts 
such as the law, the legal system, the justice system and other general 
descriptions of those fields and institutions to which researchers and 
practitioners suggest that therapeutic jurisprudence principles might apply 
in a wider sense, as a precursor to considering whether we can conceive 
of these concepts as operating according to a discrete paradigm.8 There is 
an element of vagueness about this in the literature that is perhaps 
reflective of the allegations of vagueness and indeterminacy that are 
sometimes levelled at the therapeutic jurisprudence movement itself. 
 
In a paper that does conceive of therapeutic jurisprudence as a paradigm,9 
for example, Freiberg conceives of it as having relevance to entities 
variously described as ‘the wider judicial and correctional system’, ‘the 
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 By the same token, there is a danger in trying to be too pedantic and exclusive in the 
definition process. The ambit of what is caught by terms such as ‘legal system’ or ‘justice 
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criminal justice system’, ‘court practices’, ‘traditional institutions of criminal 
justice’, ‘court system’, ‘the courts’, ‘the larger court structure’, ‘broader 
judicial enterprise’ and ‘larger trial court systems’.10 Without attempting 
much in the way of analysing the nature of a paradigm or what 
adversarialism is actually a paradigm of, Freiberg asserts (in the abstract 
to the paper) that: 
recent changes to court practices manifested in drug courts, 
domestic violence courts, mental health courts and Koori courts 
can be generalised to the wider judicial and correctional system 
through an understanding of the key features of problem oriented 
courts and the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence. It argues 
further that therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice have 
in common a recognition of the importance of factors such as 
trust, procedural fairness, emotional intelligence and relational 
interaction which, if applied more broadly, can provide a 
constructive alternative to the flawed adversarial paradigm which 
presently dominates the criminal justice system.11 
 
This sort of representation of the relationship between therapeutic 
jurisprudence and adversarialism is relatively common in the literature and 
perhaps understandably so. 12  It contains three assumptions that are 
explored in depth in chapters 4 to 6. They are: 
1. that adversarialism constitutes a paradigm13 
                                                 
10 
 Arie Freiberg, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Australia: Paradigm Shift or Pragmatic 
Incrementalism?’ (2003) 20(2) Law in Context 6–7, 18–20. 
11 
 Ibid 1 (this extract is the abstract to the paper). A few years later, Freiberg seemed to 
have broadened his scope somewhat by suggesting the emergence of a ‘non-adversarial 
paradigm’: Arie Freiberg, ‘Non-adversarial Approaches to Criminal Justice’ (2007) 16 
Journal of Judicial Administration 205. 
12 
See also Susan Daicoff, ‘Growing Pains: The Integration Vs Specialisation Question for 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and other Comprehensive Law Approaches’ (2008) 30 
Jefferson Law Review 551; Warren Brookbanks, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving 
an Ethical Framework’ (2001) Journal of Law and Medicine 328, 329; David Wexler, 
‘Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (1995) 1(1) Psychology, Public 
Policy and Law 220. 
13 
 Or at least operates pursuant to a paradigm. Now that this sort of distinction has been 
made, that is between something that ‘is’ a paradigm and something that operates 
pursuant to a paradigm, I will adopt the simpler analytical approach of using the two 
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2. that this adversarial paradigm is flawed 
3. that therapeutic jurisprudence 14  is an alternative (and arguably 
superior) paradigm. 
Chapters 5 and 6 consider the implications of conceiving of therapeutic 
jurisprudence as being part of a discrete therapeutic paradigm (rather than 
itself comprising one) and posits whether this therapeutic paradigm is 
incommensurable with the adversarial paradigm. Whether it is, or is part 
of, a superior paradigm is not a focus here. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that to conceive of something as a paradigm 
does not entail an assertion that it is somehow a complete system of 
theory or practice. A shift in paradigm, as was discussed in the previous 
chapter, entails a shift in the core focus and values of a discipline that 
generates new exemplars for testing new theories and practices within a 
discipline. Much of what is done in the replaced paradigm may be retained 
within the changed disciplinary matrix. It is important to note this in order 
to avoid the concerns, made by some therapeutic jurisprudence scholars 
and critics, that therapeutic jurisprudence is not some sort of cult, 
panacea, substitute for rigorous analysis of facts and law or an end in 
itself.15 Even if we were to accept the strong position contained within 
statement (3) above, this would not entail that therapeutic jurisprudence 
provides the theoretical or normative basis for everything carried out within 
the rubric of the law. 
 
A shift in paradigm could even be characterised as simple and broad a 
process as the law being fundamentally concerned with refereeing a 
dispute between parties to decide a winner based on accepted procedural 
                                                                                                                                     
concepts interchangeably from here on. For the purposes of this part of the thesis at 
least, very little hangs on the distinction. 
14 
Freiberg does obviously conceive of therapeutic jurisprudence in this statement as part 
of a wider and more holistic approach to ‘law’, and this issue is dealt with in more detail in 
Chapter 5. 
15 
Ian Freckelton, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The 
Price and Risk of Influence’ (2008) 30 Jefferson Law Review 575, 576. 
113 
 
rules, to being fundamentally concerned with seeing itself as a social force 
potentially enhancing or inhibiting therapeutic outcomes. To accept the 
latter as a fundamental focus would not entail losing all the adversarial 
qualities of the former, but it would (at least) entail that a therapeutic filter 
might be applied to all legal processes a priori. 16  This filter would, 
however, contain some paradigmatic exemplars that would require 
compliance. We could propose, for example, that where there is a choice 
between two ways of conducting a witness examination, where both 
comply with rules of due process and substantive law, but where one will 
produce demonstrably less anti-therapeutic effects for the witness, then 
that latter form of examination ought to be conducted.17 It is virtually de 
rigueur in contemporary therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship to note that 
what was once an approach to the reform of mental health law and 
practice has broadened into many other areas of law and to list a whole 
host of those areas. However, the focus of therapeutic jurisprudence on 
the emotional and psychological well-being of those involved in the legal 
system, in ways such as this, is a logical consequence of that early focus. 
 
In an early paper on the scope of therapeutic jurisprudence, Wexler asked: 
Once one starts approaching legal areas with the use of the 
therapeutic jurisprudence lens, who can tell what one will find? If 
certain legal arrangements or procedures seem to lead to high 
stress, anger, feuding behaviour, even violence between different 
parties, neighbours, riparian land owners and so forth, those 
arrangements and procedures may indeed become ripe for 
therapeutic jurisprudence inquiry.18 
                                                 
16 
Wexler allows that therapeutic jurisprudence is not new in that it provides a therapeutic 
lens with which to examine existing and proposed laws, procedures and roles. However, 
what does seem to be new, he claims, is that it ‘brings together and situates under one 
conceptual umbrella areas that previously seemed disparate, many of which were 
developed in isolation … therapeutic jurisprudence itself provides a lens and a new scope 
of scholarly inquiry’: David Wexler, ‘Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law’ (1992) 
16(1) Law and Human Behaviour 236. 
17 
 Something like this sort of evolution has occurred in relation to especially vulnerable 
witnesses such as children and victims of sexual abuse. 
18 
David Wexler, ‘Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (1995) 1(1) 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 220, 228. 
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3.3 Conservatism and Pragmatism in Juristic Models 
 
In the subsequent 17 years since the publication of this paper by Wexler, 
there has indeed been a very significant spread of therapeutic 
jurisprudence principles and practices into both specialist and mainstream 
courts and legal practices. However, Wexler went farther and noted that 
until that time the bulk of therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship had been 
micro-analytical rather than macro-analytical. He saw it as a problem that 
so much therapeutic jurisprudence writing and research is ‘centrist’ in that 
it seeks to reform the law rule by rule and procedure by procedure, rather 
than to take the transformative approach championed by the so-called 
‘outsider’ movements in jurisprudence such as critical legal studies, critical 
race theory and feminist jurisprudence. He sees it as a potential weakness 
that much social science research and scholarship limits itself to micro-
level recommendations and criticisms of the legal system. He notes that 
there was certainly no intention to construct a ‘Therapeutic State’, but 
argued that a macro-analytic therapeutic jurisprudence was needed (and 
was emerging).19 
 
This issue of whether therapeutic jurisprudence can be conceived of as 
more than a micro-analytical process or filter depends on (to some extent 
at least) whether it can be characterised as a paradigm in the Kuhnian 
                                                 
19 
According to Wexler, micro-analytical therapeutic jurisprudence is not limited to work on 
an individual case, client or problem. He asserts that it is more akin to a law reform 
process in which the practitioner or researcher attempts to affect all future similar issues 
or instances of the rule or procedure. In an earlier paper—David Wexler, ‘Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship’ (1993) 11 Behavioural 
Sciences and the Law 17—Wexler had argued that therapeutic jurisprudence reflects 
changing conceptions of the law and legal scholarship and also made some comments 
about the relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence, the social sciences and the 
discipline of law. His view was that therapeutic jurisprudence does raise questions that 
produce answers that are both empirical and normative, but the proper task of the legal 
scholar is not to generate data but to use data in framing recommendations and then to 
perhaps (at 19) ‘suggest important and relevant lines of inquiry to social scientists’. 
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sense. At the very least, a Kuhnian analysis assists in providing some 
possible criteria for the validity of broader application. By conceiving of 
both adversarialism, and a purported therapeutic alternative, as operating 
according to a paradigm-based juristic model, we can be more precise 
than other contributors to the literature whose work is hampered, to some 
extent, by an unclear picture of what theoretical perspectives and 
assumptions would need to change in order for therapeutic jurisprudence 
to obtain significant mainstream influence and credibility.20 
 
A juristic model would include a theoretical framework, and disciplinary 
matrix, on which the processes of civil and criminal litigation in courts are 
based. Those processes (which I suggest sprout from common theoretical 
and procedural roots) include at least legal and judicial reasoning, legal 
and judicial methodology, legal and judicial interpersonal rules and 
techniques, criminal and civil procedure, legal and judicial ethics and legal 
epistemology. This list is not meant to be exhaustive nor is any item within 
it necessary. The juristic model would include what Kuhn referred to as the 
disciplinary matrix and the rationales and theories that inform and regulate 
it. The relevant paradigm at the heart of the juristic model would consist of 
the relevant set of exemplars. 
 
If we accept, for the sake of the analysis contained in this thesis, that we 
have a legal system that is informed by a paradigm (and most would agree 
that if so, then this is an adversarial paradigm), then we accept that there 
is something that that paradigm is ‘paradigmatic of’. This may sound 
somewhat tautological, but it simply highlights that there is no real need to 
precisely or exhaustively describe what either a legal system or a juristic 
model are. The legal system is something that can be (and very frequently 
is) referred to in professional and academic discussions and analyses 
between practitioners within the discipline(s) of law. It is a useful holistic 
                                                 
20 
This is not to suggest that a fully worked theoretical framework for the paradigm needs 
to be articulated in order to ‘sell’ the paradigm, but that a generation of jurists who are 
immersed in the paradigm would need to develop and flesh out such a framework if it was 
to survive. 
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descriptor. Juristic model is simply a more analytical term, adopted in this 
chapter, for reasons that are discussed below.21 
 
As has been previously noted, law is an inherently pragmatic and 
conservative discipline. In explaining why it is that the adversarial system 
is in fact paradigmatic, I rely to some extent on that observation to ground 
the assertion that jurists value certainty.22 However, we ought not to over-
emphasise this conservatism to the extent of labelling jurisprudence or the 
study of law as an attempted exercise in simple empiricism, as some 
commentators do. Some social science theorists take the view that there 
is a profound difference between what they conceive of as legal thinking 
and thinking within their own disciplines, based on the perception that 
legal thinkers take the law as a given. Campbell, for instance, has this to 
say about legal thought by way of comparison to what he calls 
‘sociological thought’: 
Lawyers habitually operate within the framework of the legal 
system and adopt for their own standpoint the interpretations of 
reality contained in the law. This may be done consciously or 
unconsciously … sometimes with good justification and 
sometimes without. Allied to this assumption of ‘the law as there’ 
are a whole host of other assumptions as to the functions and 
utility of law as a practical instrument for social control. They 
impart to legal thought a practical and pragmatic flavour. Taking 
as given, the legitimacy of established norms and procedures, 
and accepting their purpose to be that of defining and controlling 
human behaviour, legal thought virtually constitutes an official 
version of knowledge. That this is not the case with sociological 
thought is a point that requires no elaboration.23 
 
Campbell claims that this acceptance of law ‘as a given’ rests on a 
‘massive assumption’ that the contents of laws are in some sense 
descriptions of the actual world. The importance of worldviews (or more 
precisely, Weltanschauung) to any purported paradigm was discussed 
                                                 
21 
 One important reason for the use of the term ‘juristic model’ is to catch within one 
phrase both academic and practicing lawyers, that is, jurists.  
22 
See the discussion below about Thomas Hobbes in relation to certainty in the law. 
23 
Colin Campbell, ‘Legal Thought and Juristic Values’ (1974) 1(1) British Journal of Law 
and Society 13. 
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previously, but to suggest that legal theorists or practitioners necessarily 
conflate pragmatic conservatism with knowledge claims is spurious. It may 
seem to those outside the law that jurists look upon the law (in the sense 
of a body of rules) as empirical facts, but the reality is that much of what a 
lawyer does requires us to adopt that appearance. 
 
It would be a rare opportunity for an advocate to suggest to a court that a 
particular law is invalid or inconsistent with other laws, but such a situation 
is possible. It is not that uncommon for legislation to be challenged on the 
basis of its constitutional validity, or for a common law rule to be 
challenged and overturned by a later appellate court. The circumstances in 
which such challenges succeed are relatively uncommon, which is why 
they usually attract much attention, but that is a very different thing to 
seeing laws as descriptive of the actual world.24 Laws are contingent upon 
the intention of their source. Parliament, for example, can choose whether 
or not to give some declaratory statement the quality of law and can, in 
most instances, remove that quality at whim. To claim that it is a fact that 
the law about a given matter is such and such is quite different to claiming 
that this is some particular ‘interpretation of reality’. 
 
                                                 
24 
It could be that writing in the late 1970s, Campbell was influenced by the emergence of 
contemporary natural law jurisprudence, as characterised by the work of jurists such as 
John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin. The natural law position is a neo-Kantian view that 
positive law (ie, that which is posited or written down) is not sufficient to qualify as law. 
Rather, according to the natural law theorists, it must also accord with some naturally 
occurring normative phenomena such as ‘justice’ or ‘morality’. It is hardly a settled matter 
in jurisprudence, or in the wider discipline of ethics for that matter, that these sorts of 
phenomena are part of the ‘natural world’ at all. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (1978); John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980); John Finnis, ‘On 
“Positivism” and “Legal Rational Authority”‘ (1985) 5 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 74–
90; Finnis 1991, II, 167–83.  
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Therapeutic jurisprudence is often described as an interdisciplinary 
attempt (pioneered by Wexler 25  and Winick) to convince the legal 
profession that law is a social phenomenon that inevitably and significantly 
influences the health of many of those who come into contact with it, and 
that we should strive to reform our legal institutions, rules and roles to 
ensure that this influence creates as little harm as possible.26 The concept 
of a juristic model that is proposed here is meant to be broad enough to 
capture at least the potential objects for reform that Wexler and Winick 
identify, but also those elements of the law and legal practice over which 
adversarialism has significant control. 
 
One of the reasons that it is difficult to establish which institutions, 
processes and rules are caught within the ambit of the adversarial system 
(as discussed further in the next chapter) is that there is such a strong and 
necessary streak of pragmatism in the law. Law was a system of resolving 
disputes long before it became an academic discipline and did not develop 
from a coherent and well-articulated body of theoretical principle. 27 
However, because of that inherent pragmatism, it is probably not 
surprising that of all the social sciences and humanities, law should be 
prominent among the disciplines that seek to see themselves governed by 
such a predominantly scientific phenomenon as the conceptual paradigm. 
At various stages, lawyers, political theorists and legal academics have 
sought to equate law with the natural sciences. 
 
                                                 
25 
Wexler was the first to coin the phrase in a paper he presented to a National Institute of 
Medical Health workshop in 1987 (that paper then became the introduction to his book 
Therapeutic jurisprudence: The Law as a Therapeutic Agent (1990).  
26 
David Wexler and Bruce Winick, Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence (1996) 17. 
27 
 I acknowledge the influence of some early philosophers (such as Plato and even the 
pre-Socratics) and of some theologians (such as St Thomas Aquinas) on jurisprudence 
as discussed in Chapter 4, but this sort of influence on ‘the law’ was ad hoc and often 
written in relation to existing law. 
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John Stuart Mill, for example, asserted that there was such a thing as a 
‘naturalistic’ social science and that there were causal laws that shaped 
human society and social interactions just as there are causal laws that 
seem to define the physical or natural world.28 Some critics suggest that 
there is such a strong tendency for lawyers and legal philosophers to see 
the law as a given in that it assumes the mantle of a worldview itself rather 
than as reflective of some broader worldview (as was suggested in relation 
to the liberal Weltanschauung in the previous chapter). Campbell 
reiterates his earlier view of the perceived relationship between the law 
and wider reality in this way: 
Legal thought seems possessed of characteristics and 
peculiarities in its mode of comprehending reality that distinguish 
it radically … Essentially, in my view, this stems from an 
acceptance of law as given, which results in most subsequent 
thinking resting on the massive assumption that the prescriptions 
contained in law and laws are in some sense descriptions of the 
actual world. Lawyers habitually operate within the framework of 
the legal system and adopt for their own standpoint the 
interpretations of reality contained in the law.29 
 
However, the depth of this view of the law as a given is not necessarily all 
that great. Conceiving of the law as some sort of a prioiri truth is perhaps a 
better illustration of law’s pragmatism than evidence of the worldview of 
the jurist. The tendency of some jurists to conceive of the law as being a 
form of objective logic has long been recognised as more of a mask for 
more human characteristics. According to early legal realist Oliver Wendell 
Holmes: 
The training of lawyers is a training in logic. The processes of 
analogy, discrimination, and deduction are those in which they are 
most at home. The language of judicial decision is mainly the 
language of logic … But certainty generally is illusion … Behind 
the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and 
importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate 
and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and 
nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a 
logical form. You always can imply a condition in a contract. But 
                                                 
28 
 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic (2002). 
29 
 Campbell, above n 23. See also Colin Campbell, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 
Harvard Law Review 450, 457. 
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why do you imply it? It is because of some belief as to the 
practice of the community or of a class, or because of some 
opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of 
yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative 
measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical 
conclusions. 
As we shall see in the next section of this chapter, however, this influence 
of subjective and contextual factors on ‘the very root and nerve of the 
whole proceeding’ is what makes the law such an important candidate for 
Kuhnian analysis. 
 
3.4 Extending the Paradigm Concept to the Social Sciences 
and Humanities 
 
The legitimacy of extending the paradigm concept to the social sciences 
and beyond can be observed in the long history of scholarship dedicated 
to that objective. 30  Handa, working in the field of the sociology of 
education, is usually credited with pioneering the development of the 
concept of the Kuhnian paradigm within the context of social sciences. He 
analogises the scientific paradigm with what he calls a ‘social paradigm’ 
and focuses on the social circumstances that precipitate a shift in social 
paradigms. The assertion here is that there is, therefore, precedent for 
attempting to conceive of a Kuhnian paradigm as being relevant to 
disciplines outside of science. 
 
There has always been a desire among social scientists to define their 
disciplines as mature sciences in some sort of revolutionary/paradigm-
shifting phase/crisis rather than as pre-scientific ideologies. 31  One 
asserted problem with ideologies, as argued by Hutcheon, is that by 
‘rendering their proponents politically powerful but rationally and 
                                                 
30 
 ML Handa, ‘Peace Paradigm: Transcending Liberal and Marxian Paradigms’ (Paper 
presented at the International Symposium on Science, Technology and Development, 
New Delhi, India, 20–25 March 1986). 
31 
As both Popper and the early Kuhn agreed they were. 
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instrumentally impotent, they can throw up insurmountable barriers’32 to 
reasoned and value-guided change within a discipline. Because ideologies 
claim to represent truth, their methods, models and communities focus on 
the transmission and interpretation of unchallenged doctrine rather than 
rational, hypothesis-testing and organic progress. Kuhn held that science 
does not seek true theories converging towards an ultimate picture of 
reality. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the adversarial paradigm is closely 
(perhaps symbiotically) integrated with traditional liberal ideology and its 
strong focus on individual rights and due process. The implication is, in 
much of the literature critical of therapeutic jurisprudence, that in opposing 
the primacy of adversarialism, therapeutic jurisprudence advocates are 
thereby taking an anti-liberal stance against individual rights and due 
process.33 The nature of this criticism is critically important, as it may well 
be the relative emphasis placed on the importance of due process, 
procedural fairness or natural justice that forms a deep enough schism 
between the two asserted models of juristic thought (that is, adversarialism 
and therapeutic jurisprudence) to define them as paradigmatic 
competitors. This illustrates just what it is that is incommensurable 
between the two. The existence of contrary exemplars are, of course, 
necessary for paradigm shift. 
 
In the adversarial system, integrity of procedure is what guarantees 
justice, and this is largely achieved by allowing the adversarial litigants to 
define the dispute and the resources used to decide a winner. Within a 
purported therapeutic paradigm (such as that mooted earlier by Freiberg), 
                                                 
32 
 Pat Hutcheon, ‘Popper and Kuhn on the Evolution of Science’ 4(2) Brock Review 
(1995) 28, 37. 
33 
 The nature and scope of this criticism is closely examined in Chapter 6, but see, eg, 
Eric Cohen, ‘The Drug Court Revolution: Do We Want Theory Rather Than Justice to 
Become the Basis of Our Legal System?’, The Weekly Standard, 27 December 1999, 20; 
Morris B Hoffman, ‘The Drug Court Scandal’ (2000) June North Carolina Law Review, 
1477, 1529. 
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the court and judge are required to be much more interventionist and to 
modify and customise procedure according to the opportunities that arise 
to address the real substance at the heart of disputes or of offending 
behaviour.34 
 
In an adversarial court, the scope for a judicial officer to seize upon an 
opportunity to address issues wider or more fundamental than those 
dictated by the black letter law, the strategic decisions of litigants and 
lawyers and by rules of evidence and procedure is mostly quite limited. In 
a therapeutic court, judicial officers may well be required to actively seek 
out and act on such opportunities. The very fact that this would seem 
anathema to some liberalist-minded critics suggests that they, as well as 
many therapeutic jurisprudence practitioners and advocates, see the 
differences as paradigmatic in the Kuhnian sense. An illustrative view is 
that of Kates who, in an article provocatively entitled ‘Why Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Must Be—and Will Be—Eliminated From Our Family 
Courts’, asserts that: 
One of the problems with the rise of therapeutic jurisprudence … 
has been the subtle denigration of long-established precepts of 
lawyer independence and due process … The introduction of 
subtle and often unrecognized conflicts of interest afflicting 
lawyers’ representations of their clients, created through the 
common development of multidisciplinary collegial relationships 
… arise because most lawyers represent different kinds of clients 
on ideologically oppositional sides in different cases.35 
 
As for the contemporary social scientists, the motivation for lawyers 
wanting to perceive the law, or a juristic model, as akin to some natural 
phenomenon is explainable by what certainty offers, promises and obtains. 
Certainty of definition, of interpretation and of application are traditionally 
the cornerstones of good law-making and of good judging. They are a 
                                                 
34 
 Freiberg discusses many of the purported differences and defining values of what he 
refers to as ‘a broader narrative for law and justice’ in Arie Freiberg, ‘Non-Adversarial 
Approaches to Criminal Justice’ (2007) 16 Journal of Judicial Administration 205, 221. 
35 
 Elizabeth Kates, ‘Why Therapeutic Jurisprudence Must be Eliminated from Our Family 
Courts’ (2008) 13 Domestic Violence Report 65. 
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bulwark against perceptions and accusations of arbitrariness and 
subjective bias. A classic statement of this need for certainty among jurists 
comes from Hale’s criticism of Thomas Hobbes’ position on the common 
law: 
It is one of the thinges of greatest moment in the profession of the 
Com[m]on Law to keepe as neare as may be to the Certainty of 
the Law and the Conson-ance of it to it Selfe, that one age and 
one Tribunall may Speake the Same thinges and Carry on the 
Same thred of the Law in one Uniforme Rule as neare as is 
possible; for otherwise that w[hi]ch all places and ages have 
Contended for in Laws[,] namely Certainty and to avoid 
Arbitrariness and that Extravag-ance that would fall out, if the 
reasons of Judges and advocates were not kept in their traces[,] 
wold in halfe an age be lost.36 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, this concern that all legal tribunals 
ought to ‘[s]peake the Same thinges and Carry on the Same thred of the 
Law in one Uniforme Rule as neare as is possible’ has given rise, within 
the adversarial worldview, to assumptions that due process, procedural 
fairness and natural justice require strong homogeneity in the way courts 
and judges treat those appearing before them. The argument that 
precedent and due process can be consistent with a much more intimate 
focus on individual needs by judges, pursuant to a therapeutic paradigm, 
is dealt with in Chapter 5. 
 
3.5 Determinism, Empiricism and Juristic Models 
 
It is far from clear that to qualify as a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense that a 
candidate set of exemplars must be linked to a purely empirical discipline 
in any case, as was argued in Chapter 2.37 This is partly because the rigid 
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Matthew Hale, ‘Criticisms on Hobbes’s Dialogue of the Common Laws’ in WS 
Holdsworth (ed), A History Of English Law (2
nd
 ed, 1937) 506. 
37 
By empirical I mean either the sense in which a discipline is based on data gleaned 
from observations, experience or experiment, or the sense in which an empirical 
discipline or method is differentiated from one that makes use of deduction from first 
principles (such as analytical philosophy). We could conceive of both the natural sciences 
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and deterministic view of the natural sciences has been considerably 
eroded over the past 100 years or so. At least, the strong brand of 
determinism evinced by the position that every event, including human 
cognition, behaviour, decision and action, is causally determined by an 
unbroken chain of prior occurrences.38 
 
A determinist worldview is one in which the physical world (at least) is 
fundamentally shaped and regulated by causal laws and relationships that 
can be observed and measured, which in turn leads to empirical certainty. 
This fundamentalist worldview has been largely abandoned in the natural 
sciences, most notably in physics39 and biology.40 To some extent, it was 
Kuhn who identified and gave a broader theoretical justification for the 
trend away from a deterministic worldview in science by denying that 
observation, experience and experiment serve as neutral arbiters between 
competing theories. In arguing that paradigms are largely an expression of 
a consensus among practitioners, based on factors other than empirical 
certainty, the idea that there are scientific methods that are theory-neutral 
has largely been discredited. 
 
Law is also a fundamentally normative enterprise and any attempt to say 
what the law is, or what it ought to be, is going to be in large part a 
normative rather than empirical undertaking. This is a familiar theme in 
jurisprudence. Interestingly, the founders of therapeutic jurisprudence 
seem to be sensitive and somewhat tentative as to the role of empirical 
method in a therapeutic jurisprudence paradigm. Wexler cautions that 
those who examine existing therapeutic jurisprudence research ought to 
                                                                                                                                     
and the social sciences as being based on observation and testing—and therefore, 
empirical disciplines. 
38 
Peter Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (1983). 
39 
John Earman, ‘Aspects of Determinism in Modern Physics’ in J However, terfield and J 
Earman (eds) Philosophy of Physics, Part B (2007) 1369–434; George Ellis, ‘Physics and 
the Real World’ (2005) Physics Today.  
40 
Edward Lewis and Russell MacGregor, ‘On Indeterminism, Chaos, and Small Number 
Particle Systems in the Brain’ (2006) 5 Journal of Integrative Neuroscience 223–47.  
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accept that it is a hypothesis-generating activity, but that the overall 
therapeutic jurisprudence project should not ‘stand or fall on the reader’s 
assessment of the empirical accuracy of particular illustrations’. 41  He 
warns against legal scholars attempting to water down or ‘censor’ their 
method under some prior notion of what empirical methods may allow or 
to resolve perceived methodological difficulty by erring on the side of 
conservatism. He suggests that therapeutic jurisprudence scholars ask the 
questions that need to be asked and that then: 
social scientists and ethicists should be given the opportunity of 
thinking through the propriety of conducting the research … 
[I]ndeed, policy recommendations may often be permissibly made 
on the basis of empirical questions that lead suggestions but that 
lack definitive empirical answers.42 
 
There is clearly an important question to address in terms of whether 
understanding law (or any social practice or normative system for that 
matter) must necessarily collapse into making judgments about the value 
of the ways in which the law currently operates. If we were to grant, 
however, that we cannot make a full and adequate description of the law 
without taking a position as to its worth and value, then that ought not to 
preclude us from asserting that the law can be conceived of as conforming 
to one paradigm or another. Indeed, we could well interpret Kuhn as taking 
the view that these value judgments about opposing paradigms is what 
ultimately causes them to shift (as opposed to Popper’s view that it is 
empirical falsification rather than the mind-set of the practitioners in a 
discipline that leads to significant theoretical shifts).43 
                                                 
41 
David Wexler, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal 
Scholarship’ (1993) 11 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 17, 21. 
42 
In support of this assertion, Wexler claims support from John Monahan and Laurens 
Walker, ‘Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers’ (1991) Wisconsin Law Review 
569. 
43 
This is not to say that legal theorists have decided one way or the other on this 
fundamental issue. HLA Hart, for example, claimed that observers and researchers can 
articulate laws and develop an understanding of law’s purposes, social functions and the 
ways in which it gives reasons for action without taking a view as to the moral status of 
those reasons or purposes. We could, for instance, tell the complete story of the 
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We could simply accept the view, most notably championed by Ronald 
Dworkin, that law is a profoundly interpretive and social practice (and 
hence it necessarily has some evaluative dimension required by the 
interpretive process) 44 —and so any theory about law must be partly 
evaluative. In fact, it is hard to find any contemporary legal theory that 
purports to be morally neutral. Such an acceptance does not preclude 
juristic models from having the qualities of a conceptual paradigm and 
some sociologists such as Campbell would claim that this only strengthens 
the claim.45 
 
In rebutting the assumption that jurisprudence as a whole must conform 
with a rigid determinism, Freedman suggests four reasons why laws of 
complete generality and uniformity are no longer the lynchpin of even the 
natural sciences. 46  First, the sciences no longer produce inductive 
inferences of absolutely rigid causal laws but, rather, statistical regularities 
that are assumed to predict what will happen in given situations, and once 
that regularity begins to erode the inferences become suspect. This is 
reminiscent of Kuhn’s comparison of the Copernican and Ptolemaic 
systems. Second, the hard sciences now maintain a core belief in the 
existence of indeterminacy or chance at the heart of some physical 
                                                                                                                                     
Nuremberg laws (which prohibited German nationals from marrying Jews) without either 
condemning or advocating any moral rationale for those views in so doing: HLA Hart, The 
Concept of Law (1961).  
44 
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Law as an Applied Social Service’ in Proceedings of a Seminar: 
Problems and Prospects of Socio-Legal Research (1971). 
45 
 The American Realists attempt to link social sciences such as psychology and 
sociology with jurisprudence by explaining judicial reasoning in difficult appellate cases by 
examining (non-legal) attitudes and perspectives of the individual judges. The Critical 
Legal Studies movement famously made concerted attempts to influence the legal 
paradigm by infiltrating the faculty and curricula of American law schools in the 1970s.  
46 
MLA Freedman, ‘Acquiring Social Knowledge’ in Lloyd’s Jurisprudence (6th ed, 1999) 
7. 
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events.47 Third, some hypotheses cannot be verified, but this surely does 
not mean that which is hypothesised about cannot exist unless and until it 
is verified by direct observation or measurement. 
 
This third component of Freedman’s argument is quite useful to the focus 
of this thesis in that it is compatible with the assertion by Popper, which 
Kuhn would not dispute,48 that theories (or laws) are always ‘tentative and 
provisional and liable to possible refutation’. Thus, despite the fact that the 
purported adversarial paradigm may be very heavily entrenched due to its 
proven ability to drive our juristic model for centuries, its component 
theories and methods are, if we accept the analogy, nevertheless tentative 
and open to replacement if circumstances change. They are not linked to 
deterministic features of the physical world—and this does not set them 
qualitatively apart from the natural sciences, the social sciences or the 
humanities. 
 
Finally, Freedman recognises Kuhn’s emphasis on the subjective and 
values-based influence of normal science, which, as discussed above, 
implies that a key reason for the continuation of a current paradigm is the 
state of mind of its proponents and advocates who share an entrenched 
commitment to their common theoretical beliefs, values, instruments and 
methods (and may also have, according to Freedman, the organised 
support and direction of government and industrial enterprise). 
 
                                                 
47 
Typically illustrated by reference to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in quantum 
mechanics, which holds that pairs of physical properties, such as position and 
momentum, cannot both be known simultaneously. The more precisely one property is 
known, the less precisely the other can be known. This statement has been interpreted in 
two different ways. This is not just a function of the measuring process or equipment, 
Ballentine asserted that this is a statement about the nature of the system itself as 
described by the equations of quantum mechanics: Leslie Ballentine, ‘The Statistical 
Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics’ (1970) 42 Review of Modern Physics 358. 
48 
 Except that Kuhn would predicate refutation on paradigm shift, with its cultural 
components, rather than on Popperian falsification and the effect of a single counter-
example.  
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Freedman tracks a detailed debate in the jurisprudence and social science 
literature about whether law (or even the wider field of the social sciences) 
can be contained within the empiricist account of the natural sciences. If it 
can, then the four reasons above suggest that there is no reason why any 
juristic model, and hence any paradigm of law, cannot be conceived of as 
tentative and subject to fundamental change or, as Kuhn would call it, 
revolution. However, regardless of whether there is a close enough 
relationship to make that conceptual leap, Freedman concludes that: 
Jurisprudence is concerned with rule-governed action, with the 
activities of officials such as judges and with the relationship 
between them and the population of a given society. But whether 
jurisprudence is a social science or not, the debates about 
methodology in the social sciences between positivists and 
empiricists and practitioners of hermeneutics are echoed in juristic 
literature.49 
 
This seems to be a tenable position; namely, that even if we were unable 
to classify law as a social science, the key methodologies and features of 
a juristic model are analogous enough to those of a social science (and 
hence to a natural science), that it is a valid and insightful exercise to 
analyse alternative juristic models as if they were Kuhnian paradigms and 
capable of shifting in the Kuhnian sense. This seems to be the unspoken 
(and perhaps intuitive) assumption made by those scholars (such as 
Freiberg) who have indeed asked whether we are currently experiencing a 
paradigm shift from an adversarial to a therapeutic juristic model. 50 
Without a rigorous analysis of the nature and content of the competing 
paradigms of course, the assumption is premature. 
 
                                                 
49 
Freedman, above n 46, 11. 
50 
Freiberg (and others) claim that in a sense the paradigm shift is well advanced. He 
observes that: 
not only does the criminal justice system overall not function adversarially for 
the vast majority of cases, but that changes in a number of areas have affected 
the adversarial paradigm in ways that require a fundamental re-examination of 
the operation of the courts, of the role of judicial officers and lawyers and, 
significantly, of the way in which lawyers of the future are educated.  
Arie Freiberg, ‘Non-Adversarial Approaches to Criminal Justice’ (2007) 16 Journal of 
Judicial Administration 205. 
129 
 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, social sciences are those academic 
disciplines that study elements of human society as their raw material 
rather than naturally occurring phenomena. There are a wide range of 
social science disciplines, giving rise to a wide range of methods and 
(therefore) paradigms. Some social sciences, such as physiological 
psychology and economics, use empirical experimental methods and 
conventions of observation and theorising that are almost identical to 
those found in the natural sciences. Others use methods such as critical 
analysis or hermeneutics that are of more use in understanding the 
objects of their study (such as sociology and cultural anthropology). Some 
disciplines on the fringe of the social sciences (such as social work) are 
almost purely focused on practice and, therefore, make little use of any 
highly structured research methods, and are, therefore, less easily 
associated with any coherent, conceptual paradigm. We need to site the 
discipline of law, or the juristic model within this spectrum if we are to 
conceive of it as a social science. 
 
There has been a traditional tension between positivist and more 
functionalist approaches in all of the social science disciplines, as there 
has been in jurisprudence. In most disciplines, the belief that the methods 
of direct observation and the manipulation of variables used in the natural 
sciences ought to form the basis of all academic research and modes of 
inquiry has not survived the mid 20th century. Researchers in both the 
natural sciences and the social sciences, even if not subscribing to a 
complete postmodern agenda, recognise the distorting effects of observer 
bias in all research. That trend is consistent with Kuhn’s approach to the 
construction of the paradigm. 
 
The philosopher-sociologist Jürgen Habermas takes a view of 
jurisprudence and the study of the law that accords well with Kuhn’s 
emphasis on the consensus of those within a discipline as critical to the 
existence of a paradigm opposed to purely empirical or observational data. 
This is particularly so if we are conceiving of law as a way of thinking or 
deliberating (as a discourse) or as a way of knowing (as epistemology). As 
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with many of his generation, Habermas moves away from an Aristotelian, 
correspondence theory of truth to one of consensus. He is mainly 
concerned with the pragmatic qualities and effects of labelling a statement 
as true in line with his agenda to transform democracy into a genuinely 
deliberative political process. Rather than accepting that a statement is 
true if it accords with some naturally occurring (and observable) state of 
affairs, Habermas allows that the criterion for truth is a potential consensus 
of all those involved in a given discourse. What marks a particular 
consensus as credible is its compliance with an ‘ideal speech situation’, 
which Habermas defines as having a set of formal and procedural 
properties.51 According to Teubner: 
It is this proceduralization of the truth criterion which has rendered 
Habermas’ discourse theory so important for law. It makes the 
theoretical-empirical discourse of the sciences directly 
comparable to the practical-normative discourse in politics, morals 
and law; their validity claims depend on the correctness of 
procedure.52 
 
Social systems are arguably much more dynamic and complex than 
natural phenomena, and variables within a social system are unlikely to 
have the same predictability of interaction as, say, chemicals in a chemical 
reaction. This complexity and lack of predictability requires conceptually 
different methods that can cater for differences in what is observed, but 
still provide some degree of explanatory power. Many modern professions 
require knowledge of, and expertise in, a range of both natural sciences 
and social sciences and sometimes of the broader humanities. Medical 
practitioners, for example, study the three basic natural sciences (biology, 
chemistry and physics) but also social sciences such as psychology. 
 
Law has often been characterised as being on the boundary of the social 
sciences and the humanities. The rules and principles of law are generally 
                                                 
51 
 Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice (J Viertel trans, 1971)—as further explained in 
Jurgen Habermas, ‘A postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests’ (1973) 3 Philosophy 
of the Social Sciences 157. 
52 
 Gunther Teubner, ‘How the Law Thinks’(1989) 23(5) Law and Society Review 1. 
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mandated, articulated and interpreted based on social or economic goals 
and objectives as ascertained by typically social science methods. Unlike 
a normal scientist, Kuhn held, ‘a student in the humanities has constantly 
before him a number of competing and incommensurable solutions to 
these problems, solutions that he must ultimately examine for himself’. He 
compared the disciplines in the following way. Once a paradigm shift is 
complete, a scientist cannot then explain a new phenomenon in terms of 
the findings, rules or accepted facts that were unique to a previous 
paradigm. For example, it would not be open to contemporary pathologists 
to claim that disease was caused by miasma. 53  However, a person 
working in the social sciences or humanities, argued Kuhn, can often 
select from a range of theoretical perspectives by which they can interpret 
or critique the findings of others within their discipline. This is to some 
extent true of the law and jurisprudence, which has seen a wide range of 
critical and theoretical perspectives develop (such as the American 
realists, critical race theory, postmodern jurisprudence and feminist 
jurisprudence).54 
 
Fuller considers this to be a fundamental obstacle to the application of the 
paradigm concept to the social sciences and humanities. His interpretation 
of Kuhn’s position in SSR is summed up in this way: 
Kuhn identified his Eureka moment—when his theory of 
paradigms finally gelled—as occurring when he witnessed the 
vast difference in the way social and physical scientists conduct 
arguments. No matter how much physicists disagree on the value 
of a particular piece of research, they could always agree on an 
exemplar against which to judge it. This was not possible in the 
                                                 
53 
The miasmatic theory of disease held that diseases such as cholera, chlamydia or the 
Black Death were caused by a miasma, a noxious form of ‘bad air’. Miasma was 
considered to be a poisonous vapour or mist filled with particles from decomposed matter 
(miasmata) that caused illnesses. It was identifiable by its foul smell. This concept was 
displaced by the germ theory of disease, probably as late as 1890. 
54 
I am avoiding, in this section of the chapter, a discussion as to whether therapeutic 
jurisprudence is in fact just another of these possible theoretical or critical perspectives or 
whether it has enough breadth and depth to qualify as a separate juristic paradigm. That 
discussion will be undertaken in Chapter 5. 
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social sciences where any candidate exemplar (say Marx, 
Durkheim, Keynes, Freud, Skinner, or nowadays Foucault) would 
also be a lightning rod for fundamental disagreements.55 
 
However, there have been a number of attempts to provide a theoretical 
justification for extending the notion of a Kuhnian paradigm to include 
juristic thought (and, therefore, to legal institutions and methods).56 Early 
attempts to do this included an explanation of the restorative justice 
approach to juvenile justice processes 57  and an explanation for the 
resilience of concepts of marital property law.58 
 
Campbell has suggested that it is possible to establish the ‘inherent 
propriety of applying Kuhn’s thesis to juristic thought’ by arguing at two 
levels in this way: 
Firstly, juristic thought as a realm of knowledge is open to similar 
considerations as scientific thought; secondly, agreement can be 
reached on the question whether juristic thought is at the 
paradigmatic stage or the pre-paradigmatic stage. 
Interestingly enough, sociologists are not only the most ardent of the 
academics in adopting the phenomenon of the Kuhnian paradigm shift to 
their own discipline, but also in arguing that legal thought (both in the 
sense of the judicial and legal reasoning process and in the jurisprudential 
                                                 
55 
Steven Fuller, Kuhn vs Popper (2003) 22. 
56 
There has always been debate about whether law and jurisprudence falls within the 
rubric of the humanities or social sciences at all, especially given that the practice of law 
is largely governed by rules that derive their normative force from the 
authority/sovereignty of their source rather than from the doctrinal or theoretical 
perspectives. There may be an element of intellectual isolationism and elitism in Fuller’s 
assessment as well. He claims that despite the early Kuhn’s dismissal of the social 
sciences as being explainable by the concept of the paradigm, that ‘[n]evertheless, 
Kuhn’s admirers persisted in wrenching SSR from its original context and treating it as an 
all-purpose manual for converting one’s lowly discipline (sic) into a full-fledged science’: 
ibid 22. 
57 
Edwin Lemert, Social Action and Legal Change: Revolution within the Juvenile Court 
(1970). 
58 
 MDA Freeman, ‘Towards A Rational Reconstruction of Family Property Law’ (1972) 
25(1) Current Legal Problems 84.  
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realm) constitutes a Kuhnian paradigm. Some emphasis ought to be 
placed on this, given that sociology is the discipline most concerned with 
analysing and classifying other academic fields and their relevant 
worldviews. 
 
Within the field of the sociology of knowledge, a number of influential 
figures have defended the view that juristic thought represents a 
paradigm. Well before the advent of some of the most influential schools of 
jurisprudence and before the exposure of the myth of the declaratory 
theory of judging, Aubert reached the view that there was a significant 
similarity in methods of legal reasoning, modes of legal decision making, 
the construction of legal propositions, shared assumptions and standard 
methodologies—as well as a reflection of these methods and assumptions 
in many schools of jurisprudence. These are all indications, argued Aubert, 
of the clear existence of a classic disciplinary paradigm.59 
 
Campbell allows 60  that there are sufficient commonalities, from a 
sociological perspective, between legal thought and scientific thought and 
between juristic activity and scientific activity, to accept that law and legal 
theory operate pursuant to a paradigm, even if only for purposes of 
heuristics or exegesis. 61  With the benefit of another decade of 
                                                 
59 
Vilhelm Aubert, ‘The Structure of Legal Thinking’ in J Andenaes et al (eds) Legal 
Essays: A Tribute to Frede Castberg (1963) 41–63. See also Vilhelm Aubert, ‘Researches 
in the Sociology of Law’ (1963) 7 American Behavioural Scientist 16, 18, where he 
concludes that ‘legal methods, legal conceptualisations and the underlying theory share 
an identity or internal coherence which has, indeed, remained constant over time’. 
60 
CM Campbell, ‘Legal Thought and Juristic Values’ (1974) 1(1) British Journal of Law 
and Society 13.  
61 
In terms of heuristics, Campbell means that even if we study law for the purposes of 
uncovering the set of simple and efficient rules that have evolved in the common law 
jurisdictions to try and reduce complex social and legal problems to contests between 
relatively simple propositions, rights and values, a paradigm readily emerges. In terms of 
exegesis, if we study law to uncover and explain the historical and cultural backgrounds 
and contexts of the authors of law, their texts and intended audiences, a paradigm also 
readily appears.  
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jurisprudence to survey (after Aubert), Campbell also acknowledged that 
any number of emerging legal theories could represent a new paradigm in 
terms of suggesting changed values, standards and criteria for selecting 
problem areas for research and for ‘accepting the legitimacy of 
solutions’.62 
 
A hypothesis can be disproved by one contrary and reproducible 
observation. It is not particularly useful to view class propositions, 
assertions and explanations in law as hypotheses. For example, we could 
assert that drug courts are more effective than mainstream courts in 
reducing recidivism rates among drug-addicted offenders. An observation 
of one court or jurisdiction where that has not been the case for a 
particular period is not that useful in terms of the overall assertion. A 
theory is a bit more resilient than that; the theory can be modified. A 
paradigm will not be as easily shifted by anomalies as a hypothesis or a 
theory. This is why the paradigm has to do more than these other simpler 
concepts. Campbell concludes that: 
legal theory and jurisprudence do operate under a particular 
paradigm. This paradigm, derived from the commitments and 
reasoning of practical lawyers, involves a particular ‘world view’, 
an orientation to practical and pragmatic problem-solving, and set 
methods for tackling these problems. For the disciples the 
paradigm involves acceptance of the legal system as given, and, 
by operating within the framework of the legal system, an 
adoption of its particular standpoints in interpreting or constructing 
reality. With its focus on the pragmatic concerns of decision-
making and the perspective of the judge in recognising as ‘legal’ 
certain factual situations and in deciding what particular legal 
meaning to attach to them, legal theory adopts a social control 
standpoint. Its ‘exemplars’ and puzzle solutions follow from the 
judicial process as does its methodology in seeking to answer 
such questions. Commitments and stances of this sort go to make 
up the paradigm—the constellation of beliefs, values and 
techniques that is shared by members of the jurisprudential 
community.63 
 
                                                 
62 
Campbell, above n 60, 16. 
63 
Ibid 22. 
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The argument in the chapters that now follow is that as competing 
paradigms, both adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence share the 
general quality of social control that Campbell asserts. However, they differ 
in relation to the objectives of that control in what it means to say that a 
certain fact situation has a legal status and that the puzzle solutions within 
a therapeutic paradigm would subsume and to some extent redefine and 
add to those that exist under the adversarial paradigm. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
As was seen in Chapter 2, the earlier comments by Kuhn (in SSR) that 
seemed to indicate that he considered disciplines outside of the hard 
sciences to not be governed by paradigms64 collapsed into an assumption 
that researchers and practitioners in the social sciences and humanities 
would have no need for, nor interest, in a history of disciplinary change 
that focused on commonalities with science. However, in the 1969 
postscript, Kuhn acknowledged that differences in methodology were 
secondary to similarities in worldview and the ways in which disciplines 
educate their new members and rely on orthodoxy to preserve order within 
the discipline.65 
 
This is not to say that Kuhn simply dismissed any differences between 
science and other disciplines. He certainly did not. However, he did allow 
that such differences were not of a nature to preclude the migration of the 
paradigm phenomenon beyond the hard sciences. He concedes that 
‘scientific development may resemble that in other fields more closely that 
has been supposed’.66 Indeed, Kuhn closes the SSR postscript by noting 
that: 
I shall close by underscoring the need for … comparative study of 
the corresponding communities in other fields. How does one 
elect, and how is one elected to membership in a political 
                                                 
64 
 See section 2.4 in this thesis. 
65 
 SSR 208.  
66 
 Ibid 209. 
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community, scientific or not. What is the process and what are the 
stages of socialization to the group? What does the group 
collectively see as its goals, what deviations, individual or 
collective, will it tolerate; and how does it control the 
impermissible aberration?67 
 
While it may be true, perhaps more so at the time of Kuhn writing the 
postscript to SSR in 1969, that there seems to be less competing schools 
of thought within the academic branches of the hard sciences than in the 
social sciences and humanities, these latter disciplines have strongly 
endorsed the paradigm concept and its emphasis on the internal culture 
and social architecture of a discipline. Jurisprudence and movements for 
the reform of legal practice rank highly among these. Campbell sets the 
minimum level of applicability of Kuhn to jurisprudence as being for the 
purposes of heuristics and exegesis. Even if we simply posit and analyse 
a juristic model in order to make explicit some set of simple and efficient 
rules that have evolved in the common law jurisdictions to attempt to 
reduce complex social and legal problems to contests between relatively 
simple propositions, rights and values, a paradigm readily emerges. The 
extent to which the adversarial juristic model connotes this is explored in 
the following chapter. In terms of exegesis, if we study law to uncover and 
explain the historical and cultural backgrounds and contexts of the authors 
of law, their texts and intended audiences, a paradigm also readily 
appears. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
If juristic models are valid candidates for Kuhnian paradigms, then it 
should follow that what is almost universally referred to as the adversarial 
system operates pursuant to a paradigm. It may be that an adversarial 
paradigm is the only paradigm that has ever defined the modern (post-18th 
century) common law legal world.1 
 
Academic and judicial writings debating whether adversarialism is, or is 
not, the best and most efficient method of dispensing justice are legion.2 
This does not beg the question as to whether adversarialism is the current 
paradigm. It assumes that it is so. The assumption is that although there 
                                                 
1 
 It could also be argued that there exists an inquisitorial paradigm that regulates the 
legal systems of the Western European jurisdictions. See Bron McKillop, ‘What Can We 
Learn from the French Criminal Justice System?’ (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 49. 
2 
 Although citations for examples of such works are surely unnecessary given their 
ubiquity, an interesting compilation and distillation of some common themes can be found 
in Evan Whitton, ‘21 Reasons You Won’t Get Justice from the Adversarial Court System’, 
Online Opinion, 7 April 2003 <http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=268>. 
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are variations,3 from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and from time to time, there 
is a core of principle, method and belief that defines the model. 
 
Chapter 2 set out the Kuhnian position that a loosely organised and ad 
hoc field or discipline progresses from a pre-paradigm state to a mature 
science when it develops a set of exemplars, which practitioners accept as 
defining what it is to do normal science within that discipline, thereby 
giving rise to a paradigm. A period of normal science consists merely of 
the work of practitioners and researchers working within the limiting 
exemplars of that discipline. A period of normal science is usually very 
lengthy and it is convergent, rather than divergent, in the sense that true 
innovation is discouraged, and any apparent success of novel methods 
suffers a regression to the mean—they are seen as either statistical 
anomalies or practices existing at the margin of the discipline.4 
 
A period of normal research and science in a field as diverse and crucial to 
the functioning of society as the law, which is practiced and analysed by 
many thousands of practitioners on a daily basis, will inevitably give rise to 
anomalous data and intractable problems that resist resolution by the 
normal methods of the discipline. As the ability of the new methods to deal 
with the intractable problems of the existing paradigm accelerates, 
practitioners lose faith in the existing paradigm and a disciplinary crisis 
emerges. In this chapter, I examine the extent to which anomalies within 
jurisprudence and the practice of law have been absorbed and 
marginalised, or expressed as mere refinements within the adversarial 
system, as evidence that adversarialism has the quality of a paradigm. 
Significant changes to proceedings that have traditionally been 
                                                 
3 
 For a discussion of the great variety of adversarial and inquisitorial approaches in legal 
procedure, see Oscar Chase, ‘American Exceptionalism and Comparative Procedure’ 
(2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 277. 
4 
 In the case of therapeutic jurisprudence, this marginalising phenomenon might be what 
Freiberg referred to as ‘pragmatic incrementalism’. Arie Freiberg, ‘Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence in Australia: Paradigm Shift or Pragmatic Incrementalism?’ (2003) 20(2) 
Law in Context 6. 
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indisputably adversarial in nature are now being referred to, for example, 
as ‘less adversarial proceedings’.5 In order for change to be seen as valid, 
it must be conceptually consistent with the current paradigm. 
 
Since new methods may strike at the heart of the existing paradigm, which 
is populated by exemplars that are based on powerful worldviews and 
values, resistance to the emerging paradigm tends to be articulated in 
calamitous language. Work within a period of normal science is cumulative 
as methods and processes build incrementally on the exemplars 
developed in the transition from the pre-scientific period to that of mature 
science. I argue that an identifiable adversarial juristic model has 
developed in this way over the past three centuries. The work around a 
new paradigm, conversely, is non-cumulative in that it represents an 
epistemic rupture (in the sense suggested by Bachelard in Chapter 2) and 
a break from orthodoxy. The techniques and research of those working 
within the new paradigm build on each other, not on the techniques and 
research of the old paradigm.6 
 
In addressing the assumption that adversarialism is paradigmatic, we 
need to recall that Kuhn provided differing and evolving conceptions of 
what a paradigm is. In the earlier chapters of SSR, he emphasises the 
existence of exemplars that are concrete and analytical. Practitioners refer 
to them to solve problems. They are efficient and satisfying enough to 
appeal to the current worldview of potential practitioners but flexible 
enough not to stifle innovation (so long as the innovations do not 
                                                 
5 
 Chief Justice Diana Bryant and Deputy Chief Justice John Faulks, ‘The “Helping Court” 
Comes Full Circle: The Application and Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the Family 
Court of Australia’ (2007) 17 Journal of Judicial Administration 93. See also Less 
Adversarial Trial Handbook (2009) 
<http://www.familycourt.gov.au/wps/wcm/resources/file/eb08eb04841dff4/LATReport_100
609.pdf>. 
6 
 The extent to which innovations are credited as being products of, or inspired by, 
therapeutic jurisprudence are held by their advocates to be building on existing 
adversarial practices or building a separate body of theory and practice is a key focus of 
Chapter 6 of the thesis. 
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contradict the exemplars). In this sense, practitioners are perhaps less 
likely than academic and theoretical researchers to characterise 
innovations as part of an alternative paradigm. If the innovations are 
mostly allowed to operate (albeit at the margins of the discipline), then the 
practitioners working in the margins are probably willing to accept 
marginalisation rather than run the risk of rejection and ridicule by 
threatening the core assumptions and values of the existing paradigm. 
 
The exemplars, though, exist alongside the metaphysical commitments 
that are expressed in terms of preferred analogies or models that are used 
for parsing and taxonomising the domain of reality being studied, and the 
methodological values that the community of practice agrees characterise 
their work. The exemplars are paradigms in the narrower, analytical frame 
of reference. However, the wider sense of the paradigm is this whole 
disciplinary matrix and the matrix is a product of consensus (sometimes 
tacit), not some purely positivist representation of reality.7 In this chapter, I 
argue that the historical development of the adversarial paradigm has 
followed just such a pattern. It has been an ad hoc and pragmatic process 
where procedures and rules have been cemented largely as a result of 
tacit consensus and tradition. Many adversarial procedures persist, as 
asserted below by Davies,8 despite the original rationale for their existence 
having become obsolete. 
 
In the later chapters of SSR and in the 1969 postscript, Kuhn places 
greater emphasis on this social construction of the paradigm. Exemplars 
provide for a shared framework that allows for an ease, fullness and 
directness of communication within a scientific community and for the 
                                                 
7 
 The primary reliance on oral evidence in civil and criminal trials, for example, developed 
because most jury members in the 18th and 19th centuries were illiterate. Most jurors in 
the 21
st
 century are, presumably, literate: Geoffrey Davies, ‘Why We Must Abandon the 
Essential Elements of Our System’ (2003) 12(3) Journal of Judicial Administration 155, 
157. 
8 
 See ibid, generally. 
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‘unanimity of professional agreement’. 9  This is not just some shared 
agreement or consensus about a theory, it is a consensus about a model. 
To that end, this chapter also examines the social construction of 
adversarialism to illustrate its paradigmatic qualities. 
 
4.2 The Common Law Tradition—Pre-Paradigm Phase and 
the Journey to Normal Science 
4.2.1 Pre-Enlightenment Legal History—Feuds, Ordeals and the Rise 
of Public Regulation of Disputes 
 
We can trace the emergence of the adversarial system as the juristic 
paradigm for the common law world back to the significant reforms to 
criminal and civil trial procedure in England in the 18th century. This was 
the culmination of a centuries-long pre-paradigm phase, where legal 
processes were almost inseparable from political processes, dictated by a 
succession of autocratic systems of governance. The gradual 
displacement of the legislative power of the monarchy and the devolution 
of the power of the state to representative bodies gave rise to a more 
meaningful conception of social and political rights, and of personal 
autonomy. This process, as discussed below, was not necessarily 
motivated by any shift in political beliefs about the intrinsic rights of 
individuals, so much as a felt need to more efficiently manage 
relationships between people and property in a changing industrial 
context. Some 20th century academics, such as Foucault,10 characterise 
this management of relationships in terms of the social construction of 
identity and of the increasing political power of the middle class in Europe. 
 
This slow, and often bloody, social and political evolution has led to a 
situation where, for some critics, questioning the primary (and often 
exclusive) importance of due process in legal procedure is synonymous 
with an attack on freedom and human rights. The struggle for 
                                                 
9 
 SSR 207. 
10 
 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish—The Birth of the Prison (1975). 
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constitutional recognition of the right to a fair trial and to have disputes 
objectively and independently adjudicated has been so long and arduous 
that, as Kuhn and others suggest, the belief in the paradigm borders on 
the religious.11 The history of the legal system in England is a history of 
the creation and recognition of personal rights. 12  Adjudication is the 
cornerstone of adversarialism—and it constructs interpersonal dynamics 
as a dispute. 
 
The Romans left Britain shortly after 400 AD, and over the next two 
centuries, invading tribes from Europe completely displaced Roman 
civilisation and ensured there was no continuity of legal tradition and 
hence no possibility of any surviving juristic paradigm based on the heavily 
codified Roman law. Post-Roman, Saxon England was a conglomeration 
of agricultural communities where murder and theft were dealt with by self-
help in the form of vengeance and blood feuds. Feuding could be effective 
in preventing and deterring crime, to some degree, because the 
expectation would be that the commission of an offence would attract 
immediate reprisal and retaliation. 
 
General deterrence, the belief that the commission of an offence is an 
economically irrational decision, is still the chief rationale and justification 
for the imposition of criminal sanctions in the 21st century (at least to those 
committed to the adversarial paradigm), and held by some analysts to be 
                                                 
11 
 For example, the oath of political allegiance in the US, has an overt religious element, 
enmeshed with statements about political freedom and due process: ‘I pledge allegiance 
to the flag of the United States of America, and to the republic for which it stands, one 
nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all’. Interestingly, the addition of 
the phrase ‘under God’ was adopted by the US Congress as recently as 1954, and was 
an overt expression of difference to the quality of State atheism in the communist bloc 
nations. See Scott Merriman, Religion and the Law in America: An Encyclopedia of 
Personal Belief (2007). 
12 
 In this section I survey some defining features of that lengthy pre-paradigm phase in 
order to illustrate how it aligns with the Kuhnian conception of a pre-paradigmatic 
discipline, but do not intend it to be a comprehensive discussion of English legal history. 
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the only sentencing purpose that is empirically justifiable.13 This nexus, 
between the belief in a divine law that informs human law and a need for 
social control based on deterrence, is one theme that does survive, and to 
a great extent informs the criminal law through the pre-paradigmatic phase 
right into the current conception of adversarial criminal justice. Thomas 
Aquinas articulates concepts of both general and special deterrence for 
the 13th century that sound startlingly similar to contemporary criminal 
jurisprudence: 
A severe punishment is inflicted not only on account of the gravity 
of a fault, but also for other reasons. First, on account of the 
greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other things being 
equal, deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on account of a 
habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except 
by severe punishments. Thirdly, on account of a great desire for 
or a great pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily deterred from 
such sins unless they be severely punished. Fourthly, on account 
of the facility of committing a sin and of concealing it: for such like 
sins, when discovered, should be more severely punished in 
order to deter others from committing them.14 
 
A more complex trading and commercial environment led to the convening 
of some ad hoc civil and criminal tribunals presided over by heads of 
households, until the enactment of some rudimentary laws (known as 
dooms) by the rulers of the four Anglo-Saxon kingdoms in England during 
the 500s.15  Very few Anglo-Saxon dooms have survived in the written 
record, and even less is known about legal procedure of that time. It is 
apparent, however, that compensation for the victims of crime (rather than 
adjudication) was seen as more conducive to preserving peace and the 
social fabric needed to ensure the survival of small agricultural 
communities that provided the larger state with taxes. 
 
                                                 
13 
 A significant econometric study of the effectiveness of general deterrence can be found 
in Andrew Von Hirsch et al, Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity (1999) 28. 
14 
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
trans, 1948) 1096 [first published 1265–74].  
15 
 Frank Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England (1971) 279; Alan Harding, The Law Courts of 
Medieval England (1973) 17. 
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Those engaged in blood feuds were ordered, on the authority of these 
laws, to end hostilities and to agree to terms of settlement among 
themselves. To facilitate this private resolution of grievances, however, set 
tariffs were posted as the basis of restitution for given offences and 
losses.16 The amount of the tariff varied according to the social status of 
the offender or litigant. No personal antecedents of the offender were 
taken into account and criminal responsibility was assumed. No defences 
or excuses existed. The tariff contained a component of restitution for the 
victim and a component paid as an indemnity to the king. This commercial 
interest of the Crown in litigation was one significant origin of political 
interest in litigation, heralding the eventual transformation of both civil and 
criminal law from the private to the public sphere.17 This partial public 
usurping of legal procedure was essential as a precursor to a developed 
economy that would require systemic regulation. 
 
The private settlement of legal disputes was not, however, a matter of an 
objective analysis of factual evidence. Although there was an assumption 
of divine sanction to the process, the seeds for state-regulated 
adjudication were being sown. An accused person needed to address the 
allegations of a complainant by an appeal to God, through the assistance 
of oath helpers or via a trial by ordeal. An oath helper would speak to the 
good character of the accused, who would be required to swear his 
innocence before God. If the accused was able to requisition sufficient 
numbers of oath helpers, then that was considered to be conclusive 
evidence of his innocence. In the absence of these character witnesses, 
judgment of God by the ordeal was required. According to the (formal) 
                                                 
16 
 Interestingly, some key elements of this juristic model can still be found in the 
jurisprudence and operation of the Roma courts or Kris in both Europe and North 
America. See WO Weyrauch (ed), Gypsy Law: Romani Legal Traditions and Culture 
(2011); TA Acton, ‘A Three-Cornered Choice: Structural Consequences of Value-Priorities 
in Roma Law as a Model for More General Understanding of Variations in the 
Administration of Justice’ (2003) 51(3) The American Journal of Comparative Law 639–
58. 
17 
 John Hostettler, A History of Criminal Justice in England and Wales (2009) 15. 
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Anglo-Saxon worldview, ordinary men had no facility to determine guilt or 
innocence, which were qualities reserved for a divine arbiter. 
 
The trial by ordeal was held within the jurisdiction of the church.18 The role 
of the oath helper was abolished, purportedly due to the prevalence of 
perjury in 1166, making ordeal by hot water19 the only alternative, although 
this was never seen as punishment.20 It has been suggested that the trial 
by ordeal, being administered by the clergy, was engineered (by selecting 
the quality of the bandages or the heat of the water, for example) so that 
those who were most disliked by the community, or considered most likely 
to threaten the social and political order, were unlikely to pass the ordeal.21 
However, in most cases, if the surviving records can be trusted, people 
were acquitted by the ordeal. Hostettler cites an 1888 study of the 
surviving records by Maitland, which found only one case in which the 
ordeal did not acquit the accused.22 The rationale for this may have been a 
pragmatic belief that the trial allows a man who is guilty in fact to purge the 
wrong and, therefore, to be held morally innocent in the sight of God.23 
                                                 
18 
 George Fisher, ‘The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector’ (1997) 107 Yale Law Journal 587. 
19 
 Hostettler, above n 17, 15, describes the ordeal in this way:  
For this an iron cauldron was placed over a fire in a church. When the water 
boiled, the accused had to reach down into the vessel and snatch up a stone 
from the bottom. The hand and arm were then swathed in cloth or linen for 
three days, after which they would be exposed and if the flesh was uninjured 
God had pronounced the accused not guilty. If the flesh was badly scalded he 
was guilty and sentenced by the curt, usually to death. 
20 
 Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time 
of Edward I (1895) 138. 
21 
 Margaret Kerr, ‘Cold Water And Hot Iron—Trial By Ordeal In England’ (1992) 22 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 582. 
22 
 Frederic Maitland, Select Pleas of the Crown (1888) 75, cited in Hostettler, above n 17, 
21. Leeson suggests that the main reason for the very high acquittal rate for ordeals was 
that those who genuinely believed in their innocence, or the justice of their plaint, were 
more likely to resort to an ordeal since they believed they would succeed. Those who had 
a consciousness of guilt would be more likely to settle and pay compensation. Thus, the 
clergy, as suggested above, would deliberately ameliorate the conditions of the relevant 
ordeal to ensure that those undertaking it would prevail. 
23 
 Trisha Olson, ‘Of Enchantment: The Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Trial by 
Jury’ (2000) Syracuse Law Review 113. 
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The ordeal fell into disuse when a more secular society allowed for a 
migration of power from the church to the state, and when a critical mass 
of clerics found the duty to be inconsistent with a changing view of their 
ecclesiastic role. 24  Its subsequent demise created the sort of chaotic 
conceptual environment that so characterises the Kuhnian conception of a 
pre-paradigmatic discipline. Fisher underscores the role of the ordeal in 
observing that: 
the institutional brilliance of the ordeal was that it so neatly 
merged the appearance of diving judgment with the reality of a 
great measure of human control … in the trial jury the English 
justice system managed to produce this very useful combination 
of traits … it may be impossible to understand even the later 
history criminal trial without a theory about why the ordeal worked 
so well and about what its demise left lacking. 
 
The ordeal gave the quality of divine sanction to human judgment, making 
it more likely to garner community support and confidence. It could be 
argued, by analogy, that the sanction of natural justice and due process 
are the characteristic guarantees of the modern justice system on which 
its public confidence is based. It is worth noting here, however, that the 
overriding rationale for the therapeutic jurisprudence movement is to make 
litigation far less of an ordeal, while retaining public confidence and a 
respect for rights.25 
                                                 
24 
 Bartlett observes that:  
Secular authorities understood the importance of priestly participation to 
ordeals. Operation. A decade before the Church banned them, some clerics 
decided for themselves that ordeals were at odds with their religion. They 
stopped administering them. But secular authorities would have none of it. As 
Pope Innocent III complained: ‘Although canon law does not admit ordeal by 
hot iron, cold water and the like, unhappy priests are being compelled to 
pronounce the blessing and become involved in such proofs and are being 
fined by the secular officials if they refuse.’ 
Robert Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water: The Medieval Judicial Ordeal (1986). 
25 
 David Wexler has expressly endorsed Slobogin’s definition of therapeutic 
jurisprudence as ‘the use of social science to study the extent to which a legal rule or 
practice promotes the psychological or physical well-being of the people it affects’: 
Christopher Slobogin, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder’ (1995) 1(1) 
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4.2.1 Industrialisation and a More Forensic Legal System—The 
Institutionalising of Due Process Exemplars 
 
Landsman observes that: 
[t]he fundamental expectation of an adversarial system is that out 
of a sharp clash of proofs presented by litigants in a highly 
structured forensic setting, will come the information upon which a 
neutral and passive decision maker can base a satisfying 
resolution of the legal dispute.26  
He notes that nobody set out to design the adversarial system. It was 
neither part of a grand governmental design, nor the scheme of ingenious 
legal philosopher. 
 
The emergence of the quintessential, procedural exemplars of the 
adversarial model can be traced to developments within the criminal 
courts of the mid 1700s. Langbein observes that: 
[t]he judges attempted to admit defense counsel at trial for the 
limited purpose of assisting the defendant to probe accusing 
evidence, expecting that the defendant would otherwise continue 
to speak in his or her own defense. By articulating and pressing 
for the enforcement of the prosecutorial burdens of production 
and proof, defense counsel largely silenced the defendant, 
leading to the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard of proof, and 
the privilege against self-incrimination. The adversary dynamic 
changed the very theory of the criminal trial. Whereas the old 
altercation trial had been understood as an opportunity for the 
accused to speak in person to the charges and the evidence 
against him, adversary criminal trial became an opportunity for 
defense counsel to test the prosecution case.27 
Langbein refers to the pre-adversarial form of the criminal trial as the 
‘accused speaks’ trial. In this style of litigation, the accusing citizen(s) 
confronted the accused in an altercation-style trial. No defence advocate 
was permitted and prosecutors were rarely used. The accused citizen 
engaged in a running bicker with the accusers. The purpose of this direct 
                                                                                                                                     
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 193–219; David Wexler, ‘Reflections on the Scope of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (1995) 1(1) Psychology, Public Policy and Law 222. 
26 
Cited in Hostettler above n 17, 26. 
27 
 John Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (2003) 257. 
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communication was to allow the accused to speak in his own defence, 
with a judge to moderate in much the way a referee would do in a contact 
sport. The judge took quite an interventionist role in this sort of 
proceedings, calling on the accuser(s) to particularise their charges and 
lead evidence and on the accused to respond to substance rather than to 
issue simple denials. 
 
A contemporary explanation of the rationale for the ‘accused speaks’ trial  
reads: 
The innocent accused will be as able to defend himself on ‘a 
Matter of Fact, as if he were the best Lawyer,’ whereas ‘the Guilty, 
when they speak for themselves, may often help to disclose the 
Truth, which probably would not so well be discovered from the 
artificial Defense of others speaking for them.28 
However, once the admission of lawyers to prepare evidence, brief 
advocates and to deal with an increasingly complex regulatory 
environment became common, both the judge and the litigants became 
relegated to the background. The judge became the arbiter of procedure, 
of the conduct of the lawyers and of the application of a developing law of 
evidence. This was not an intellectually passive role by any means, but to 
someone more familiar with the interventionist style of judging prevalent in 
the inquisitorial system developing in continental Europe, the judge 
appeared even disinterested in the proceedings. The French 
correspondent Cottu, observing a criminal trial in 1820, noted that the 
English judge ‘remains almost a stranger to what is going on’, and that the 
accused did so little in his own defence that ‘his hat stuck on a pole might 
without inconvenience be his substitute at the trial’.29 
 
As the legal and judicial process became abstracted in this way, its 
paradigm status began to be lauded and cemented almost immediately. 
18th-century criminal barrister John Adolphus described the experience in 
this way: 
                                                 
28 
 William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, vol 2 (1931) 400; R v Arthur 
Hedge esq. (1812). 
29 
 Cottu, Administration 88, 105, cited in Langbein, above n 27, 253. 
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I cannot describe the effect produced on my mind by the first 
hearing of an impassioned address, quick taunt, convincing reply, 
and above all the viva voce examination of witnesses and the 
comments on their evidence.30 
 
This passionate conversion to the world of adversarial advocacy, hinted at 
by Adolphus, illustrates the cultural power of a paradigm to attract 
practitioners. Kuhn downplayed the role of the rules of methodology in 
delineating a paradigm, but placed primary value on the mutual 
understandings among practitioners about what it means to work in a 
given discipline. Polanyi refers to these shared disciplinary understandings 
as the ‘tacit knowledge’ of a discipline. The ‘knowing how’ is much more 
definitive of a discipline than the ‘knowing what’.31 The path from the pre-
paradigm phase to paradigm phase within a discipline leads to cognitive 
restructuring of those within the paradigm. Polanyi, like Kuhn, emphasises 
the appearance of these passionate commitments to the worldview of the 
paradigm as creating a logical gap between those within and without. 
 
The increased focus on rights, and the belief that standardisation of 
procedure (due process) was the best means of protecting them, was the 
real genesis of the adversarial paradigm. Once standardised court and 
litigation procedures were in place, then rules of evidence and of advocacy 
and judging followed quickly. These became the exemplars on which the 
adversarial system rested. It became all too natural for students and 
researchers of the law to see their function as exploring the nature, extent 
and limit of emerging doctrines (of both the substantive law and of legal 
procedure). To this day, legal research is largely referred to as doctrinal 
research. Once the exemplars are in place, says Kuhn, then ‘[w]ork under 
the paradigm can be conducted in no other way, and to desert the 
paradigm is to cease practicing the science at all’.32 
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 Cited in John Hostettler, Fighting for Justice: A History of Adversary Trial (2006). 
31 
 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (1962). 
32  
SSR 34. This, in part explains the significant resistance to therapeutic jurisprudence 
from some members of the judiciary (particularly in North America) who see it, possibly 
correctly, as an assault on adversarial exemplars. See, eg, Eric Cohen, ‘The Drug Court 
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Exemplars are more than just sets of facts that provide answers to 
problems. They are models, generated by values and ideals as much as 
practical experience, and so they have significant normative and directive 
force. Thus, once paradigmatic exemplars are in place, they do not just tell 
practitioners what to do, they tell them why to do it that way. This 
normative entrenchment brings certainty and a sense of moral justification 
that gives purpose and clarity to practitioners. Given the necessary 
relationship between worldview and ideology to paradigms (discussed in 
Chapter 2), we can see that once the adversarial system became 
paradigmatic, there was no going back to a pre-paradigm phase within the 
liberal democracies—apart from political revolution or coup. The 
adversarial paradigm is, to some extent, enmeshed at a constitutional 
level in Australia and England.33 
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 See for example s 80 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, which 
provides that:  
The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth 
shall be by jury, and every such trial shall be held in the State where the 
offence was committed, and if the offence was not committed within any State 
the trial shall be held at such place or places as the Parliament prescribes. 
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4.3 The Practice of Law in the Adversarial Context—
Exemplars 
 
As discussed above, the adversarial system of law that has developed 
over the past 200 years has become forensically complex. This has, 
arguably, resulted in litigation and court processes that are very effective 
in finding the truth and in accurately adjudicating between competing legal 
rights and the evidence supporting them. The fact that civil and criminal 
appeals can often be decided on very fine points of law is testament to this 
forensic complexity. Such accuracy and attention to detail in a very strict 
regulatory environment is, however, labour intensive. This means that 
adversarial legal resolutions to problems are expensive. Civil litigation is 
beyond the means of the average citizen and of most smaller enterprises. 
Criminal procedures are equally expensive, resulting in a legal aid system 
that is in perennial economic crisis in terms of its ability to deliver services, 
and significant delays in bringing matters to court. 
 
According to Kuhn, normal science is a craft. The craft exists to give 
purpose to the paradigm. Practitioners within a discipline in a time of 
normal science work within exclusive and conservative communities that 
he claimed resembled medieval guilds more than dynamic, democratic 
groups. The discipline of law is virtually a tailor-made example of the 
Kuhnian conception of a discipline compared to that espoused by Popper 
and the positivists. Popper claims that practitioners learn from their 
mistakes, thereby enabling incremental (rather than revolutionary) 
developments of a theory or field as particular hypotheses are falsified. 
However, Kuhn asserts that it is success that drives learning during a time 
of normal science. The exemplar problem solutions are applied to new 
puzzle situations and thereby reinforced. Anomalies are marginalised as 
puzzles that have no place in the current field—they are puzzles to be 
solved by another discipline (or perhaps by interdisciplinary work where 
the exemplars of the companion discipline are definitive). Nickles 
articulates the difference in this way: 
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Normal scientists belong to closed, conservative communities of 
practitioners that resemble medieval guilds more than relatively 
undisciplined, democratic, Enlightened, Popperian open societies. 
Whereas Popper and the logical empiricists, like most Anglo-
American philosophers, are children of Descartes’ method of 
doubt, a Kuhnian research community is so deeply committed to 
the rectitude of its dogmas and practices that it can be said to 
follow something like the medieval way of belief.34 
 
The fundamental statement of the nature of judicial power by the High 
Court of Australia is that it is essentially a power of a sovereign authority to 
‘decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its 
subjects, where the rights relate to life, liberty or property’. 35  Judicial 
power, in other words, is adjudicatory (it is only to be exercised to make 
binding decisions) and it constructs those who seek its exercise as 
adversaries (the parties to a ‘controversy’). In Leeth v Commonwealth 
Judges Deane and Toohey asserted that the provisions of Chapter III of 
the Commonwealth Constitution did more than simply bestow federal 
judicial power in the federal courts, they placed limits on the scope and 
nature of that power. They said that: 
They also dictate and control the manner of its exercise. They are 
not concerned with mere labels or superficialities. They are 
concerned with matters of substance. Thus, in Ch.III’s exclusive 
vesting of the judicial power of the Commonwealth in the ‘courts’ 
which it designates, there is implicit a requirement that those 
‘courts’ exhibit the essential attributes of a court and observe, in 
the exercise of that judicial power, the essential requirements of 
the curial process, including the obligation to act judicially.36 
 
The use of such normative phrases as ‘the essential attributes of a court’, 
‘the curial process’ and ‘act judicially’ assumes that there is an identifiable 
and prescriptive set of features or rules by which these qualities can be 
measured and assessed. That is, there must exist a set of disciplinary 
exemplars that receive at least tacit, universal support from practitioners 
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 Thomas Nickles, ‘Scientific Revolutions’ in Edward Zalta (ed) The Stanford 
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35 
Huddart Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 per Griffith CJ. 
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(judges and lawyers in this case). The implication is that these exemplars 
hold normative force or, in other ways, to act in contravention of them is to 
act outside of the discipline (literally outside of the law).37 
 
The entrenchment of judicial power as an exclusive power of judges 
presiding in Chapter III courts in Australia is an entrenchment of the 
Doctrine of the Separation of Powers. It is an attempt to protect the courts 
from interference from the legislature. However, it assumes that judicial 
power is capable of analytical and precise definition—an assumption that 
we could observe a particular activity undertaken by a judge and assess it 
against such a definition to determine whether it is, in fact, judicial. This is 
a sign of a juristic model determined to define itself as a paradigm in order 
to cement its authority and exclusivity. If a given judicial activity or role 
does not accord with ‘traditional judicial procedures, remedies and 
methodology’38 then it is invalid.39 If there existed an increasing number of 
judicial roles and functions40 that did not accord with ‘traditional judicial 
procedures, remedies and methodology’, then these would be 
characterised by Kuhn as anomalies. A sufficient number of anomalies 
would indicate a transition from a period of normal science to a period of 
disciplinary crisis. 
 
The adversarial paradigm is partly an assumption that those who access 
the courts do so because they are adversaries (whether they be private 
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individuals or individuals in dispute with the state), and that they will 
remain adversaries for at least so long as their matter continues to be 
before the court. However, the paradigm expects and requires them to be 
adversaries. The court fundamentally exists to resolve the dispute by 
declaring a winner, or to coerce the litigants into a settlement, not to 
change those elements of the relationship between the parties that led to 
the dispute. 41  The pragmatic but naïve assumption is that community 
stresses and tensions are necessarily reduced by ending the dispute, not 
by working on or repairing dysfunctional relationships or lives. As 
discussed above, adversarial trials also serve a symbolic and cultural 
purpose, providing a certain measure of catharsis by the very nature of the 
ritual itself. In comparison to inquisitorial systems, for example, advocates 
of the adversarial trial claim that the emphasis on the participation and 
control of the litigant parties themselves is essential.42 
 
There is also little doubt that powerful and influential sections of the legal 
profession and the judiciary view some elements of the adversarial 
process as so intrinsic to their role as officers of the court that they cannot 
be dispensed with, and that this commitment to the perceived integrity of 
the system then also becomes a source of their power. McEwan claims 
that the formation of a professional bar in 18th-century England led to an 
emotional commitment by the English bar to traditional adversarial 
features such as ‘cross-examination, non-disclosure of the defence case 
and the labyrinthine complexities of the rules on the admissibility of the 
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in Anthony Duff, Lindsay Farmer et al, The Trial on Trial Volume 1: Truth and Due Process 
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defendant’s criminal record’, which might thus be seen as ‘reluctance in 
the legal profession to let go of its power’.43 
 
The entrenchment of rules and protocols as exemplars is reflected, 
according to Kuhn, in a tendency of an extant paradigm to marginalise 
both contrary observations and theoretical analysis. In the case of the 
adversarial paradigm, this is exemplified, as was alluded to in the previous 
section, in the marginalisation of Kant’s views on deterrence as a valid 
justification for the infliction of state punishment. Kant’s assessment of the 
validity of state-imposed general deterrence contrast strongly with the 
Thomistic view of deterrence as being rooted in natural law. After the 
Enlightenment, the doctrine of general deterrence maintains its exemplar 
quality (and is regarded as virtually inviolate by judges), but divine or 
natural rationales for its use are replaced with social science data that 
purports to show that deterrence works. The general deterrence exemplar 
is also a useful example of an adversarial exemplar that is intimately 
connected to a liberal economic worldview, in which individuals are 
regarded as being fundamentally rational agents with fairly simple 
motivations that can be used to control them. According to Kant: 
Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to 
promote some other good for the criminal himself or civil society, 
but instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the 
ground that he has committed a crime; for a human being can 
never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of 
someone else … He must first of all be found to be deserving of 
punishment before any consideration is given of the utility of this 
punishment for himself or his fellow citizens.44 
 
This position is commonly interpreted as being purely retributive in nature. 
However, a closer reading of the Metaphysics of Morals45 reveals a more 
nuanced approach in which punishment serves two purposes. Punishment 
as a threat was necessary to deter crime, a tool with which civil society 
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could counteract individual urges to infringe the rights of others. However, 
when punishment is imposed, it could only be done so in a retributive way; 
that is, as a means of punishing the offender and not as means of 
deterring others as some social goal or directive.46 Therefore, according to 
Kant, the state was morally prohibited from including an element of 
general deterrence in a sentence. Although there are certainly conflicting 
views on the moral validity of general deterrence, this Kantian reasoning 
still resonates in contemporary juristic debate. 
 
The debate centres on whether it is unfair to punish an individual to set an 
example for others and that the only factors relevant to sentence ought to 
be the seriousness of the actual offence and the amount of harm or 
damage done and the circumstances of the particular offender involved. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission was of precisely that view when it 
conducted its review into Commonwealth sentencing law in 1988—and for 
that reason general deterrence is markedly missing from the list of express 
sentencing justifications in section 16A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), 
which sets out the factors relevant to sentence for federal offences.47 
 
President Kirby, of the New South Wales Court of Appeal (as he then 
was), in the matter of DPP v EL Karhani48 had to consider an appeal by 
the Attorney-General of a sentencing decision by a district court judge in 
New South Wales. The judge had handed down a sentence of three years 
and nine months imprisonment to a man convicted of smuggling a 
trafficable quantity of heroin into Australia. This happened shortly after the 
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insertion of the new sentencing provisions into the Crimes Act and the first 
instance judge said that he could not consider issues of general 
deterrence in the sentence because that was not a factor prescribed in the 
Crimes Act. In rejecting this reasoning, President Kirby in his appeal 
judgment held that: 
It would have been surprising indeed if such a fundamental 
principle of sentencing, inherited from the ages, had been 
repealed by the Act. But legislative slips can occur. It is therefore 
necessary to look to the language and purpose of the Act. The 
language of the Act gives no support for the proposition that 
general deterrence has been removed from the list of criteria to 
be considered by a court sentencing a person for a Federal 
offence.49 
 
That is, to some extent, an extraordinary conclusion for His Honour to 
have come to, and if the sentencing justification had been anything other 
than general deterrence it is doubtful if he would have tried to usurp the 
role of the legislature and essentially rewrite the Act in that way. 
Nevertheless, superior courts have consistently read the general 
deterrence purpose into the Act despite the Commission’s deliberate 
decision to exclude it. The Commission then recanted from this position in 
the later report into the sentencing of federal offenders, Same Crime, 
Same Time.50 
 
In her wide-ranging critique of the inability of adversarialism to retain its 
relevance in a postmodern world, Menkel-Meadow points to a wider 
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academic dissatisfaction with its value. 51  She claims that despite the 
‘longevity and robustness of adversarialism as a mode of human 
discourse’, even some philosophers and epistemologists have questioned 
its value as the best way to understand the world.52 The choice of the 
descriptor ‘mode of human discourse’ is an interesting one and appears to 
be equivalent to what I have referred to as a juristic model in relation to the 
law. She points out that there are many other modes of human 
discourse,53 some that relate to the law, some that do not. Her position is 
that: 
the scientific method, for example, which, although it needs to 
‘falsify’ propositions with contrary data, does not set out to prove 
something by juxtaposing its opposite. Additionally, conversation, 
storytelling, mediation and consciousness raising are all more 
circular and far less structured in method. Dangerous monologic 
(or far less adversarial) forms like inquisitions and Star Chambers 
also exist. Finally, there are other, completely different legal 
systems—civil, mediational and bureaucratic systems are 
examples.54 
 
It is worth noting that tribunals within the common law systems that seek 
to vary or dispense with some core adversarial protections and guarantees 
of due process and natural justice (such as the rights to representation 
and to cross-examine witnesses) tend to be created by statutes that 
include significant limitations on how information obtained at the expense 
of those protections can be used. This is evidence that the farther a 
process is seen to deviate from the adversarial paradigm, the more 
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oversight and accountability is required to limit the potential damage 
suffered as a result of that deviation.55 
 
Even those judicial officers who comment extra-judicially about the 
structure and future of the litigation system tend to hedge their bets and 
avoid overt suggestions that adversarial principles do not form the core of 
exemplars at the heart of the legal system. For example, Judge Ipp 
(writing extra-curially) is one of those who acknowledges that the 
adversarial system of litigation has grown and evolved organically, but 
does not want to imply that it is, therefore, somehow ‘non-adversarial’: 
Our system of justice is indeed adversarial in character, but it has 
long progressed from the basic classical adversarial system 
where judges are entirely passive. By an ad hoc development of 
rules we now have a hybrid system based on adversarial 
elements. It should be recognised that our system has never been 
immutable.56 
 
Adversarialism is thus seen as providing a web of paradigmatic exemplars 
that are entrenched at the heart of the legal system. Judges and lawyers 
may vary procedure, they may innovate and they may criticise. However, 
ultimately, if a question arises as to whether what a judge or lawyer does 
is valid and carried out according to law, then the answer is found by 
consulting what Judge Deane 57  referred to as ‘traditional judicial 
procedures, remedies and methodology’, which have constitutional and 
normative force. 
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4.4 The Discipline of Law in the Adversarial Context—
Social Order and the Wider Liberal Worldview 
 
Although traditional jurisprudence tends to connect the rise of the due 
process exemplars with a growing political and social enfranchisement of 
the middle class produced by the industrial revolution, and the spread of 
laissez faire liberal values and practices designed to protect mercantile 
and individual freedoms, later thinkers take a more critical view. 
 
Foucault is distrustful of the traditional jurisprudence of this period that 
attempts to cloak changing legal and penal policies in terms of 
Enlightenment concerns for human, social and political rights. He traces 
the changes in patterns of offending in the 1600s, which were much more 
likely to be crimes of violence such as homicides and assaults, to a 
preponderance of property offences beginning in the mid 1700s. He 
explains this change in offending as a turn: 
from a criminality of blood to a criminality of fraud, driven by a 
rising mode of capitalist production, increase in wealth for the 
class reaping the benefits of that production and a greater value 
placed on property relations rather than the customary deference 
to the local lord or priest … The true objective of the reform 
movement was not so much to establish a new right to punish 
based on more equitable principles, as to set up a new economy 
of the power to punish, to assure its better distribution, so that it 
not be too concentrated at certain privileged points or too divided 
between opposing authorities.58 
 
The new structures of the criminal justice system began to take on ‘the 
bourgeois appearances of a class justice’ to meet the needs of a 
developing market economy in which the relationships between people 
and property were in great need of regulation and protection. These are 
perspicacious insights from Foucault, who held that these changes were 
due to strategic adjustments of the mechanisms of power, rather than to 
incremental improvements in a general respect for human and political 
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rights. The conceptual connection with Kuhn’s emphasis on the political 
and social worldview of practitioners is important. 
 
This political need to protect property relationships goes a long way to 
explaining the intrinsic and symbiotic relationship between adversarialism, 
property rights and due process exemplars that developed and became 
constitutionally entrenched in the 19th and 20th centuries. A market 
economy cannot thrive without the close regulation of production, property, 
ownership and trade. It requires smooth and efficient processes for the 
transfer of ownership and the protection of property rights. It was perhaps 
inevitable that the markets of the Western liberal democracies were seen 
by jurists as a complex web of often conflicting property rights that could 
only be resolved and clarified by conceiving them of disputes in need of 
quick and determinative adjudication. This was clearly recognised by Marx 
as early as 1867 when he wrote that: 
Commodities cannot go to market and make exchanges of their 
own accord. We must therefore have recourse to their guardians 
… their guardians must place themselves in relation to one 
another as persons whose will resides in those objects, and must 
behave in such a way that each does not appropriate the 
commodity of the other … except by means of mutual consent. 
This juridical relation, which thus expresses itself in a contract, is 
a relation between two wills and is but a reflex of the real 
economic relation between the two.59 
 
In addition to the analysis of historians, sociologists and philosophers, 
there has been some academic and judicial acknowledgement that the 
principles claimed to comprise the core of the adversarial process are a 
matter of historical and cultural protocol, rather than due to some rational, 
a priori and mandated design. To a large extent, it appears that the 
principles of adversarialism are a product of common law convenience 
and are in fact susceptible to paradigmatic change if the judiciary (and 
legal profession) are in favour of change. An early assertion that the 
adversarial core is a product of the court system itself comes from 
Blackstone: 
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If therefore the fact be perverted or misrepresented, the law which 
arises from thence will unavoidably be unjust or partial. And, in 
order to prevent this, it is necessary to set right the fact and 
establish the truth contended for, by appealing to some mode of 
prohibition or trial, which the law of this country has ordained for a 
criterion of truth or falsehood.60 
 
According to Underwood, this is an express acknowledgement that the 
common law trial has been ordained by the common law itself as the 
method of resolving civil disputes in a court.61 Underwood goes on to 
make an argument, based on observations similar to those of Davies,62 
that the imperatives that historically drove the structure of civil procedure 
(such as the need for oral proceedings, a single climactic trial and litigation 
controlled by the parties) no longer apply in many cases and the 
adversarial core ought to be malleable. Underwood observes that: 
the process of a modern trial is not something that has been 
designed, or recently redesigned, to achieve the best result for 
the parties in dispute. Rather, its adversarial nature and 
characteristics of continuity and orality have arisen from an 
historic scenario, that by and large no longer exists. 
 
The received view is often that the adversarial trial persists because it is 
the best mechanism for finding the truth, meaning the facts that can 
establish which party ought to win, if we construct their interaction as a 
dispute. However, this view has always been a pragmatic fiction. Lord 
Denning famously asserted that the adversarial nature of our legal system 
requires that an adjudication be made, not that the truth must be 
discovered. An adjudication is made on the grounds of the admissible 
evidence, regardless of whether that evidence necessarily discloses what 
actually happened. Denning said: 
If the plaintiff fails to prove his case—for want of any admission by 
the defendant—no injustice is done to him. Even though the truth 
may not have been ascertained, no injustice is done. In these 
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cases all that justice requires is that there should be a fair 
determination of the case whatever the real truth may be.63 
Here Denning alludes to the fact that justice is a socially constructed 
concept. It has no meaning outside of a social, human context. It refers to 
a shared understanding of how humans ought to, ideally, interact. It is both 
teleological and an abstraction. In other words, justice is what we, or 
rather what the courts, say it is. Since our courts and legal processes have 
evolved (rather than designed) to operate adversarially, justice is 
constructed as being discoverable by adversarial processes. 
 
This social constructivist perspective is important, as Foucault suggested, 
because it helps explain why a social institution such as a law court has 
such a claim and needs to be seen as operating pursuant to a paradigm. 
Constructivist philosopher John Searle explains that if the general 
constructivist account of social facts is correct, there may be many terms 
that crystallise only when the participants share certain intentional states 
about what they are doing. In the case of a social fact, as opposed to a 
natural fact, the attitude that we take towards the phenomenon is partly 
constitutive of the phenomenon.64 A constructivist position, then, would be 
that the term ‘court’ is a feature and outcome of socio-linguistic behaviour, 
which only becomes apparent a posteriori. It would be that, far from an 
adversarial court being some inevitable feature of human interaction, this 
assumed inevitability is rather a product of our study of it. We explain the 
adversarial process in ways that make sense of its supposed evolution 
and usefulness to us. 
 
There is significant critical literature, devoted to a critique of a wider 
tradition of adversarialism, which encompasses much of the liberal 
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academic agenda, across a number of key disciplines. According to some 
critical schools, the adversarial techniques of analytic philosophy that have 
largely defined academic discourse for a century are far from neutral and 
objective, and are based, rather, on an unspoken consensus among 
privileged practitioners who define a field and its methods. In essence, the 
various methods within analytical philosophy assume that complex issues, 
phenomena and questions can be reduced to more simple components. 
Logical analysis of claims and arguments lead to the assertion of various 
beliefs that can then be tested, and perhaps disproven or discredited by 
others. It seeks to arrive at truth by promoting the value of clarity, rigour 
and argument.65 
 
Moulton argues, in her seminal paper ‘A Paradigm of Philosophy: The 
Adversary Method’, that this process has a different social meaning for 
men and women.66 The adversarial method of identifying a position that 
can then be attacked and refuted operates ‘to the advantage of those 
whose socialised gender identity best fits a combative practice’. Behaviour 
seen as appropriately assertive in men is readily seen as aggressive in 
women. As well as subtly reinforcing the privilege of maleness, according 
to this view, the adversarial paradigm impoverishes philosophical practice, 
excluding other more exploratory approaches that may, in some contexts, 
be more fruitful. She says that: 
aggression normally has well deserved negative connotations … 
this negative concept, when it is specifically connected to … 
workers in certain professions (sales, management, law, 
philosophy, politics) often takes on positive associations. In these 
contexts, aggression is thought to be related to more positive 
concepts such as power, activity, ambition, authority, competence 
and effectiveness.67 
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Moulton contrasts68 the views of Popper and Kuhn in much the same way 
as this thesis did in Chapter 2. That is, to contrast Poppers view that a 
discipline progresses through a process of induction (where a theory is set 
up to hypothesis that all As are Bs and then to look for counterexamples 
that would falsify the theory) with Kuhn’s view that theories are not 
falsified, they change in reaction to changes in paradigms and worldviews 
that are not solely based on induction but a recognition that the questions 
that can be answered by the new paradigm are of more intense interest to 
practitioners. 
 
Moulton engages in a compelling critique of the contemporary methods of 
analytical philosophy, from a feminist perspective, beginning with the 
assumption that it operates pursuant to a Kuhnian paradigm. In doing so, 
Moulton goes beyond the more familiar assertion that there is a socially 
constructed belief that aggression is a non-feminine quality that is a 
burden for women in professions such as philosophy and law. Her main 
concern is to explain why compliance with exemplars of the adversary 
method in philosophy actually limits and distorts the work of philosophers. 
If the adversarial techniques of pure induction are paradigmatic 
exemplars, rather than just one of the methods available within the wider 
disciplinary matrix, then other ways of analysing the more intractable 
problems of philosophy are not taken seriously by the disciplinary 
mainstream and the history of philosophy itself is distorted. 
 
Moulton’s articulation of the adversarial paradigm that informs the method 
of academic philosophers is both insightful and valuable in the sense that 
it articulates a context in which both philosophical method and juristic 
method can be seen as expressions of very similar worldviews and 
ideologies. Her comparison is neither contrived nor abstract. There are 
profoundly important reasons why the work of an analytical philosopher 
and the work of an adversarial lawyer are so strikingly similar (at least in 
terms of the core methods of reasoning). These reasons have to do with 
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an intellectual preoccupation with a particular conception of objectivity as 
the guarantee of truth—and a belief that the truth thus generated is 
intrinsically valuable, unassailable and exclusive.69 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The quality of exclusivity is what truly marks a set of exemplars as 
paradigmatic. In the trend of some Australian courts (discussed above) to 
describe therapeutic process not as non-adversarial but as less 
adversarial, there is no explicit challenge to the exclusivity or primacy of 
adversarial exemplars. We see a neat parallel to the debate about how 
dominant adversarialism ought to be in the law in Moutlon’s articulation of 
her real concern about adversarialism in her own field: 
My objection to the Adversary method [in philosophy] is to its role 
as a paradigm. If it were merely one procedure among many for 
philosophers to employ, there might be nothing worth objecting to 
except the conditions of hostility are not likely to elicit the best 
reasoning. But when it dominates the methodology and evaluation 
of philosophy, it restricts and misrepresents what philosophic 
reasoning is. 
 
She then concedes that criticism of a paradigm, however warranted, will 
not succeed in replacing that extant paradigm unless there is an 
alternative paradigm ready to replace it. However, in the case of 
philosophy, Moulton argues, non-adversarial reasoning exists both within 
and outside the discipline, yet the current paradigm does not recognise it. 
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Moulton’s insight is consistent with the Kuhnian view that data, methods 
and reasoning that are not the products of exemplars within the current, 
predominant paradigm are marginalised and seen as either simple 
statistical anomalies or to be worked on outside of the discipline. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Kuhn was fascinated with the appearance of 
professional and conceptual order within the natural sciences.70 Much of 
the analysis of the adversarial system undertaken in this chapter has 
highlighted the fact that the law, much like the hard sciences, is an 
inherently conservative discipline that places a dogmatic emphasis on just 
this sort of professional and conceptual order. If we accept that legal 
practitioners, judges and scholars act as if the existing set of adversarial 
exemplars provide an adequate resource for solving all the puzzles that 
the operation of the legal system throws up, then the conclusion is that 
they, by-and-large, trust that there is an extant juristic model and, 
therefore, an extant paradigm, and that it works. The next chapter 
considers whether therapeutic jurisprudence could constitute, or be part 
of, an alternate, paradigm-based juristic model. 
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Chapter 5 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a Paradigm 
 
 
Contents 
 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 168 
5.2 The Ontological Issue—Paradigmatic of What? ......................... 173 
5.3 Evidence of Paradigm Status ........................................................ 209 
5.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................... 221 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Advocating for, foreshadowing or recommending a paradigm shift is to 
assert that a replacement candidate paradigm exists. The rhetoric of those 
who attempt to articulate a vision of particular legal processes and 
domains based on non-adjudicative models is steeped in the language of 
Kuhn. 1  As was suggested in chapters 1 and 2, this use of Kuhnian 
terminology and concepts can be explained, to some degree, as being 
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motivated by the ‘thrill of revisionism’, rather than by any perceived need 
for academic or intellectual rigour. However, for therapeutic jurisprudence 
to constitute a paradigm, whether of a whole juristic model or just of some 
subset of legal thought and practice, in anything but a colloquial sense, 
there must be evidence that it displays the necessary qualities of a 
Kuhnian paradigm. If therapeutic jurisprudence is part of a posited wider 
therapeutic (or non-adversarial or post-adversarial) paradigm, then they 
too must possess these qualities. 
 
In Chapter 4, the discussion as to whether adversarialism constituted a 
paradigm of a juristic model focused on the history of the adversarial 
system and whether an evolution from a pre-paradigmatic phase to a 
period of normal science could be identified, whether there was evidence 
of the emergence and instutionalisation of a set of discrete disciplinary 
exemplars and whether practitioner acceptance of adversarialism could be 
identified and explained by linking it to a wider cultural and political 
worldview. 
 
The question of whether the therapeutic approach to law constitutes, or 
may constitute, a paradigm needs to be examined according to a 
somewhat different emphasis, although the criteria outlined in the previous 
paragraph are still relevant. This is simply because the therapeutic 
paradigm, if it exists, is not the currently accepted paradigm. It is not 
developing within a field that is currently in a pre-paradigm phase. Thus, 
an identifiable set of potential exemplars is necessary, as is the political 
and cultural context of disciplinary acceptance, but it would also need to 
satisfy the qualities that Kuhn says characterise a paradigm that is 
emerging as a reaction to disciplinary crisis, precipitated by a set of 
intractable problems. The work of practitioners and academics within the 
field needs to be examined to determine whether they are exhibiting the 
sorts of attitudes characteristic of a period of crisis. Kuhn says that: 
Confronted with anomaly or crisis, scientists take a different 
attitude toward existing paradigms, and the nature of their 
research changes accordingly. The proliferation of competing 
articulations, the willingness to try anything, the expression of 
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explicit discontent, the recourse to philosophy and debate over 
fundamentals, all these are symptoms of a transition from normal 
to extraordinary research.2  
 
Certainly, a candidate for paradigm status must advocate an identifiable 
and evolving set of disciplinary exemplars against which potential 
practices and rules within the discipline can be benchmarked for validity. 
The candidate must also attract a critical mass of disciplinary acceptance. 
Those criteria will be touched on in this chapter.3 However, the key quality 
required in order to be seen as an alternative paradigm, qua alternative, is 
that it must promise to solve (rather than just identify or assert) intractable 
problems within the discipline. If it does not, then it is only an alternative in 
the sense that it replicates the set of current exemplars in different 
language—what Freiberg describes as ‘pragmatic incrementalism’. 4  It 
need not promise to be a panacea, a complete theoretical framework for 
the discipline or a self-contained disciplinary matrix. However, it must 
promise to succeed where the current paradigm fails. If therapeutic 
jurisprudence does this, then the key issue of incommensurability between 
adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence arises (and is dealt with in 
Chapter 6). 
 
Kuhn claims that there have been many scientific revolutions (paradigm 
shifts) and some have occurred in quite specialised sub-subfields within a 
given discipline—some with as few as 25 practitioners as members.5 We 
                                                 
2 
 SSR 90–1. We ought not, however, to conclude that the existence of these attitudes 
necessarily indicates that a discipline is undergoing a paradigm shift. That is a different 
question, and one that is expressly addressed in Chapter 6 of the thesis. 
3 
 As will become clear in the analysis below, it is relatively easy to find evidence for these 
criteria, but the more potent question is whether these attitudes and exemplars are 
indicative of a separate (existing or emerging) paradigm, rather than just evidence of 
disciplinary crisis simpliciter. 
4 
 Freiberg, above n 1, 8. 
5 
 SSR postscript 177, 178. Kuhn refers to subgroups of disciplines in this regard, such as 
the broad discipline of chemistry, which contains the subgroup of organic chemists and 
the further sub-subgroup of protein chemists. He discusses the increasingly important 
role of informal communications as the subgroups become more specialised. Attendance 
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can conceive of therapeutic jurisprudence as a range of paradigm-based 
subfields.6 It could, conversely, be conceived of as something far less 
influential or coherent than a paradigm. However, regardless of how broad 
or narrow the conception, the process of juxtaposing and contrasting 
therapeutic jurisprudence (as a potential paradigm of either the legal 
system or of some subfield) with the adversarial paradigm still does the 
key work of the thesis in highlighting potential incommensurability. The 
importance of commensurability is that it delineates, explains and predicts 
the future relationship between two contexts, schools or communities 
within a discipline.7 
 
It also allows practitioners to precisely delineate the issues on which they 
disagree, or upon which they are unable to make use of a neutral, 
common language to debate their views.8 As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
conceptual relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence and 
adversarialism is currently murky (and fraught with political and ideological 
                                                                                                                                     
at small, specialised conferences, the pre-distribution of papers and the existence of what 
we would now see as intimate email discussion lists, Facebook and other social media 
groups shared by members. All these are seen to thrive as fora for communication 
between therapeutic jurisprudence scholars and practitioners. Indeed, this thesis could 
probably not have been written without the work of those networks in therapeutic 
jurisprudence. 
6 
 In fact, there seems to be little point, as this thesis contends, in advocating that 
therapeutic jurisprudence adopt the role of a paradigm of the whole legal system.  
7 
 At SSR 112 Kuhn explains that at times of disciplinary revolution, practitioners’ 
perception of their environment must be ‘re-educated’—they must learn a new gestalt. 
This is so they can recognise that some old problems in the discipline are no longer really 
questions for that discipline at all—and that some questions that were once thought to be 
trivial or marginal within the discipline are now at its core.  
8 
 The suggestion being that it is very worthwhile for those who adopt contrary positions to 
know which of those issues on which they differ are fundamental. In other words, on 
which issues they will just have to ‘agree to differ’. Academic debates are generally of this 
nature, that is, a tension between contrary positions where both positions may be wrong, 
but both cannot be correct. Contradictory debates, in which both contending positions 
cannot be wrong, are relatively rare. 
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undercurrents) and that may cause confusion within the project in regards 
to mainstream therapeutic techniques and principles.9 
 
The breadth of the incommensurability that fully manifests may not be 
precisely known for a long time, if ever. From the position of the outside 
observer, and even from that of the contemporary practitioner, some 
changes in paradigm exemplars can appear to be just cumulative 
developments of the existing paradigm. 10  There is a tendency to 
characterise particular therapeutic jurisprudence innovations in this way 
within some of the relevant literature (such as the less adversarial 
proceedings initiative in the Family Court of Australia, discussed in 
Chapter 4). However, even if therapeutic jurisprudence operates to insert 
some rules or exemplars within the core of the existing legal disciplinary 
matrix, it will have succeeded in effecting paradigmatic change (albeit by 
modifying the existing paradigm rather than by replacing it).11 Some fields 
(and law is almost certainly one of them) contain so many sub-disciplines 
of specialist study and practice that paradigm change within some of them 
is inevitable, according to Kuhn.12 
 
Thus, the objective of this chapter is to evaluate the current dynamics and 
status of the therapeutic jurisprudent movement to ascertain whether it is, 
itself, a potential paradigm (of either a whole juristic model or of at least 
one component part), or an integral part of a larger (non-adversarial) 
paradigm—or neither. The conclusion will be that therapeutic 
                                                 
9 
 Nigel Stobbs, ‘The Nature of Juristic Paradigms: Exploring the Theoretical and 
Conceptual Relationship Between Adversarialism and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (2011) 
4(1) Washington University Jurisprudence Review 97. 
10 
 SSR 52. 
11 
 Because as we have seen in Chapter 2, the core of exemplars within the disciplinary 
matrix is what articulates the paradigm. A paradigm that is amended in this way may not 
even be recognised as having undergone fundamental change. It could be argued that 
this reality is why there is so much reference in the literature to concepts such as ‘post-
adversarial’ and ‘non-adversarial’ systems—systems that are, as yet, largely defined by 
what it is they are opposed to. 
12 
 SSR 37. 
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jurisprudence can be legitimately conceived of as paradigmatic, in either of 
those senses, but that there is little evidence that the therapeutic 
jurisprudence movement aspires to fund an entire juristic model in the way 
that adversarialism does. Integral to this evaluation will be some 
consideration of criticism and contrary opinion levelled against the 
therapeutic jurisprudence movement, but the depth and effect of that 
criticism will be more sharply examined in the Chapter 6 discussion of 
incommensurability.13 
 
5.2 The Ontological Issue—Paradigmatic of What? 
 
In this section I deal with the issue of what therapeutic jurisprudence is, in 
the Kuhnian context. I examine the various ways in which therapeutic 
jurisprudence can be conceived of as being paradigmatic. Then, in the 
following sections, I consider whether, in fact, it is paradigmatic. This first 
question is largely one of ontology,14 and it is necessary to deal with it 
before discussing, in the following section 5.3, whether this goes beyond 
conception to reality. To this end, I shall consider three ontological 
positions in relation to therapeutic jurisprudence: 
 First, (at 5.2.2) I consider whether therapeutic jurisprudence can be 
conceived of as paradigmatic in the sense that it could comprise a 
discrete juristic model (of the kind discussed in Chapter 3). 
 Second, (at 5.2.3) I consider whether it can be posited as part of 
some larger therapeutic (or post-adversarial) paradigm that is, itself, 
paradigmatic of a discrete juristic model. 
                                                 
13 
 This is because the criticism is best seen, for the purposes of this thesis, as resistance 
to therapeutic jurisprudence acquiring any paradigmatic status in its relationship with 
adversarialism. The bulk of therapeutic jurisprudence critique comes from (but is not 
confined to) adversarially committed members of the judiciary. 
14 
 The subject of ontology is the study of the categories of things that exist or may exist in 
some domain or field. The product of such a study, called an ontology, is a catalogue of 
the types of things that are assumed to exist in that particular domain of interest or field. 
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 Third, (at 5.2.4) I consider whether it may be paradigmatic of a 
‘problem-solving’ approach to just some particular forms of legal 
work. 
If the answer to any of these questions is ‘yes’, then the exercise of testing 
any of these potential paradigms for incommensurability with the 
adversarial paradigm is justified and of value.15 
 
5.2.1 How Does Therapeutic Jurisprudence See Itself? 
 
In considering the level at which therapeutic jurisprudence can be 
conceived of as paradigmatic it is obviously important to consider how 
those within the therapeutic jurisprudence community view their work and 
research. It is also necessary to examine how its critics perceive it and 
how the movement reacts to these critics. This is no easy undertaking 
because there is a range of views both within the ranks of its adherents 
and within the positions of individual practitioners over time. The identity of 
therapeutic jurisprudence is both fluid and reactive. Both the extant 
literature and the ongoing work of therapeutic jurisprudence practitioners 
demonstrate views consistent with all three ontological categories listed 
above. 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence makes synthetic rather than analytic assertions 
about law.16 That is to say that whether its assertions are true or not will be 
determined by how their meaning relates to the world rather than purely by 
virtue of their meaning. The justification of its assertions will depend on 
experience and observation. They are no more a priori than the equivalent 
assertions of adversarialism. They are testable and must be tested in 
order to determine their validity. For example, the assertion that something 
is therapeutic is akin to the assertion that something is just. We cannot 
                                                 
15 
 If therapeutic jurisprudence proves to be not just conceived of in any of these ways, 
but manifests itself as an extant competitor to the adversarial equivalent, then that 
exercise becomes even more useful and urgent. 
16 
 Interestingly, this tendency to make synthetic observations and assertions places 
therapeutic jurisprudence more within the social sciences arena than the humanities. 
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work out what therapeutic or justice mean simply by consulting a 
dictionary; we need to examine and assess the social functions of these 
concepts or values. Practitioners and advocates who manifest these 
purportedly therapeutic concepts and processes must construct, and then 
point to, definitions of these concepts to justify what it is they do in their 
name. Then, in order to have any real utility, they must be capable of 
being used to justify some conduct and to criticise or question other 
conduct. 17  In the case of therapeutic jurisprudence, the claim is 
consistently made that it can be used to critically assess legal rules, roles 
and players in order to improve them. If we assert that a certain legal rule 
ought to be amended or repealed because it is unjust, then we need a 
definition of justice that explains why this is so. Similarly, if we promote a 
rule or practice on the grounds that it is therapeutic (or less anti-
therapeutic), then we need a definition of therapeutic that explains why 
this is so. 
 
The meaning of the concept might be variable in practice (between 
professional or cultural groups), but this does not condemn it to a futile 
relativism or pluralist status. Even where opinions differ as to what might 
count as anti-therapeutic in a particular situation (for example), what unites 
practitioners in the field is the belief that there is something that is properly 
so-called anti-therapeutic. 
 
As Kuhn suggests in SSR, asking what a theory ‘is’ may be a somewhat 
contrived undertaking, given that a theory is not static. It evolves, 
according to Kuhn and most other philosophers of science, into whatever 
its proponents and advocates want it to do and be, and into what the 
members of the wider discipline will allow it to be. This observation, that 
the ambit of a theory is delineated by what the members of the discipline 
will allow it to be, is crucial. Kuhn says: 
Though the strength of group commitment varies, with nontrivial 
consequences, along the spectrum for heuristic to ontological 
                                                 
17 
 This central claim is initially explored in detail in Bruce Winick, ‘The Jurisprudence of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (1997) 3 Psychology, Public Policy and the Law 184.  
176 
 
models,18 all models have similar functions … they are held up to 
determine what will be accepted as an explanation and as a 
puzzle-solution.19 
 
Over the past two decades, the therapeutic jurisprudence community has 
proposed a variety of explanations for what therapeutic jurisprudence is, 
what it is not and what its core methodology should be. These 
explanations do, indeed, spread across both heuristic and ontological 
contexts. This is an understandable dynamic, given that therapeutic 
jurisprudence has been both an attempt to describe processes that are 
already happening in courts and legal practice, and also a normative 
agenda (that is, an effort to prescribe what ought to happen). A number of 
therapeutic jurisprudence advocates would prefer it to be conceived of as, 
primarily, a set of procedural guidelines, protocols and techniques for 
making the justice system more user-friendly in quite specific ways. 20 
However, to pretend it is not reflective of a least some deeper beliefs 
about the role of the wider legal system in a civil society, as will be argued 
below, seems counterintuitive. 
 
Despite the fact that some researchers expressly refer to therapeutic 
jurisprudence as a paradigm, and do so to propose it as a clear alternative 
to an adversarial paradigm, advocates, analysts and critics of therapeutic 
jurisprudence accord it differing status. Some see it as a unique and 
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 Kuhn is saying here that a theory or model can be just a set of problem solving 
techniques based on experience (a heuristic) or a complete ontology (an explanation for 
how a whole field or discipline works). The latter, ontological sort of theory, is close to 
what I refer to as a ‘juristic model’ in Chapter 3. 
19 
 SSR 184. 
20 
 The number of handbooks, bench books, practitioner guides and operations manuals 
based directly on therapeutic jurisprudence work is significant and impressive. It cannot 
be denied that the drive to eradicate anti-therapeutic effects and consequences from 
many areas of legal practice demonstrates substantial practical benefit. See, eg, Michael 
King, ‘Solution-Focused Judging Bench Book’ (2009) Australasian Institute of Judicial 
Administration. 
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identifiable movement,21 some see it as a lens or vector within a wider 
movement,22 while others seem to afford it a much narrower ambit. We 
have seen Freiberg and others describe it as an alternative paradigm to 
adversarialism, and Wexler early on emphasised the need for therapeutic 
jurisprudence practitioners to undertake more macro-analytical research.23 
 
Some voices of caution, such as Freckelton, have called for restraint in 
over-emphasising the ambit of therapeutic jurisprudence and of treating it 
as a panacea.24 There is even an express reluctance to allow it to be 
thought of, or written of, as a theory. As has been suggested in previous 
chapters, there is little or no attempt by Freckelton or others to tease out 
what it is about therapeutic jurisprudence that precludes it from the status 
of theory. It seems likely that this assertion is motivated more by a concern 
that therapeutic jurisprudence not be hijacked by the jurisprudential fringe 
nor marginalised in the ways that the ‘law and’ movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s were. In fact, it is usually in response to critics of therapeutic 
jurisprudence, who rarely base their criticisms on theoretical grounds, that 
this reluctance is expressed. 
 
                                                 
21 
 Wexler occasionally uses this label when referring to those who contribute to 
therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship and practice. He describes one of his recent 
essays as exploring ‘the therapeutic jurisprudence movement from theory to practice and 
the role of lawyers and judges as therapeutic agents.’ David Wexler, ‘Two Decades of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (2008) 24 Touro Law Review 17. 
22 
 Susan Daicoff, ‘Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law Movement”‘ 
(2006) 6(1) Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal. 
23 
 David Wexler, ‘Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (1995) 1(1) 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 222. 
24 
 There are no explicit arguments that would deny therapeutic jurisprudence paradigm 
status in the literature; most critics are more concerned with pragmatic and 
legal/constitutional issues rather than ontological or epistemic status. See, eg, James 
Duffy, ‘Problem-Solving Courts, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Constitution: If Two is 
Company, is Three a Crowd?‘ (2011) Melbourne University Law Review 394. 
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King, Freiberg et al have asserted, in response to criticisms of the alleged 
vagueness of the definitions and normative positions of the movement, 
that therapeutic jurisprudence: 
is rather modest in its goals. It is not a theory. It is not presented 
as a defence or indeed a critique of the justice system or society 
generally—those seeking a radical approach to the law should 
seek elsewhere. It is not an approach to radically restructuring the 
legal system or society. It is not a new-age movement or a cult. It 
is not presented as a unitary, coherent body of knowledge or 
approach to judicial or legal practice.25 
Although a paradigm is rarely any of these phenomena referred to by 
King, Freiberg et al, the implied warning off of legal theorists and those 
seeking broader legal and social reform it contains is telling. The 
delineation of what constitutes a therapeutic jurisprudence practitioner 
implied in this analysis tells the world, and the professions, what it means 
to be part of this movement. 
 
Co-founder of therapeutic jurisprudence, David Wexler, gave the first 
significant definition of the nature and scope of therapeutic jurisprudence 
in a 1992 paper written to propose a new, interdisciplinary approach to 
mental health law in the US. At that time, he wrote that: 
[t]herapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law as a 
therapeutic agent. It looks at the law as a social force that, like it 
or not, may produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic 
consequences. Such consequences may flow from substantive 
rules, legal procedures, or from the behavior of legal actors 
(lawyers and judges). In other words, one may look at the law 
itself as being a therapist—or at least a therapeutic agent or tool. 
                                                 
25 
 Michael King, Arie Freiberg, Becky Batagol and Ross Hyams, Non-Adversarial Justice 
(2009) 32. This urging of prospective ‘radicals’ to look elsewhere is a particularly 
revealing turn of phrase, possibly indicating both a Kuhninan sense of ownership over the 
movement by key practitioners (whose views and values are highly likely to be absorbed 
and reproduced by their students)—and a sensitivity to broad-based criticism. Apart from 
some fairly isolated expressions of concern from more conservative members of the 
North American judiciary (discussed later in this chapter), there is scant evidence in the 
literature that therapeutic jurisprudence is considered to be (for example) cult-like or a 
new-age movement. 
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Likewise, like iatrogenic disease in medicine,26 the law may itself 
produce psychological suffering (‘law-related psychological 
dysfunction’ or ‘juridical psychopathology’). The task of 
therapeutic jurisprudence is to identify—and ultimately to examine 
empirically, relationships between legal arrangements and 
therapeutic outcomes.27 
 
It is worth considering whether this foundational statement of the task of 
therapeutic jurisprudence constitutes what Freiberg, King et al referred to 
as a ‘modest’ goal. As to whether therapeutic jurisprudence is in any way a 
theoretical undertaking (which Freiberg, King et al deny) needs to be 
assessed in light of the way in which Wexler finishes the setting of the 
agenda above when he declares that: 
[t]he research task is a cooperative and thoroughly 
interdisciplinary one (potentially involving law, philosophy, 
psychiatry, psychology, social work, criminal justice, public health, 
and other fields). Such research should then usefully inform policy 
determinations regarding law reform.28 
 
Wexler has been the leading figure and advocate for the expansion of 
therapeutic principles and practices in law ever since.29 Wexler has said 
that his interest in expanding outwards from his work in the mental health 
jurisdiction was to some extent inspired by Perlin’s efforts to keep the 
scholarship of constitutional rights in criminal procedure alive at a time 
when the composition of the US Supreme Court changed to a more 
conservative mix. Perlin was part of a movement that attempted to ‘pin 
new, liberal, far-reaching constitutional rights on state constitutional 
provisions’ to compensate for the lack of interest and scholarship at a 
federal level. Wexler believed that the emerging field of scholarship based 
on a collaboration of law and social science researchers and practitioners 
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 This means an unintended adverse condition in a patient resulting from treatment by a 
physician or surgeon. 
27 
 David Wexler, ‘Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law’ (1992) 16(1) Law and 
Human Behaviour 27, 32.  
28 
 Ibid 32. 
29 
 See ibid 33. See also Michael Perlin, ‘State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of 
Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier?’ (1987) 20 Loyola Law Review 1249. 
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might wither on the vine unless there was a concerted effort to publish and 
to pursue the agenda. 
 
Wexler, and the other key figures in the area, have also continued to 
grapple with how to characterise therapeutic jurisprudence in terms of its 
precise place and function within legal theory and legal practice. The 
seminal definition Wexler first articulated (extracted above) suggests that 
the law can be conceived of as a therapeutic agent, in addition to 
whatever other qualities and functions it has. At first blush, it sees to graft 
this purported therapeutic quality onto the more traditional juristic 
properties rather than to seek to supplant any of them. If the subsequent 
construct has components that are conceptually symbiotic, in the sense 
that one cannot exist (in a normative sense) without the other, then this 
might be consistent with a conception of therapeutic jurisprudence as 
comprising a juristic model.30 
 
In perhaps his most recent significant consideration of the ontological 
issue, Wexler begins by asserting that: 
In actuality, therapeutic jurisprudence is not and has never 
pretended to be a full-blown (my emphasis) theory. More properly 
and more modestly31, it is a simply a ‘field of inquiry’—in essence 
a research agenda … From the beginning, however, TJ has 
sought to work with frameworks or heuristics to organise and 
guide thought.32 
A ‘field of inquiry’, a ‘research agenda’ and an evaluative process that 
informs ‘heuristics’ are all readily consistent with the sorts of scientific 
entities that Kuhn allowed could be referable to a particular paradigm. 
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 In the sense that the model could not exist without the therapeutic function/effects. In 
this sense, the therapeutic jurisprudence phenomena are not unique in the paradigmatic 
core of the disciplinary matrix, but they nevertheless conceptually reside there. 
31 
 Those familiar with Wexler’s scholarship would be aware of his characteristic modesty 
and humility. It could be that a little of this humility colours his view of the conceptual 
scope of TJ. 
32 
 David Wexler, ‘From Theory to Practice and Back Again in Therapeutic Jurisprudence: 
Now Comes the Hard Part’ (2011) 10–12 Arizona Legal Studies 1. 
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In a much earlier, but influential, paper, Wexler acknowledged that the 
interdisciplinary nature of therapeutic jurisprudence lent itself to micro-
analytical application.33 However, he also made some strong arguments 
for a significant macro-analytical context. He foreshadowed a discourse in 
which scholars within the field would begin examining law’s therapeutic 
effect on society, or on particular social groups, and at clusters of 
decisions and of general legal doctrines. He expressly allowed that 
researchers might well use therapeutic jurisprudence as a method of 
critiquing the ‘roots of the law’ and to use such critique to inform calls for 
‘fundamental, transformative societal change’.34 He further notes that the 
typical questions about the validity of the therapeutic jurisprudence 
agenda at the micro-analytical level would rear their heads in the wider 
theoretical domain—namely, questions relating to the due 
process/interventionist dichotomy, questions about a standard empirical 
method and questions about scope.35 
 
There is, then, some interesting ontological drift in Wexler’s articulations of 
the nature and scope of therapeutic jurisprudence. His conception seems 
to expand and contract between two key identifiable parameters: ‘to 
identify—and ultimately to examine empirically, relationships between 
legal arrangements and therapeutic outcomes’ and to critique the ‘roots of 
the law’ and to inform calls for ‘fundamental, transformative societal 
change’. Research and innovations clustered around the first of these 
parameters are easy to identify; they are prolific. Work with direct links to 
the broader parameter is not so common. This drift and diversity is, to 
some extent, reflected in the general body of therapeutic jurisprudence 
scholarship.  
 
On the one hand, some fear that if therapeutic jurisprudence is not seen 
as something more than a filter or lens that can be used to comment on 
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 Wexler, above n 23, 222. 
34 
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the therapeutic value of a law or procedure, then it might be consigned to 
relative obscurity—its products may be seen as little more than ‘books of 
handy hints’ (the contents of which are not even based upon express links 
with social science data so much as practitioner experience and 
anecdotes).36 Conversely, some see it as forming part of a wider agenda, 
and that membership of that agenda is what will best promote its longevity 
and continued relevance.37 Given that therapeutic jurisprudence is a fluid 
and user-constructed (synthetic) phenomenon, decisions can obviously be 
made by those who develop them, about what they are and what they 
become. The ontological question is, itself, fluid. 
 
In considering whether therapeutic jurisprudence and other vectors of 
what she refers to as the ‘Comprehensive Law Movement’38 ought to be 
subject to integration (meaning that all lawyers ought to be trained in 
them), or specialisation (meaning that only some lawyers ought to be 
trained in them) or some hybrid process (in which all lawyers and judges 
are trained in them but then choose to work in the mainstream or specialist 
practices), Daicoff concludes that the hybrid process is the most likely, 
given the current level of penetration of these vectors within both law 
schools and within the legal profession. She claims that: 
[w]hile the integration/specialisation question remains open, the 
hybrid approach appears to be most likely, where most lawyers 
and judges are aware of the various comprehensive law vectors, 
but only a few choose to practice or adjudicate in those ways … 
most importantly, therapeutic jurisprudence and the other 
comprehensive law vectors should be recast as simply ‘best 
lawyering practices’, excellent leading advising, or ‘leadership’.39 
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 Donald Farole, N Puffett, M Rempel and F Byrne, ‘Applying Problem-Solving Principles 
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‘Best practice’ in the sense meant by Daicoff is very close to what Kuhn 
would consider to be an exemplar. On a more restrained note, Freckelton 
suggests that: 
in the maturation phase of therapeutic jurisprudence those who 
identify its advantages have an intellectual responsibility to be 
clear about the parameters and limits of therapeutic 
jurisprudence. This will reduce its invocation in ways that will bring 
it into disrepute and result in outcomes inconsistent with its 
values. In addition, with its successes comes an obligation to 
explore what is claimed to be its implementation in practice and to 
evaluate rigorously whether such implementation is achieving the 
desired goals.40 
 
It appears then that there is no complete consensus within the therapeutic 
jurisprudence community itself about absolutely excluding any of the three 
conceptions of therapeutic jurisprudence posited at the beginning of this 
chapter. Although there is certainly some ontological drift to be found in the 
work of its lead proponents, we can, however, detect a greater preference 
for a more restrained and focused ambit. I turn now, over the next three 
sections of the chapter, to my own analysis of the relative viability of the 
three ontological states. 
 
5.2.2 Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a Distinct Juristic Model 
 
If we accept the assertions of Campbell, Aubert, Cotterre and other 
scholars (canvassed in Chapter 3) that juristic thought and legal discourse 
or practice can constitute distinct paradigms in the Kuhnian tradition, then 
it is reasonable to ask whether the therapeutic jurisprudence 
conception/model of the law also constitutes such a paradigm.41 A juristic 
model, as previously explained, is a theoretical framework (governed by 
paradigmatic exemplars) on which the processes of civil and criminal 
litigation in common law courts are scaffolded. 
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Those processes (which have a common theoretical basis) could include 
such things as legal and judicial reasoning, legal and judicial methodology, 
legal and judicial techniques, criminal and civil procedure, legal and 
judicial ethics and the rules and protocols for professional interactions 
between legal players. 42  In Chapter 4, it was argued that there is an 
adversarial paradigm that developed disciplinary exemplars to inform and 
ground our current juristic model. This section considers whether 
therapeutic jurisprudence could develop into the paradigm for a different 
juristic model.43 
 
In Chapter 2, the argument was advanced that a shift in the paradigm that 
defines a juristic model does not need to appear as a root-and-branch 
reconceptualising of the discipline. It could manifest as just a shift in basic 
focus that occurs, as a result of practitioner acceptance, mind-set and 
worldview, over a long period. It could be as general as a shift from the 
law being fundamentally concerned with refereeing a dispute between 
parties to decide a winner based on accepted procedural rules to being 
primarily a social force, enhancing or inhibiting therapeutic outcomes, 
where the formal legal rules become less determinative of the integrity of 
process, and where the therapeutic rules must be adhered to in order to 
guarantee integrity of process. 
 
Provided that this general shift in focus also provided a set of accepted 
exemplars for, inter alia, measuring therapeutic outcomes, then 
therapeutic jurisprudence could be conceived of as a juristic model. It is 
important to reiterate here that a juristic model neither encompasses nor 
proscribes a complete system of rules and practices untied by a coherent 
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underlying narrative44—in the sense that a change in models would entail 
the sort of ‘radical restructuring of the legal system or society’ that King 
and Freiberg are so wary of. 45  Neither does the Kuhnian agenda in 
general lend itself well to considerations of grand narratives. 
 
Traditional jurisprudence, deeply steeped in the ethos of modernity from 
which it so intimately evolved, has always proposed theories that construct 
the law as a contiguous and objectively discoverable set of rules, 
principles, doctrines and expressions of authority that exist to justify and 
implement that authority. Even so trite an expression as ‘the Rule of Law’ 
is primarily a political utterance that places law at the centre of governance 
and polity. Jurisprudence has traditionally sought to draw together these 
identified rules, doctrines and principles into a coherent thread as if they 
were based on an underlying ur-text or some metanarrative of what is 
legitimate. Although certainly not a postmodern theorist,46 Kuhn has no 
interest in clinging to the notion of the lawyer as simply a skilled technician 
applying a set of continually refined rules and practices heading towards 
some ever more effective and efficient manifestation of legitimate 
authority. 
 
Assertions that therapeutic jurisprudence can provide some sort of 
underlying and comprehensive narrative are virtually non-existent in the 
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 If we grant that adversarialism is the paradigm for our current juristic model then there 
is no comprehensive set of adversarial rules that cover all elements of legal work and 
practice. The adversarial rules that do exist inform and limit all rules within the model, 
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45 
 See Duffy, above n 24. 
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everyday work of lawyers’: Costas Douzinas, Ronni Warrington and Susan McVeigh, 
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literature. Even where practitioners or academics do advocate for such a 
wider conception, they recognise that there is likely to be resistance from 
the more conservative elements within the movement. Satin, in a 
somewhat notorious publication, expressly asks Wexler and Freckelton if 
their insistence on making relatively modest claims about the potential 
ambit of therapeutic jurisprudence are grounded more in attempts not to 
alienate ‘the adversarial-rights-obsessed legal profession at the heavy 
cost of muting—even crippling—TJ’s transformative potential’.47 
 
A Kuhnian paradigm is a product of the collective will and consent of those 
who propose and practice it,48 not a pre-designed blueprint for a discipline 
(despite the need for practical exemplars), and not a self-contained 
explanation of its place in society, let alone a grand narrative. For these 
reasons, this section of the chapter does not assert or examine any claim 
that therapeutic jurisprudence can somehow explain, describe or justify 
the whole legal system. In fact, a claim that a Kuhnian paradigm somehow 
provides any overarching narrative for a given field or discipline is a non 
sequitur. What I am considering here, however, is the possibility that 
therapeutic jurisprudence can provide exemplars that provide the primary 
benchmarks for assessing whether any legal rule or legal process is 
valid49  and whether any legal actor is acting validly (in a professional 
sense). These are not exclusive benchmarks, but they are those that are 
the most fundamental; namely, those that cannot be severed from the 
juristic model. An exemplar, as described in Chapter 2, is an example of a 
solution to a puzzle within the discipline, with which all proposed future 
solutions must align.50 
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 Mark Satin, ‘Healing First: Time for the US Justice System to Get Less Mechanistic 
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 Kuhn describes this as the ‘constellation of group commitments’: SSR 181. 
49 
 In a sense other than the constitutional or legislative heritage and compliance of the 
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50 
 An exemplar exceeds what we would think of as an ‘example’. An exemplar is not just 
an illustrative instance of a phenomenon, it is an example that, due to its status as an 
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At its most basic then, the question here is whether therapeutic 
jurisprudence provides benchmarks or criteria against which any legal 
rule, legal actor or legal process can be measured to determine whether 
that rule, actor or process is valid in the eyes of those all those involved in, 
and affected by, those rules, actors and processes.51 It is not difficult to 
find posited therapeutic protocols and rules that could be conceived of as 
exemplars, the question is how far, conceptually, do such exemplars 
stretch and whether they are broad enough to generate the framework of a 
juristic model. 
 
If we accept the position of Wexler and Winick that the basic therapeutic 
jurisprudence agenda is to ask ‘whether the law’s anti-therapeutic 
consequences can be reduced, and its therapeutic consequences 
enhanced, without subordinating due process and other justice values’52—
what potential is there, then, to elevate these therapeutic questions to the 
level of co-requisites with due process (adversarial) exemplars? Could we 
conceive of a set of juristic exemplars with symbiotic components, to the 
extent that we might say, ‘no legal rule, role or process must generate 
avoidable anti-therapeutic consequences, unless such avoidance would 
subordinate due process requirements?’53 
 
For example, a very common finding of evaluations of drug court 
processes and outcomes is that the strongest factor that determines the 
                                                                                                                                     
member of the same class of things. This is discussed in much greater depth in section 
6.2. 
51 
 In order to be conceived of as paradigmatic of anything, however narrow or broad, 
therapeutic jurisprudence would need to provide the relevant exemplars that solve 
intractable problems.  
52 
 David Wexler and Bruce Winick, Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence (1996)  17. 
53 
 Note that this is not the only way that a possible therapeutic exemplar could be 
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therapeutic paradigm. 
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success of drug court programs is the interventionist style and conduct of 
the judge, which provides a stark contrast to the typically reserved and 
detached demeanour of the adversarial judge. Rempel, Zweig et al, found, 
in a survey of 23 drug courts across six US jurisdictions, that those judges 
whose court behaviour correlated most highly with better participant 
outcomes were described as more involved and interventionist, that is, 
those who were ‘more respectful, fair, attentive, consistent and caring’.54 
The judges who scored most highly against these criteria were more 
closely associated with reduced recidivism and drug use in offenders after 
18 months of completing their drug court programs. Although many of 
these descriptors could be used to characterise the work of mainstream 
judges, they do not all command the status of disciplinary exemplars in the 
adversarial court. They are good practice, certainly, but not all are required 
to the extent that a judge would not be acting judicially without manifesting 
them. Thus, we can certainly conceive of these sorts of descriptors as 
potential exemplars, but a mainstream judge acting in an uncaring manner 
or who placed a stronger emphasis on appearing detached and reserved 
(rather than on being meaningfully involved and interventionist) would 
probably not be considered to be acting inappropriately. 
 
The juristic model itself is an abstraction and does not need to 
exhaustively explain and reconcile all the elements of new legal rules and 
processes.55 The model ought, however, to be able to inform each, and 
any, of those processes to the extent that it can provide exemplars for the 
solution of problems (rather than simply puzzles in the Kuhnian sense). 
Both the extensive body of therapeutic jurisprudence literature, and the 
application of therapeutic jurisprudence principles in so many legal and 
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 Michael Rempel, Janine M Zweig, Christine H Lindquist, John K Roman, Shelli B 
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Drug Courts’ (2012) 95(4) Judicature 154, 156. 
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 This is consistent with the Kuhnian view that there are always anomalies within a 
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judicial practices, demonstrates that there is significant potential for the 
movement to provide exemplars for an increasing number of processes.56 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to enumerate how each of the posited 
processes for a juristic model relate to various therapeutic jurisprudence 
initiatives or principles, but given that a change of paradigm does not 
change everything within a disciplinary matrix, this is not a critical 
omission.57 As noted above, there is significant reluctance expressed by 
some key figures in the therapeutic jurisprudence community to allow the 
movement to be conceived of as somehow radical or to be defined by its 
critics in terms so broad as to open itself to academic ridicule and 
professional marginalisation. King, Freiberg et al have considered the sort 
of criticism that holds that therapeutic jurisprudence attempts too much 
and is, therefore, conceptually meaningless. They note critical 
assessments of therapeutic jurisprudence that argue that it ‘contemplates 
a global, and therefore meaningless interface between the law and the 
human condition or human behaviour’58 or that it is touted by its advocates 
as ‘not unlike mediation, as a cure for the all-too-real ills of the adversarial 
system’. 59  This explains, in part, their warning that therapeutic 
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jurisprudence is ‘not presented as a defence or indeed a critique of the 
justice system or society generally’.60 
 
Thus, although there is no need for a juristic model to provide any grand 
narrative, it must provide an exemplar-based, theoretical framework on 
which the processes of civil and criminal litigation in common law courts 
are scaffolded. To the extent that such a model defines what the law is, 
what it does and what it should do, it needs to provide fundamental 
statements about the nature and purpose of basic legal institutions and 
concepts. Despite the wide range of legal contexts in which therapeutic 
jurisprudence has been used as a diagnostic lens, and even as a potential 
provider of disciplinary exemplars, there is, as yet, no critical mass of 
scholarship or analysis that constructs it as a wide enough enterprise to 
comprise a juristic model. It does not, for example, have any penetration 
into such fundamental sources as written constitutions or even significant 
amounts of legislation. There is very little (if any) acknowledgement of 
adversarialism in the written constitutions of the common law jurisdictions 
either. 
 
There is an obvious tension in therapeutic jurisprudence research and 
commentary (and in that of the critical literature) between those who see 
therapeutic jurisprudence as an essentially normative agenda and those 
who prefer to characterise it as more neutral and utilitarian. Those (fewer) 
researchers who see it as a transformative and wider agenda express 
frustration at the narrower characterisations. Satin, in particular, calls for 
Wexler and the other leaders of the movement to ‘stop the charade’, and 
‘drop the fig leaf’; in other words, to challenge the centrality of the 
adversarial paradigm itself and use therapeutic jurisprudence to ‘reinvent 
the very nature of the law-and-justice system itself’. 61  That could be 
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construed as a call for a Kuhnian paradigm shift, and comparing the 
conceptual depth of that call with the call of Freiberg for his version of a 
paradigm shift (discussed in Chapter 1) highlights the need for, and value 
of, this ontological analysis of therapeutic jurisprudence. Are these views 
best seen as contradictory, contrary or complementary? 
 
To conceive of therapeutic jurisprudence as potentially constituting a 
complete juristic model is not obviously fallacious. It is a rapidly expanding 
and evolving movement. Whether such a conceptually broad ambit is 
realistic, desirable or likely, however, remains to be seen. If we were to 
assert that all legal rules, roles and actors must be subjected to a 
therapeutic filter (comprised of therapeutic exemplars), as well as a more 
formal due process or legal positivist filter, then this symbiotic model would 
come close to positing therapeutic jurisprudence as a juristic model. To 
claim, however, that therapeutic jurisprudence currently does have that 
quality would not be defensible. The issue of potential incommensurability 
at this ontological level, while of some speculative interest, lacks 
immediacy. Next, I consider whether it could be part of a wider paradigm 
that, itself, informs a juristic model. 
 
5.2.3 Therapeutic Jurisprudence as Part of a Wider Therapeutic or 
Non-Adversarial Paradigm 
 
Since the 1960s there has been no shortage of academic and professional 
legal movements that have in common a mistrust of a legal system that is 
paradigmatically adversarial. Although a number of these have gained 
individual traction and forced some key reforms of specific laws and of 
how the law functions, the adversarial paradigm remains intact. Some of 
these movements and approaches have been combined, either by design 
or in a more ad hoc way, into identifiable clusters. These clusters 
                                                                                                                                     
that policy ought to be directed towards the needs of specific, individual citizens and 
communities rather than what is best for the State (an ideologically typically associated 
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obviously have some common themes and values beyond a simple 
opposition to an exclusive reliance on adversarial exemplars as the 
benchmarks for validity.62 One thing these clusters share is a desire to 
move beyond the prolonged period of Kuhnian normal science in which 
the law has been functioning. The most obvious characteristic of a period 
of normal science, according to Kuhn, is a ‘dearth of major novelties, 
conceptual or phenomenal’. 63  During these times, the failure of the 
discipline to achieve the results expected of it are characterised as the 
failure of the practitioners (scientists) involved. 
 
Practitioners who never, or rarely, fail to resolve the issues on which they 
work develop (quite rightly) reputations as expert puzzle solvers. However, 
the really pressing problems such as a cure for cancer do not get resolved 
during a period of normal research, says Kuhn, because they have no 
solution.64 He makes the analogy of an expert jigsaw puzzle solver trying 
to assemble a complex jigsaw puzzle by taking pieces from two separate 
boxes. No matter how talented the person attempting the puzzle, it can 
never serve as a test of their puzzle-solving skills because it is not a 
puzzle at all. It is a problem whose solution lies within the ambit of a 
different paradigm. A judge within a mainstream criminal court who tries to 
rehabilitate a drug-addicted offender without having the requisite training 
and without being able to prescribe something like an Intensive Drug 
Rehabilitation Order is virtually doomed to fail. The resources needed to 
address the extra-legal issues at the heart of the offending conduct are not 
generally available within a mainstream criminal court. 
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One crucial thing that a discipline acquires from its paradigm is a set of 
criteria by which practitioners can choose which problems can be 
assumed to have a solution. Problems that do not align with these criteria 
are ostracised as being metaphysical or as belonging to another discipline. 
Kuhn expresses the wider social implication of that reality in this way: 
A paradigm can … insulate the [practitioner] community form 
those socially important problems that are not reducible to the 
puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the 
conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies.65 
 
A key reason for the rapid development of a discipline, says Kuhn, is that 
practitioners thereby focus on problems that are only lacking a solution 
due to their own lack of ingenuity. A practitioner who comes along with a 
more precise instrument or a refined version of an existing experimental 
design is touted as a hero. Interestingly enough, law and jurisprudence are 
characterised by both significant advancement and precision and by a lack 
of success in engaging with some of the wider social problems that create 
and inform legal problems. The fact that clusters of movements and 
approaches opposed to an exclusive adversarialism in law tend to involve 
collaboration and hybridisation of data and method from other disciplines 
is illustrative of this Kuhnian truth. 
 
It is quite common, in the relevant literature, to conceive of and label 
therapeutic jurisprudence as a ‘lens’. It is worth considering what this 
means in terms of the ontological question. We ought not to confuse 
different conceptions of what a lens might be in relation to Kuhnian 
paradigms, especially in the context of analysing the purported place of 
therapeutic jurisprudence within the wider schema of non-adversarial 
approaches to law. 
 
It was mooted in the conclusion of the previous section that therapeutic 
jurisprudence could potentially provide benchmarks or criteria against 
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which any legal rule, legal actor or legal process can be measured to look 
for anti-therapeutic effects and consequences, but that we are currently a 
long way from seeing such a filter universally adopted as a method of 
gauging the validity of legal rules, actors or processes. However, 
therapeutic jurisprudence is sometimes seen, in the literature and in 
practice, as one component within a wider set of filters.66 
 
To that end, we need to consider whether therapeutic jurisprudence could, 
in fact, be part of a wider non-adversarial paradigm that contains this wider 
set of filters, given that the conceptual core of this thesis relates to the 
relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism and the 
nature and extent of any Kuhnian incommensurability between the two. If 
we can conceive of a wider juristic paradigm, which subsumes therapeutic 
jurisprudence as a non-severable subset, we can then ask with this wider 
paradigm is incommensurable with adversarialism.67 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Daicoff nominates therapeutic jurisprudence 
as one of a number of vectors within what she refers to as the 
‘Comprehensive Law Movement’, all of which are striving to explicitly 
recognise and value law’s potential as an agent of ‘positive interpersonal 
and individual change and which seek to bring about a positive result’68 
(such as healing, wholeness, harmony, or optimal human functioning) as 
part of the resolution of legal matters. These vectors may either provide 
alternative ways to resolve these matter or their underlying contexts, or 
they may complement and optimise the more traditional legal processes. 
They attempt this, she claims, by integrating and prioritising extra-legal 
concerns—factors beyond strict legal rights and duties—into law and legal 
practice. These ‘rights plus’ factors (as she calls them) include such 
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elements as: ‘needs, resources, goals, morals, values, beliefs, 
psychological matters, personal well-being, human development and 
growth, interpersonal relations, and community well-being’.69 Thus, it is 
important to recognise that what she describes, and advocates, are 
modifications to legal methods and procedures, not other (non-legal) 
methods to do a similar job. 
 
Daicoff70 has attempted to identify and explicate what it is that a number of 
alternative approaches to the adversarial practice of law have in common. 
She analyses new approaches and ‘emerging paradigms’71 that eschew 
the wholly adversarial, other-blaming, position taking tradition that we are 
all familiar with and suggests that these new vectors72 are all based on the 
assumptions that : 
1. law ought to optimise the psychological well-being of all those 
involved in it 
2. law ought to be concerned with a wider set of rights than just strict 
legal rights. 
To some extent she appears to be correct in identifying a convergence of 
these approaches—and convergence may be necessary for these vectors 
to have any significant reforming effect on legal institutions and 
processes73—but her construction of these vectors into a movement (the 
comprehensive law movement) may be a little premature. 
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The approaches she identifies as informing the comprehensive law 
movement include: 
1. collaborative law 
2. creative problem solving 
3. holistic justice 
4. preventive law 
5. problem-solving courts 
6. procedural justice 
7. restorative justice 
8. therapeutic jurisprudence 
9. transformative mediation.74 
 
Daicoff claims that these new approaches represent an emerging, 
alternative juristic paradigm that is an inevitable response to what she 
calls the tripartite crisis in the legal profession—namely, poor public 
confidence in the law, stress and depression among lawyers and 
decreasing professional standards.75 The movement is comprehensive in 
that it is interdisciplinary, integrated, humanistic, restorative and 
therapeutic. Each vector recognises that it is a function of law to act as an 
agent for positive interpersonal or individual change in some way (such as 
healing, wholeness and restoration). They also emphasise ‘rights plus’ as 
a legitimate concern of legal processes—for example, needs, resources, 
morals and values and personal well-being. 
 
Daicoff expressly asserts that these vectors represent a number of new 
lenses that, together, are at least consistent with a new paradigm in law. 
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She establishes the character and independence of these lenses by 
claiming: 
Until now, the legal system offered only one ‘lens,’ the traditional 
approach to lawyering. This lens typically focuses on legal rights, 
duties, and responsibilities and on resolution of legal matters and 
disputes. The comprehensive law movement adds at least five 
more ‘lenses.’ Each of these new lenses focuses on concerns, 
beyond legal rights, through which to view legal matters.76 
 
It is noteworthy that Daicoff seems to assert that there is an adversarial 
lens that is used to examine and interpret the legal system, but that it 
would be inappropriate to consider such a lens as exclusive. The 
traditional role of the law, she suggests, is the resolution (via neutral 
adjudication) of legal matters and disputes. However, the only way to 
assess the validity of such resolutions is by applying the criteria of legal 
rights, duties and responsibilities. This is the quintessential positivist core 
of adversarialism—liberal notions of due process informing the application 
of formally enacted legal norms. However, although Daicoff does assert 
that the comprehensive law movement (including therapeutic 
jurisprudence) provides vectors that ought to be given the same status as 
an ‘interpretive lens’ that is currently enjoyed by adversarialism, she also 
claims that many of them are more than mere lenses or filters. She claims 
some practical and independent roles. She continues: 
Despite perhaps being limited to one ‘lens,’ the existing legal 
system offers a number of ‘processes’ which can be used to carry 
out the goals identified by the traditional ‘lens.’ The existing 
processes include: litigation, mediation (facilitative and evaluative 
forms thereof), arbitration, private adjudications, private trials, and 
old-fashioned negotiation and settlement77.  
 
When Daicoff characterises these vectors of the comprehensive law 
movement as incorporating a ‘rights plus’ approach to working on 
disputes, what she means is that they do so with a bigger toolbox than just 
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that provided by adversarialism.78 The vectors allow for a consideration of 
extra-legal factors and not only the sorts of formal legal rights and 
obligations that we would see provided for in statutes, for example. If 
these types of factors are going to be given credence, then the processes 
of addressing the disputes obviously lends itself to a collaborative and 
interdisciplinary approach. This is exactly the kind of model on which most 
of the problem-solving courts and the neighbourhood justice centres are 
based. 
 
This consideration of non-legal factors in the resolution of a dispute or the 
administering of justice is currently antithetical to what is traditionally done 
in a common law court, and to what is taught in law schools. Law students 
are typically required to recognise and disregard factors that do not 
contribute to a legal decision and the ability to do this well generally makes 
a ‘good’ student and ultimately a ‘good’ lawyer or judge (contrary to some 
of the rhetoric in law schools and the profession about the importance of 
such things as client care). This then is the ethos that they would be 
expected to take to the bench. 
 
This tension between the law as an arbiter of formal rights and the law as 
a part of a wider solution to disputes and dysfunctional relationships is 
conceptually reminiscent of Carrol Gilligan’s79 observations that the law 
moves away from ‘an ethic of care’ towards a model based (formulaically) 
on rights and justice. The (apparent) contest is between beliefs that the 
law is limited to resolving disputes by a strict analysis of whose rights and 
interests are more important rather than by trying to reconcile or repair. In 
considering the scope of therapeutic jurisprudence as a comprehensive 
law movement vector, Daicoff cites Slobogin’s definition of therapeutic 
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jurisprudence: ‘the use of social science to study the extent to which a 
legal rule or practice promotes the psychological or physical well-being of 
the people it affects’.80 She categorises Winick and Wexler’s agenda as 
asking ‘whether the law’s anti-therapeutic consequences can be reduced, 
and its therapeutic consequences enhanced, without subordinating due 
process and other justice values’.81 
 
The main contribution of Daicoff for the purposes of this thesis, though, is 
that she proposes paradigm status for a juristic model that includes 
therapeutic jurisprudence in a stronger sense than virtually any other 
contributor to the literature, with the possible exception of Freiberg. She 
claims that the lenses and vectors of the comprehensive law movement 
are all consistent with ‘a different paradigm for the resolution of legal 
matters’. 82  She then links the assertion of an emergent new legal 
paradigm to paradigmatic changes in wider political and social institutions, 
mainly by reference and analogy to work done by feminist legal academics 
and researchers of post-enlightenment developments in law and society. 
Her analysis in this regard is closely linked (although she does not 
expressly make the connection in her paper) with the requirement of a 
changed worldview or Weltanschauung as a basis for a Kuhnian paradigm 
shift (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
 
She makes the quite sanguine claim that a reshaped geo-political world 
characterised by globalisation and a less adversarial international political 
mentality as a result of the end of the Cold War have contributed to a 
growing societal awareness of our connectedness to, and an open 
mindedness towards, all people, all countries and all cultures in the world, 
and that as a result: 
our society has witnessed the decline of a philosophy focused on 
individual rights, logic, and reason and the concomitant rise of a 
                                                 
80 
Christopher Slobogin, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder’ (1995) 1 
Psychology, Public Policy and the Law 193. 
81 
Wexler and Winick, above n 52, 72. 
82 
Daicoff, above n 68, 11. 
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counterbalancing ethos, focused on compassion, care, 
relationships, and connectedness.83  
 
As we would expect of such a broad and influential movement, attempts 
have been made to conceptually integrate therapeutic jurisprudence within 
the ambit of other jurisprudential clusters, apart from Daicoff’s mooted 
comprehensive law. Marchetti and Daly include therapeutic jurisprudence 
within the rubric of what they refer to as ‘New Justice Practices’.84 
 
There have, therefore, been well-thought-out, evidence-based and 
credible attempts to conceive of therapeutic jurisprudence as a constituent 
part of a broader non-adversarial paradigm and juristic model. In fact, as 
demonstrated by the work of Daicoff and others, there have even been 
attempts to make preliminary inventories of what these constituent parts 
may be, and what values and protocols these parts must share in order to 
generate disciplinary exemplars. 
 
5.2.4 Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a Problem-Solving Paradigm 
 
In this section I consider whether therapeutic jurisprudence may be 
paradigmatic of a problem-solving approach to just some particular forms 
                                                 
83 
 She postulates that this may be as a result of ‘a growing diversity in our power 
structure, governments, corporations, schools, and other institutions. The ethics and 
values of previously disempowered individuals may have begun to seep into our 
collective consciousness’: ibid 44. This is strongly reminiscent and reflective of the 
discussion in Chapter 2 concerning the intimate relationship between worldviews and 
paradigms.  
84 
 Elena Marchetti and Kathleen Daly, ‘Indigenous Sentencing Courts: Towards a 
Theoretical and Jurisprudential Model’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 415, 423. In a 
similar vein, Brooks and Madden identify TJ, preventive law, restorative justice and 
transformative mediation as vectors or components of what they construct as 
‘relationship-centred lawyering’: Susan Brooks and Robert Madden, Relationship-
Centered Lawyering: Social Science Theory for Transforming Legal Practice (2010). We 
could also add the construct of ‘psycho legal soft spots and strategies’, an attempt to co-
conceptualise therapeutic jurisprudence and preventive law: King, Freiberg et al, above n 
25, 65.  
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of legal work. This is something less than providing a paradigm for a 
juristic model, or being a constituent part of a wider paradigm that, itself, 
informs a juristic model. If this were to be the case, then the crucial matter 
of incommensurability still arises where the exemplars of that narrower 
paradigm conflict with those provided by the adversarial paradigm. 
 
An ontology of this kind would compare different ways of applying the law, 
rather than comparing different conceptions of what the law is. Wexler 
alludes to this ontology in making the following observation about 
therapeutic jurisprudence practices, in relation to the roles and behaviours 
of legal actors: 
Note that the TJ emphasis on ‘roles’ relates basically to the 
administration of the law. That emphasis, in turn, flows from 
another conceptual framework—that of distinguishing proposals 
for actual law ‘reform’ from those of ‘applying’ the existing law 
more therapeutically.85 
That is a very useful articulation of the baseline position with respect to the 
relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence. It 
promotes therapeutic jurisprudence as a problem-solving dynamic rather 
than as explanatory. 
 
The idea of therapeutic jurisprudence comprising a heuristic framework 
could go a little beyond establishing therapeutic jurisprudence as merely a 
set of practical tips and anecdotal successes. Wexler has asserted that 
‘therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship has also provided a conceptual 
framework for thinking specifically about lawyering and judging in the 
criminal law sphere’.86 An ontology of this kind might posit that the correct 
or best way of proceeding, in some cases, is not predetermined by a 
substantive rule, especially where an exhaustive search and analysis of 
such rules may be required, but by applying common-sense, experience 
and a consideration of the well-being of the participants. There would 
seem to be significant potential for synergy between research into the role 
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 Wexler, above n 23, 34. 
86 
 Ibid 35.  
202 
 
of heuristics in legal decision making and the enduring tension between 
efficiency and effectiveness in the practice of law.87 
 
The most common claim made by advocates of a new paradigm is that it 
can resolve the problems that have been intractable under the existing 
paradigm. That tends to be a strongly influential claim, but not always 
sufficient. This is perhaps one of the strongest indicators that therapeutic 
jurisprudence promises to be paradigmatic rather than incremental. There 
are weaknesses and failings of both the civil and criminal law that are 
perennial, notorious and apparently intractable. 
 
Recidivism among criminal offenders and the failure of policies and 
practices of rehabilitation have been a particularly vexing issue in criminal 
justice, 88  but the successes of a number of problem-solving courts in 
addressing recidivism by promoting and managing change in offenders 
has received significant attention and led to both a considerable expansion 
in the type and number of problem-solving courts and in calls for their 
techniques to be mainstreamed.89 
                                                 
87 
 There is some precedent for this in the extant literature. See, eg, Gerd Gigerenzer and 
Christoph Engel (eds) Heuristics and the Law (2007). 
88 
 The use of drug courts and the issue of criminal recidivism is used thematically 
throughout the thesis in light of the extensive research available, given that it is one of the 
oldest jurisdictions with a strong therapeutic jurisprudence and problem-solving influence. 
This is not to marginalise or ignore the other problem-solving jurisdictions. 
89 
The claims that problem-solving courts have the effect of reducing recidivism are 
sometimes questioned or even denied, but there are credible reports in the literature of 
these successes. A meta-analysis of the relationship of Indigenous sentencing courts to 
recidivism and attendance rates, for example, is conducted in N Stobbs and G 
Mackenzie, ‘An Analysis and Evaluation of Australian Indigenous Sentencing Courts’ 
(2009) 13(2) Australian Indigenous Law Review 90. As to the proliferation of problem-
solving courts, the latest incarnation seems to be rise of gambling treatment courts in 
many US jurisdictions: C Hinshaw, ‘Taking a Gamble: Applying Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
to Compulsive Gambling and Establishing Gambling Treatment Courts’ 9(4) Gaming Law 
Review 333. The 141 referenced evaluation reports in relation to drug courts in the US 
are archived by the Drug Court Technical Assistance Project available online at 
<http://www1.spa.american.edu/justice/>. The range of resources and reports stored 
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Pursuant to the adversarial paradigm, courts had little scope to anything 
close to the style of judicial management seen in venues such as the drug 
courts, and compliance with sentencing law can readily be characterised 
as puzzle solving in the Kuhnian sense. A sentencing judge in a 
mainstream court is hardly likely to invite the prosecution, defence lawyer 
and offender to join with the judge as a team in seeking to treat the cause 
of the offending behaviour and agree to meet regularly to review progress. 
Although just that approach is possible (especially with enactment of 
enabling legislation such as the Drug Court Act 2000 [Qld]), 90  it is 
generally restricted to specifically convened courts. 
 
A mainstream sentencing court is primarily concerned 91  with imposing 
penalties according to legislative sentencing factors. It is not too difficult to 
conceive of this change in approach to drug-addicted offenders as 
reflective of a change in broader worldviews. There has been a clear 
jurisprudential, legislative and political trend to view some classes of 
offence as a social and public health issue rather than as simply a legal 
problem. It is often argued that the drug courts themselves are as much a 
development in public health policy as an evolution in court functions.92 
 
The adversarial approach has always been to view property offences and 
offences of violence committed by those with drug addictions primarily as 
                                                                                                                                     
there are vast—especially regarding recidivism rates and graduation rates and various 
correlations between recidivism results and program operational features. 
90 
 S 18 of that Act, for example, provides that a Drug Court Magistrate may make an 
intensive drug rehabilitation order, and that option would not be open to a magistrate in a 
mainstream court. Legislation to abolish the drug court is soon to be introduced to the 
Queensland Parliament, however. 
91 
 Some would say exclusively concerned.  
92 
 Terry Carney, David Tait et al, ‘Mental Health Tribunals: Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Implications of Weighing Fairness, Freedom, Protection and Treatment’ (2007) 17(1) 
Journal of Judicial Administration 46; K Diesfeld and B McKenna, ‘The Unintended Impact 
of the Therapeutic Intentions of the New Zealand Mental Health Review Tribunal: 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives’ (2007) 14 Law and Medicine 566. 
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anti-social behaviour that needs to be addressed judicially by way of 
deterrence and punishment. Granted, most jurisdictions have long allowed 
a sentencing judge to include components of rehabilitation in a sentence, 
but this sentencing purpose has traditionally been drastically under-
resourced, arguably pursuant to a more punitive and positivist worldview 
that treats offenders as simplistic and two-dimensional moral subjects. 
 
There is certainly a strong Kantian tradition that informs and infects the 
adversarial worldview. Morality, being a transaction between rational 
agents, is at the heart of the doctrine of mens rea, which generally holds 
that a person is morally and legally responsible for their actions so long as 
they know what it is that they are doing and their choices are deliberate. 
Modern criminological and mental health research shows that the role of 
rational choice in offending is much less important than traditionally 
believed, and much less so in the case of those whose offending is related 
to pathology (such as those who are drug addicted).93 
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Rachel Hill, ‘Character, Choice, and “Aberrant Behavior”: Aligning Criminal Sentencing 
with Concepts of Moral Blame’ (1998) 65(3) University of Chicago Law Review 999; R 
Paternoster and G Pogarsky, ‘Rational Choice, Agency and Thoughtfully Reflective 
Decision Making: The Short and Long-Term Consequences of Making Good Choices’ 
(2009) 25(2) Journal of Quantitative Criminology 103. Notions of human agency are a 
prominent part of many criminological theories. Rational choice theory arose out of the 
positivist tradition, which reduces offending behaviour to a set of observable internal and 
external factors and suggests that criminal conduct can be regulated, managed and 
reduced by, inter alia, careful design of the physical environment (such as the playing of 
classical music in shopping centres to discourage loitering or the improvement of street 
lighting to discourage car theft). Contemporary theories of critical criminology have long 
since abandoned the positivist conceptions of crime and, by implication, the naive liberal 
worldviews which inform it.  
Being a highly conservative discipline, the law appears to be quite slow in keeping 
abreast of changes in criminological theory and scholarship. It would take quite an effort, 
for example, to convince the judiciary and the legislature to consider the implications of 
work in contemporary postmodern philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis, as they 
affect modern hybrid criminological theories that, according to Hall, Winlow and Ancrum, 
‘seek to explain how the dynamic tension between inclusion and exclusion prolongs the 
narcissistic subject throughout the life-course in an aggressive struggle for identities of 
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Evidence of the express acceptance of superior mainstream courts in 
Australia of submissions based on heuristics evolved from therapeutic 
jurisprudence principles are not hard to find. In the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal, for example, the full bench made express 
acknowledgement of the validity of argument from Counsel appealing the 
severity of a criminal sentence from therapeutic jurisprudence principles. 
Judge of Appeal Charles (with whom the rest of the bench concurred) 
acknowledged the force of the arguments by Counsel: 
It was submitted that it was within the judge’s sentencing 
discretion to extend a degree of leniency to Uren to maximize the 
prospect of rehabilitation by attempting to halt the process of 
institutionalisation. [Counsel] submitted that the judge’s approach 
reflected principles developed in the growing body of literature 
dealing with ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’ and argued that there is 
emerging empirical evidence that offenders can be rehabilitated 
where appropriate rehabilitation programmes are combined with 
an approach to sentencing by judges that supports rather than 
undermines the rehabilitation process.94 
The assertion here is that both academic and judicial opinion can be 
identified, to the effect that therapeutic jurisprudence can provide 
exemplars for the resolution of problems that the prevailing adversarial 
paradigm cannot. This is evidence of an emerging paradigm—at least in 
the heuristic sense. 
 
Sometimes an argument that an alternative paradigm is neater, simpler or 
more streamlined (even if its predictive or explanatory ability is only 
marginally better) can be influential. Kuhn claimed that the subjective and 
aesthetic considerations are important. 95  Identifying and explaining a 
paradigm shift while it is in progress is usually impossible and it is not until 
after it has been accepted, tested and applied that the most decisive 
                                                                                                                                     
social distinction expressed by the acquisition and display of consumer culture’s status-
symbols’. Fining a juvenile for shoplifting on the basis that they are a free moral agent 
living in a liberal world would seem less fraught: S Hall, S Winlow and C Ancrum, Criminal 
Identities and Consumer Culture (2008) 82. 
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arguments are developed. While the shift is occurring, traditionalists may 
claim that the new paradigm is popular just because of some initial 
success and that it is really just a novel sort of lens with which to help 
diagnose and fix problems within the existing paradigm. 
 
Given the convoluted and reactive development of the adversarial 
paradigm over several centuries, it seems unsurprising that it lacks 
structural and theoretical clarity and precision. Attempts to retain the 
threads of adversarialism in areas in which the law is experiencing 
important and successful evolutionary growth only exacerbate this 
structural messiness. In assessing the inability of the adversarial system to 
cope with post-enlightenment worldviews and to make best of use of the 
enormous body of social science data now available to us, Menkel-
Meadow suggests that: 
[b]inary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute are not the 
best way for us to learn the truth; polarised debate distorts the 
truth, leaves out important information, simplifies complexity, and 
obfuscates rather than clarifies. More significantly … are not 
susceptible to a binary (i.e. right/wrong, win/lose) solution. Courts 
with what … ‘limited remedial imaginations’ may not be the best 
institutional settings for resolving some of the disputes … before 
them.96 
 
King expresses the concern of a number of those working at the judicial 
chalk-face of the criminal jurisdiction that to characterise a particular court 
or program as problem-solving can give rise to the unwarranted, and 
counterintuitive, assumption that the court is there to solve the participants’ 
problems for them. This can act to both disempower the participant, but 
also to reinforce the suspicions of some therapeutic jurisprudence critics 
that its agenda is both patronising and coercive. 
 
                                                 
96 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, 
Multicultural World’ (1997) 38 William and Mary Law Review 5, 6. Even if we were not to 
subscribe to the postmodern theoretical perspective from which the author of that paper 
is obviously arguing, the observation (I assert) is still compelling. 
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The answer, King suggests, is to conceive of, and label the relevant courts 
as ‘solutions-focused’ or ‘solutions-oriented’ courts. He notes that: 
To assert that a court solves participants’ problems—as claimed in 
the problem-solving court literature—is to discount participants’ 
efforts made prior to entering the program, while on the program 
and after completing the program in the direction of positive 
behavioural change. As with other interventions that have a 
therapeutic effect, problem-solving courts should be regarded as 
time-limited interventions that help facilitate and support the 
change process. In other words, the efforts of the individual 
participant and the support of the court and allied treatment and 
support services combine to promote the change process.97 
 
Another way of conceptualising the rise of a therapeutic paradigm is in the 
socio-political context of the increasing social transfer, and change in the 
nature of power, from monarchs to an autocratic aristocracy to a 
burgeoning middle class. According to Schwan and Shapiro: 
the bourgeoisie have maintained authority by creating modern 
forms of subjectivity through a dual process: making an individual 
a non-threatening, subordinated political ‘subject’ while 
simultaneously installing a new kind of personhood in identity.98 
 
Foucault conceives of this sort of power as being produced by a particular 
form of knowledge: knowledge that is a definitive truth concerning the 
behaviour, motivations and personality of the individual. This socially 
constructed knowledge of self-disciplines the individual in the sense that it 
imposes and justifies a social definition of normality. The instruments of 
this imposition are institutions such as schools and prisons and the 
‘supervising’ judgments of professionals such as teachers and judges.99 
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 Michael King, ‘Solution-Focused Judging Bench Book’ (2009) Australasian Institute of 
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98 
 Anne Schwan and Stephen Shapiro, Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (2011) 11. 
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 Foucault goes further than this, suggesting, as paraphrased by Schwan and Shapiro 
that ‘the move from excessive public, physical punishments to private, invisible discipline 
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In Discipline and Punish, Foucault illustrates the development of the power 
to socially construct identity, and therefore, to punish deviance, by an 
examination of the development of the insanity defences in the criminal 
jurisdictions of Europe and the US. As early as 1810, the criminal codes of 
the European jurisdictions were providing that where an offender was of 
unsound mind at the time of the impugned act, there could be no crime. 
There was a procedural and conceptual separation as to the issues of 
determining unsoundness of mind and of defining an act or omission as a 
crime. The gravity of the physical act was in no way diminished by the fact 
that the accused was insane, nor was the punishment reduced or altered 
by a finding of insanity. The crime itself was simply deemed not to have 
occurred. However, with the significant developments in the fields of 
psychology, psychiatry, pharmacology and corrections in the 20th century, 
this original separation was significantly eroded and input from 
professionals in these fields became directly integrated in the formation of 
sentences. 
 
This, says Foucault, has been a powerful force for the social construction 
of identity and normality. Unsoundness of mind does not now simply 
eliminate the existence of a crime; rather, every offence carries with it ‘as a 
legitimate suspicion, but also as a right that may be claimed, the 
hypothesis of insanity and anomaly’. 100  Although principles of criminal 
responsibility grounded in mental health issues are generally more flexible 
than Foucault suggests in contemporary common law jurisdictions, it is 
clearly true that there have been some paradigmatic shifts in how the 
criminal law (and perhaps public law in general) views issues of mental 
capacity. 
 
What we can take from this is that there is obviously scope for 
paradigmatic change and shift within particular areas of law that do not 
seem to have displaced what we would identify as the adversarial juristic 
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 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1975) 20. 
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model. This is especially cogent given both the strong influence of 
Foucault’s conceptions of social change on contemporary jurisprudence 
and the fact that he chooses penology as the example. It seems 
uncontroversial to suggest that a movement such as therapeutic 
jurisprudence could generate paradigmatic exemplars within the core of 
the adversarial paradigm, either as a set of complimentary exemplars or 
as precursors to an eventual shift to a wider non-adversarial paradigm. 
 
5.3 Evidence of Paradigm Status 
 
As alluded to in Chapter 3, there are at least three justifications for 
conceiving of legal thought and practice as potentially conforming to 
Kuhn’s model of a paradigm. Those justifications can be extended to 
therapeutic jurisprudence in particular to garner evidence that it may have 
or acquire paradigm status in any of the three ontological categories 
discussed above. 
 
The first justification for Kuhnian paradigm status is that of disciplinary 
acceptance. Chapter 4 established that lawyers, judges and legal scholars 
consider adversarialism to be paradigmatic. Adversarialism is at the core 
of legal practice and legal education. Granted, it does not preclude the 
adoption of non-adversarial units in the curriculum,101 but these units are 
invariably either offered as elective undertakings or not necessarily 
required for professional admission.102 
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 For example, LWB498 Dispute Resolution and Non-adversarial Practice is an elective 
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A number of key researchers, and critics, in the literature discuss 
therapeutic jurisprudence as a new paradigm—either in and of itself or as 
a component of some wider category such as comprehensive law.103 A 
significant number of law schools include both undergraduate and 
postgraduate studies in therapeutic jurisprudence, comprehensive law and 
non-adversarial justice in their curricula. Judicial training in these lenses 
and vectors is relatively common. It is even becoming more common to 
read express reference to therapeutic jurisprudence in the published 
judgments of  Australian courts and tribunals.104 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, social scientists (usually drawing on the criteria 
suggested by Handa)105 refer to specific criteria in determining whether 
competing practical and theoretical approaches to a particular discipline 
are potentially paradigmatic. These are more subjective than the 
articulation of precise disciplinary exemplars, but are all consistent with 
Kuhn’s position in SSR. Finding evidence that each of these criteria or 
indicators is present in the attitude of the academy, the legal profession, 
policy makers and funding providers to therapeutic jurisprudence is not 
difficult. 
 
5.3.1 Professional Organisations That Give Legitimacy to the 
Paradigm  
 
Peak professional bodies such as the American Bar Association (ABA) 
and the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA) readily 
promote therapeutic jurisprudence as a valid and valuable component of 
contemporary legal practice. The Australasian Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Clearinghouse is a resource for lawyers and judges sponsored by the 
AIJA. The AIJA acknowledges that: 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is one of the most significant 
developments in the justice system. It [has] wide-ranging 
implications for judging, legal practice, court administration, 
corrections, legal institutions and processes generally and for 
legal and judicial education.106 
                                                                                                                                     
and Indigenous Affairs [2003] 199 ALR 604, (2003) 173 FLR 360; Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Deon Lee Uren (2003) VSCA 208. 
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 ML Handa, ‘Peace Paradigm: Transcending Liberal and Marxian Paradigms’ (Paper 
presented at the International Symposium on Science, Technology and Development, 
New Delhi, India, 20–25 March 1986). 
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 <http://www.aija.org.au/index.php/research/australasian-therapeutic-jurisprudence-
clearinghouse?task=view&id=206>. The Institute provides that ‘[t]he aim of the 
clearinghouse is to promote the exchange of information concerning therapeutic 
jurisprudence and its application and development within Australasia’.  
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The ABA is quite active in ventilating and disseminating therapeutic 
jurisprudence perspectives, especially through its journal and in the work 
of its various committees.107 
 
5.3.2 Dynamic Leaders Who Introduce and Purport the Paradigm 
 
There are readily identifiable community leaders in the development of 
and advocacy for therapeutic jurisprudence. These researchers and 
advocates regularly arrange national and international therapeutic 
jurisprudence conferences, special editions of journals, internet-based 
discussion groups, training programs for lawyers and judges and advice 
for those developing law school curricula. Many are also involved in 
continuing legal and judicial practice. Most of these have been previously 
identified in the thesis. Some of the most active and prolific include: 
Professor David Wexler (Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus of 
Law, James E Rogers College of Law at the University of Arizona),108 
Professor Arie Freiberg (former Dean of the Faculty of Law at Monash 
University),109 Judge Peggy Fulton Hora (former Judge of the California 
Superior Court and one of the founders of the drug treatment courts in the 
US) 110  and Dr Michael King (Magistrate at the Magistrates’ Court of 
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Western Australia and Adjunct Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, 
Monash University).111 
 
As discussed previously, problem-solving courts and some other 
therapeutic jurisprudence-aligned projects are tolerated and generally 
seen as ‘special’ rather than revolutionary. However, the status of those 
leading practitioners operating according to a new paradigm is also 
important. Even idiosyncrasies of background and personality can play an 
influential role—and the status of those proposing the new paradigm can 
be critical to the rate of conversion.112 
 
5.3.3 Journals and Editors Who Write About the System of Thought 
and Disseminate the Information Essential to the Paradigm and Give 
the Paradigm Legitimacy 
 
The bibliography service at the International Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Network lists citation details for hundreds of peer-reviewed papers dealing 
with therapeutic jurisprudence. 113  At least two journals have sections 
devoted to therapeutic jurisprudence papers in their regular issues.114 Key 
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therapeutic jurisprudence advocates and practitioners appear on the 
editorial boards of a wide range of law and mental health journals.115 As 
yet, there does not appear to be a journal devoted solely to therapeutic 
jurisprudence. This does not necessarily weigh against paradigm status 
(especially given the existence of a reasonable number of journals that 
focus more generally on non-adversarial justice and the fact that 
therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to influence a wide range of legal rules 
and practices), but the appearance of unique journals and the 
development of a specialist vocabulary utilised by scholars and 
practitioners within those journals is a powerful Kuhnian criterion. 
 
The absence of a unique therapeutic jurisprudence journal, especially 
given the depth and breadth of the coverage of the area in other, more 
general journals, could well turn out to be a litmus test for whether 
therapeutic jurisprudence survives as something more than a component 
of a wider non-adversarial paradigm. We could also posit that therapeutic 
jurisprudence is still very much in the early stages of developing 
disciplinary exemplars and, until this process is more advanced, the 
creation of a specialist journal could be counterproductive. There already 
seems to be an absence of express reference to discrete social science 
data in many therapeutic jurisprudence-aligned projects and publications 
and this may be an indication that a precise therapeutic jurisprudence 
methodology and set of exemplars are harder to identify. This is worth 
noting in the context of a movement that is strongly focused on extending 
its influence further into the legal mainstream. 
 
5.3.4 Government Agencies Who Give Credence to the Paradigm 
 
To some extent, identifying and positing evidence relevant to this criterion 
could be an exercise in cherry picking. Certainly, we see funding for a 
wide range of therapeutic jurisprudence inspired and aligned projects and 
innovations across jurisdictions and also for think tanks and professional 
                                                 
115 
 <http://www.law.arizona.edu/faculty/getprofile.cfm?facultyid=91>. 
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associations designed to support and resource non-adversarial 
approaches to legal practice, but the degree to which these are supported 
and funded varies considerably. The Australian experience seems to be 
that support for therapeutic jurisprudence initiatives (at least at a practical 
level) are closely linked to the ideological and policy fundamentals of 
particular governments. Some jurisdictions, such as Victoria, New South 
Wales and Western Australia, appear to be continuing a strong program of 
development in non-adversarial and therapeutic programs, whereas 
Queensland appears to be dismantling much of its recent progress. What 
does appear to be consistent with the criterion, however, is that 
governments and agencies are willing to trial and fund therapeutic 
jurisprudence initiatives. Further, even jurisdictions such as Queensland 
that have wound back some programs continue to support the efforts of 
individual practitioners and judicial officers to continue their application and 
development of therapeutic jurisprudence principles.116 
 
                                                 
116 
 The decision by the Queensland government to scrap the Murri Court, the Drug Court 
and the Special Circumstances Court on budgetary grounds has been widely criticised as 
both economically unjustified and socially irresponsible. The assertion is that the 
projected savings in running costs are nullified by the probable increase in costs of 
incarceration. The Attorney-General has claimed, however, that individual judges and 
magistrates will still be able to take advantage of existing sentencing legislation to deal 
with relevant offenders in more therapeutic ways. Without the funding to do this, that may 
be a naive assumption. There has been a long-standing problem in Queensland, for 
example, with the adequacy of payment for Aboriginal Elders asked to advise magistrates 
in Indigenous cases. See Stephen Smiley, ‘Scrapping Qld’s Murri Court Short Sighted’, 
ABC News Online, 25 September 2012 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012–09–
25/scrapping-qld-murri-courts-short-sighted/4279700>. 
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5.3.5 Educators Who Propagate the Paradigm’s Ideas by Teaching It 
to Students 
 
Winick has written 117  extensively on the relevance of therapeutic 
jurisprudence to modern legal education, especially in the US.118 In 1995, 
responding to changes in admission requirements, he writes about how 
US law schools could comply with the new ABA standards for legal 
education that require law students to receive expanded professional and 
practical training. His view, which has proved to be accurate in light of 
subsequent curriculum offerings in some states, was that training students 
in therapeutic jurisprudence would be an ideal way of meeting those ABA 
standards but also of moving ‘legal education into the modern era in a 
manner that will significantly increase the quality of lawyering and both 
client and professional satisfaction’. 
 
Commenting on the influence of therapeutic jurisprudence in the law 
school curriculum, Wexler notes that: 
The important point is to underscore the tremendous development 
of TJ during the last two decades; it has moved from a new twist 
on mental health law to a psychologically-sensitive approach to 
law in general; it has become truly interdisciplinary and 
international; it has moved from theory to practice and has 
become increasingly influential in professional formation, 
especially in legal education, as part of the curriculum and in law 
school clinics.119 
 
                                                 
117 
 Bruce Winick, ‘Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Teaching Lawyering Skills: 
Meeting the Challenge of the New ABA Standards’ (2005) 17(1) St Thomas Law Review 
81. 
118 
 Some further examples in the Australian context are mentioned below. For further 
discussion in the Australian context, see also Michael King, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence in 
Australia: New Directions in Courts, Legal Practice, Research and Legal Education’ 
(2006) 15 Journal of Judicial Administration 129. 
119 
 Wexler, above n 31, 36. 
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5.3.6 Conferences Conducted That Are Devoted to Discussing Ideas 
Central to the Paradigm 
 
Major international conferences convened by scholars and practitioners 
involved in therapeutic jurisprudence are held approximately every two 
years.120 Many others at a national, regional and local level are held. A 
survey of the schedules, topic clusters and range of the presenters 
indicates that these conferences tend to focus on both a deeper analysis 
of key theoretical and methodological issues within the field, but also an 
exceptionally wide range of evidence-based applications of therapeutic 
jurisprudence principles. 
 
5.3.7 Media Coverage 
 
Media interest in therapeutic jurisprudence can often be traced to reports, 
investigations and editorials printed in relation to the operation of the 
specialist courts with which the movement is associated. Sometimes these 
reports are supportive of the movement and the particular courts or 
initiatives, and sometimes they are critical or sceptical. Often these reports 
can be linked to changes in government law and order policies. The 
decision to close both the Queensland Drug Court jurisdiction within the 
District Court of Queensland and the Murri Court in that same state, for 
example, attracted a flurry of coverage in both traditional media and social 
media.121 
                                                 
120 
 See, eg, ‘Proceedings of the 3
rd
 
International Conference on Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, Perth, Western Australia, 7–9 June 2006’ 
<http://www.aija.org.au/TherapJurisp06/Papers/>. See also 
<http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/upr-intj/>. 
121 
 See, eg, report and editorial of Tony Moore, ‘Diversionary Courts Fall Victim to 
Funding’, The Brisbane Times, 13 September 2012. In this piece, the author reports that 
the Newman government will no longer fund the Murri, Special Circumstances and the 
Drug courts, despite the ‘outcry from community legal groups and the Queensland Law 
Society’. The Queensland Attorney-General had claimed that these courts and lists were 
not achieving their goals of reducing recidivism rates and were uneconomical, despite 
significant evidence to the contrary from the courts’ own Annual Reports and the findings 
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5.3.8 Lay Groups, or Groups Based Around the Concerns of Lay 
Persons, That Embrace the Beliefs Central to the Paradigm 
 
Community support groups motivated by principles of non-adversarial 
justice, particularly those embraced by restorative justice and therapeutic 
jurisprudence, are not difficult to locate. This is unsurprising given that 
support groups are generally more concerned with the well-being of 
particular persons or groups of people and court participants than the 
substantive law itself. We could expect such groups to be at least 
receptive to the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence and it is only this 
level of engagement that seems required by the criterion. Victims of crime 
groups, homicide support groups and rape and crisis support groups are 
common. 122  However, increasingly, focus is being placed on other 
participants within the justice system. Significant attention is given in 
Australia to the psychological and emotional well-being of both lawyers 
and law students.123 
 
                                                                                                                                     
of various research evaluations. The willingness of investigative journalists to look for the 
detail in relation to therapeutic jurisprudence type initiatives is evidence of more than a 
cursory interest in non-adversarial legal processes and initiatives.  
122 
 The Victims of Crime Reference Group convened by the Department of Justice, for 
example, links to a Homicide Victims Support Group, Angel Hands (for victims of other 
serious violent crimes), The Compassionate Friends (a bereavement and support 
information centre for families who have experienced the death of a son, daughter, sister, 
brother or grandchild) and The Kids Help Line. 
123 
 See, eg, the ‘wellness’ sessions offered to law students at Monash University: 
<http://monashlss.com/jd/wellness-sessions>. Also RM Field and J Duffy, ‘Law Student 
Psychological Distress, Adr And Sweet-Minded, Sweet-Eyed Hope‘ (2012) Australasian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 195–203; R Field and J Duffy, ‘Better to Light a Single Candle 
Than to Curse the Darkness: Promoting Law Student Well-Being Through a First Year 
Law Subject‘ (2012) Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 133–
56. 
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5.3.9 Sources of Funding to Further Research on the Paradigm 
 
Institutional resourcing for therapeutic jurisprudence, both academic and 
judicial, appears to be strong. This includes funding provided both for 
discrete therapeutic jurisprudence initiatives and research projects and for 
non-adversarial agendas with therapeutic jurisprudence components.124  
 
The second justification for Kuhnian paradigm status is that juristic thought 
obviously does seem to have some of the same qualities as scientific and 
social scientific thought. Jurists, legal academics and others make use of 
the scientific method as one means of testing the truth of assumptions and 
hypotheses and of a wide range of methods borrowed from the social 
sciences. Traditional legal research is often said to be based on the 
‘doctrinal’ method. Given its concern with analytical statements and 
substantive statements of the law as its data rather than with the social 
facts that inform the methods of the social sciences, we might be surprised 
to find that this is so. However, collaboration and interdisciplinary research 
and practice have, as seen in Chapter 3, begun to infiltrate and influence 
legal scholarship from as far back as the beginning of the 20th century. The 
claim that the practice of law is exclusively governed by rules that derive 
their normative force from the authority/sovereignty of their source rather 
than from the theoretical perspectives or from experience and 
engagement with wider social mores and values is surely far less 
                                                 
124 
 For example, the author of this thesis was a Chief Investigator on a recent federally 
funded research project that enabled a team of interdisciplinary researchers across 
Australia to investigate public attitudes to sentencing and (in part) public willingness to 
embrace therapeutic alternatives to incarceration: Project ID DP0878042, ‘Sentencing 
and Public Confidence: Public Perceptions and the Role of the Public in Sentencing 
Practice and Policy’. Research team: A/Prof G Mackenzie, Dr D Indermaur, Prof RG 
Broadhurst, Prof CA Warner, Dr L Roberts, Mr N Stobbs. The team’s proposal and 
application for funding highlighted the fact that ‘[t]hus far, Australian legislatures have 
only tentatively responded to opportunities for sentencing reform based on therapeutic 
jurisprudence’ and indicated that ‘the design and implementation of each phase of the 
project is based on sound theoretical bases in both therapeutic jurisprudence and critical 
criminology’.  
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imperative today than at any time in the history of the common law. 
Academic lawyers have long been aware that in order to retain funding 
and relevance, the profession needs to expressly embrace a wider 
method. Hutchinson and Duncan observe that: 
If we accept that law has a paradigm according to Kuhn’s 
definition, is a distinct area of scholarship, and that juristic thought 
in particular makes up part of that discrete and credible paradigm, 
then it makes sense that law would have its own unique research 
method. But therein lies an anomaly for legal researchers. 
Operate within the intuitive and arcane doctrinal paradigm and 
you are being vague according to funding providers, operate 
outside it and you are not being a lawyer according to the 
profession.125 
 
The third justification for Kuhnian paradigm status is that we can validly 
ask whether juristic thought in general is at a pre-paradigmatic or 
paradigmatic stage.126 Given the conclusions of Chapter 4, the assertion is 
that the legal system is operating pursuant to an adversarial paradigm 
and, therefore, open to challenges from other potential paradigms. 
 
Although necessary, the mere presence of the therapeutic jurisprudence 
paradigm within the mainstream practice of lawyering and judging is not 
sufficient for a therapeutic jurisprudence transformation of law. Such a 
transformation requires the articulation of arguments and positions 
challenging the core of legal theory and praxis; positions inconsistent with 
the dominant paradigm. Inconsistency between dominant and emerging 
scientific paradigms is, according to Kuhn, one of the sine qua non127 
conditions for the accomplishment of scientific revolutions. We need to ask 
whether therapeutic jurisprudence is in fact being advanced in this way. Is 
                                                 
125 
 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining And Describing What We Do: Doctrinal 
Legal Research’ (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 84. The authors acknowledge in that 
paper that their argument is to some extent influenced by the analysis undertaken in this 
thesis. 
126 
This is according to CM Campbell, ‘Legal Thought and Juristic Values’ (1974) 1(1) 
British Journal of Law and Society, 18; also V Aubert, ‘The Structure of Legal Thinking’ in 
J Andenaes et al (eds) Legal Essays: A Tribute to Frede Castberg (1963) 41, 50. 
127 
An essential and indispensable condition precedent. 
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it capturing the legal and scholarly imagination as a potential juristic game 
changer? 
 
The analysis above indicates that there is significant evidence to posit 
therapeutic jurisprudence as a paradigm for a juristic model across a 
range of ontological contexts. There is no guarantee that any particular 
innovative theory or practice will achieve paradigm status, since what is 
fundamentally required is the development of a dominant practitioner 
mind-set and disciplinary matrix rather than a set of empirical data or a 
certain level of falsification. Further, to the extent the therapeutic 
jurisprudence challenges the dominant legal paradigm, it is likely to be 
resisted by the mainstream. The depth of that resistance will also afford 
some insight as to its status as a potentially transformative paradigm. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 6, there is evidence that therapeutic 
jurisprudence’s main critics (especially those based in the US) do indeed 
see it as a force that undermines or challenges some of the most 
fundamental tenets of the common law legal systems. 
 
The question of to what extent therapeutic jurisprudence is articulating in 
depth, potentially revolutionising critiques of law and legal thought rather 
than simply informing discrete, incremental changes (small enough not to 
threaten the ruling adversarial paradigm and perhaps to be seen as 
statistical anomalies) is beginning to resolve, but a clearer answer 
emerges after a discussion regarding the current level of 
incommensurability between adversarialism and therapeutic 
jurisprudence. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
Reasonable arguments can be made, and evidence can be found, to 
support claims that therapeutic jurisprudence may constitute a Kuhnian 
paradigm in any of the three ontological categories examined in this 
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chapter (that is, as a distinct juristic model, as part of a wider therapeutic 
or non-adversarial paradigm or as a discrete problem-solving paradigm). 
 
Although there was some evidence that a certain (albeit narrow) element 
within the therapeutic jurisprudence community see the movement as 
capable of comprising a complete juristic model, the weight of practitioner 
views is that the real significance and potential of therapeutic 
jurisprudence is, and will continue to be, on influencing the law in a more 
targeted way. Certainly the drive to mainstream therapeutic jurisprudence 
seems to be more about adding to the existing set of disciplinary 
exemplars, and refining some of those already in existence, than providing 
a definitive set of exemplars. 
 
A large survey of US trial judges (n=1019) in 2007 by the Centre for Court 
Innovation128  found that most mainstream trial judges in the US have 
attitudes that are consistent with the key principles of problem-solving 
justice (as identified by Hora 2011).129  Many of these judges currently 
engage in practices that are typical of those found in problem-solving 
courts. There can be little doubt that these practices have evolved in 
response to the seemingly intractable problems of recidivism and the 
tenacious links between social disadvantage and psychological 
dysfunction, on the one hand, and criminal offending, on the other. Hora 
goes so far as to say that if we were to see the widespread adoption of 
principles such as those contained on the bench guides (she refers to 
those labelled ‘Effective Outcome Judging’), then courts of the future may 
look more like those in an inquisitorial system than in an adversarial 
one.130 
 
                                                 
128 
 D Farole and M Rempel, ‘Problem-Solving and the American Bench: A National 
Survey of Trial Court Judges’ (2008) 3 Centre for Court Innovation. 
129 
 P Hora, ‘Courting New Solutions Suing Problem Solving Justice: Key Components, 
Guiding Principles, Strategies, Responses, Models, Approaches, Blueprints and Toolkits’ 
(2011) 2(1) Chapman Journal of Criminal Justice 7. 
130 
 Ibid 35. 
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The perception among judicial officers that therapeutic jurisprudence can 
solve disciplinary problems in the Kuhnian sense (rather than simply solve 
puzzles) is not limited to the US. The drug sentencing program in 
Tasmanian courts, which is based on procedures in drug courts in other 
jurisdictions, has led the Chief Magistrate for Tasmania to claim that: 
I must say from a judicial officer’s point of view these can be very 
satisfying courts in which to sit. One sees improvements in health, 
the gaining of jobs and in one case a successful year at the 
University of Tasmania by one participant. I think of all the 
sentencing options available in the Magistrates Courts this 
program can be seen to be working in some cases.131 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the academic and conceptual trend of recent 
decades, in the history of science as well as discipline-specific histories 
and theoretical foci such as jurisprudence, has been away from grand 
narratives that seek to integrate theory, method, social organisation within 
a field, disciplinary politics and worldview into some neat and digestible 
explanation. The drive to modernity brought with it all sorts of attractive 
claims about an ordered and ever more logical scientific method that has 
revolutionised the way practitioners in all disciplines work. However, 
increasingly, the evolution of disciplines, including law, is focused on more 
openness to innovation and the trialling of practical solutions to perennial 
problems that diverge from the orthodoxy of prevailing worldviews. 
 
This explains, it can be argued, the survival of therapeutic jurisprudence 
across a number of decades and the perceived willingness of those within 
and without the discipline to give it room to expand. It seems reasonable, 
based on the discussion so far in this thesis, that the role of the judge as a 
neutral arbiter in the specialist courts has become not just malleable but in 
most cases secondary to that of a transformational leader of a treatment 
team.132 There is a clear and urgent need, therefore, to examine the extent 
                                                 
131 
 Michael Hill, Chief Magistrate, Tasmania, ‘Wandering Down the Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Road’ (2012) 20(2) Australian Law Librarian. 
132 
 The extent to which this may be at odds with the claims of Sir Anthony Mason and 
others that neutral adjudication must always be the ‘main game’ in a constitutional court is 
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of the conceptual and practical tension between these judicial roles and 
perspectives. The method for conducting such an examination, according 
to Kuhn, is via a consideration of incommensurability. 
                                                                                                                                     
obvious and will be discussed further in Chapter 6. Recall his assertion that ‘[c]ourts are 
courts; they are not general service providers who cater for “clients” or “customers” rather 
than litigants. And if courts describe themselves otherwise than as courts, they run the 
risk that their “clients” and their “customers” will regard them, correctly in my view, as 
something inferior to a court’: Anthony Mason, ‘The Future of Adversarial Justice’ (Paper 
presented at the 17th Annual AIJA Conference, Adelaide, Spring 1999) 5 
<http://www.aija.org.au/online/mason.rtf>. 
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Chapter 6 
The Nature and Implications of Incommensurability 
Between Adversarialism and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence  
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6.1 Introduction—Incommensurability and Leaps of Faith 
 
This chapter argues that therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism are 
incommensurable paradigms in the Kuhnian sense. It explores, in more 
depth, what the nature and the consequences of that incommensurability 
are, and how they are manifest in the roles of judges and legal 
practitioners within the problem-solving courts. Finally, it considers 
whether such incommensurability is resolving itself, or is likely to resolve 
itself, via a paradigm shift from adversarialism to a post-adversarial 
paradigm that includes therapeutic jurisprudence exemplars. 
 
A strong Kuhnian position on the effect of incommensurability would hold 
that advocates for competing juristic paradigms cannot fully comprehend 
the other’s perspective because they are observing elements of a literally 
different phenomenological and social world (which are contingent upon 
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their worldview, training and experience) and describing them in a different 
professional language. 1  This is Kuhn’s original position on 
incommensurability as set down in SSR (as explained in Chapter 3). 
 
I characterise this as a strong position in the sense that it seems to 
preclude a meaningful dialogue between proponents of competing 
paradigms within a given discipline. If this were literally true, disciplines 
could well become mired in a conceptual and practical paralysis, in which 
no progress could be made without some leap of faith on the part of those 
practitioners aligned with whichever paradigm was in decline as the result 
of the requisite crisis. Yet history does provide clear and powerful 
examples of how disciplines can make such leaps of faith and avoid 
paralysis. Thus, while the strong sense of incommensurability is 
                                                 
1 
 This is a phenomenon with a long pedigree in linguistics. There is a body of research 
that suggests that certain analytical or cognitive concepts (and perhaps even some 
emotions) are unique to particular cultures due to the uniqueness of their language and 
grammatical lexicon. The argument is, in its simplest form, that where two cultures do not 
share a common language, it may be impossible for the members of one of them to fully 
share in the experienced and felt world of the other. This is part of the wider 
communicative context in which ‘[m]eaning is determined in part by: who the author was, 
the purpose of the communication, for whom the information was intended, the 
relationship between the author and the audience, the culture within which the 
information was generated, the degree of commonality between source and receptor’: 
Mildred L Larson, This means-based Translation; A Guide to Cross-language Equivalence 
(1984) 141.  
According to one major study of this phenomenon: ‘The worldview implicitly held by the 
author and that of the audience can call for special attention. Information from another 
culture assuming the value of authority structures runs the risk of appearing 
meaningless’: ‘Review of Frameworks for the Representation of Alternative Conceptual 
Orderings as Determined by Cultural and Linguistic Contexts’ in Mildred Larson et al 
(eds) Project on Information Overload and Information Underuse (IOIU) of the Global 
Learning Division of the United Nations University (1986). The authors give the following 
example: ‘In Melanesia there is a fundamental recognition of the network of powers 
influencing a person. This would render information from other cultures of limited 
significance unless the relationship to such powers was made clear. To render information 
meaningful in Japanese, distinctions of social status must be rendered explicit, even 
though they may not be present in the original form of the information’. 
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conceptually defensible, its actual effects in the practical world are at a 
more nuanced level. This is, as we shall see, consistent with Kuhn’s views 
on incommensurability.2 
 
An early, but powerful, illustration of this phenomenon of strong 
incommensurability between paradigms was the Pythagorean extension of 
mathematics to cater for irrational numbers.3 Greek mathematicians held it 
to be axiomatic that all magnitudes of the same kind were commensurable 
(that is, measureable by reference to the same standard or units). All 
lengths, for instance, were assumed to be multiples of some common unit. 
We could assert, according to this view, that any physical object can be 
ascribed a length in terms of a precise number of millimetres. Pythagoras 
was able to demonstrate, however, that there existed some lengths that 
could not be precisely quantified by reference to any existing units of 
measure, regardless of the precision of any measuring device or of any 
method of calculation. The hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle, he 
showed, can be calculated if we know the length of the other two sides. 
This is done by finding the sum of the squares of these two other lengths 
and then finding the square root of that total. However, unless the sum of 
the other lengths is a perfect square (for example, 4, 9, 16 and 25), then 
the square root will be irrational—that is, it cannot be precisely expressed 
in terms of ordinary, rational numbers. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Pythagoras’ right-angled triangle 
 
                                                 
2 
 As articulated in the SSR postscript. 
3 
 This is not to assert that adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence are competing 
paradigms at the same ontological level as pre- and post-Pythagorean mathematics. 
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This means, effectively, that we can express the length of the diagonal of 
many squares as a function of some rational number (for example, √2) but 
not as a rational number. Since a number cannot be both rational and 
irrational, these sets of numbers are incommensurable; that is, they lack a 
common unit of measurement by which we can compare them. In other 
words, there exists some lengths (the irrationals) that cannot be expressed 
by rational integers, despite the fact that these lengths obviously ‘exist’. 
 
Both rational and irrational numbers exist in the sense that they can refer 
to phenomena in the observable world. I have five fingers (an amount 
expressible as a rational integer), but there also exists many objects 
whose lengths are irrational. The immediate consequence of Pythagoras’ 
theorem is that the diagonal of any square is incommensurable with its 
side—meaning that their ratio is not a rational number, that there is no unit 
of which they are both integral multiples, despite the fact that both the 
sides and diagonals of a square are extant physical properties that are 
readily apparent to an observer. The existing language of mathematics 
(before the Pythagorean conception of irrationality) was not able to 
describe this mathematical relationship, yet the relationship could not be 
denied—all triangles have sides and diagonals. 
 
Despite proving that there were numbers that were irrational in this sense, 
the development of pure and applied mathematics did not come to an 
impasse. The Greeks took it as a matter of faith (albeit a faith grounded in 
a symbolic proof)4 that these numbers existed and expressed them in a 
new mathematical language that subsumed that which already existed. A 
new mathematical paradigm emerged,5 which would eventually assert that 
                                                 
4 
 A discussion of the proofs and of the nature and effect of the Pythagorean and 
Euclidean incommensurability is thoroughly dealt with in WR Knorr, The Evolution of the 
Euclidean Elements: A Study of the Theory of Incommensurable Magnitudes and Its 
Significance for Early Greek Geometry (1975). 
5 
 Note that the paradigm that emerged was new, and resulted in a paradigm shift, due to 
its insertion of new exemplars in the core of the disciplinary matrix. Virtually all of the 
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there are more irrational numbers than rational numbers and that we can 
utilise purely imaginary numbers (such as the square root of a negative 
number) in order to make calculations about real world observations and 
phenomena. The potentially paralysing effects of this incommensurability 
was resolved by the willingness of (most) mathematicians to add 
exemplars of irrationality and complexity to the disciplinary core. In other 
words, by a shift in paradigm. 
 
This chapter considers whether this sort of incommensurability is a feature 
of the relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence, 
and if so, whether it can be reconciled, or perhaps is being reconciled, at a 
practical level. It concludes that although there is indeed some evidence of 
strong incommensurability between the two, this is neither a barrier to 
effective professional dialogue nor a threat to the continued relevance of 
either. 
 
6.2 A Deeper Analyis of the Parameters of 
Incommensurability 
 
According to Kuhn, advocates for different paradigms see the world in a 
different way because of their professional and academic training and prior 
experience as practitioners after being socialised into the profession.6 In 
other words, they have been imbued with a sense of faith in their 
respective paradigms. They generally do not see their field as being 
characterised by a set of historical paradigms at all, let alone as being 
subject to any revolutions.7 
                                                                                                                                     
existing exemplars and disciplinary matrix were left untouched. The ‘shift’ represents the 
extent to which the incommensurability is reconciled and resolved.  
6 
 The pioneering advocates within a given paradigm will not have been socialised into the 
profession or discipline in this way but will have been those who first resolved problems 
that emerged within the disciplinary crisis afflicting the previous paradigm. 
7 
 SSR 138–9. Kuhn refers to ‘a persistent tendency to make the history of science look 
linear or cumulative, a tendency that even affects scientists looking back at their own 
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Being committed to some different (newer) exemplars, they have different 
ideas about the importance of solving various problems and, more 
importantly, about the standards that a solution should satisfy. They 
subscribe to some different conceptual networks in order to inform these 
standards, hence the vocabulary and problem-solving methods that each 
use tend to differ. Most of the existing professional vocabulary remains, 
but the newer exemplars are usually articulated with new terms. 8  The 
adherents of a new paradigm are likely to have been schooled in its 
worldview, methodology and language. They and their new paradigm 
prevail, as adherents of the older paradigm convert, retire or expire. 
 
This is not to suggest, as did Kuhn’s main critic, Imre Lakatos, that a 
practitioner could not work simultaneously on two research projects, each 
ostensibly situated within opposed and incommensurable paradigms. 
There is a sense in which incommensurability is more a function of 
language structures than of any necessary limitation of human cognition. 
Even if we were to grant that therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism 
were incommensurable in the strongest sense suggested by Kuhn, we 
ought to have no real difficulty in accepting that legal practitioners can, and 
often do, work simultaneously on matters with procedures and exemplars 
grounded in either one these paradigms. A drug court judge may act in the 
problem-solving role that jurisdiction requires on one day and then as a 
mainstream adversarial trial judge the next without any apparent difficulty. 
The practice of one does not exclude practice of the other.9 
                                                                                                                                     
research … there is a reorientation toward the field that taught practitioners to ask new 
questions about, and to draw new conclusions from, old data’. 
8 
 Such as the central therapeutic jurisprudence concepts of ‘therapeutic’ and ‘anti-
therapeutic’. The words themselves may not be an addition to the English language, but 
they have a new and specific meaning in the lexicon of the law. 
9 
 The stronger epistemic argument that incommensurability, if real, prevents the 
conclusion that change or conversion from one paradigm can ever be rational (also 
proposed by Lakatos) can be credibly defended, but would be a distraction here. See, 
however, Robert Miner, ‘Lakatos and MacIntyre on Incommensurability and the 
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However, there can be only one controlling paradigm at any time (for any 
particular ontological comparison), so if we were to posit adversarialism 
and therapeutic jurisprudence as distinct juristic models, either the 
adversarial role subsumes the therapeutic role, or both must be subsumed 
by a larger (and then post-adversarial) paradigm. The conceptual 
alternative being that the official presiding over the drug court on one day 
and then over the mainstream court the next day is only presiding as a 
judge on one of the days. Kuhn provides for the following crucial caveats 
to the effects of strong incommensurability: 
1. Practitioners who experience a conversion from one 
paradigm to the other can communicate, to some extent, 
with those committed to either paradigm—and,  
2. There is some process or set of holistic benchmarks 
external to individual paradigms by which they can be 
validated or invalidated (at least in terms of their claims to 
be a paradigm) and we need not be chained to the claim 
that any particular paradigm can only be right10 according 
to some criteria unique to that paradigm, or wrong 
according to criteria unique to one of its rival paradigms.11 
 
However, debate between advocates of incommensurable paradigms is 
rarely couched in terms of these holistic, meta benchmarks and circularity 
tends to characterise the discourse of such debates.12 There are sound 
analytical reasons for why such circularity is perhaps conceptually 
inevitable and therefore of practical importance to advocates of new 
paradigms. 
 
An illustration of how attempts to comparatively evaluate paradigms, from 
the perspective of either one or the other of them, leads to circularity and 
                                                                                                                                     
Rationality of Theory-change’ (Paper presented to the 20
th
 World Congress of Philosophy, 
Boston, Massachusetts, 10–15 August, 1998). 
10 
 ‘Right’ is not a very useful label for a paradigm. 
11 
 See generally SSR postscript. 
12 
 The judicial critics of therapeutic jurisprudence and the operation of the drug courts, for 
example, inevitably respond to innovations in terms of breaches of core adversarial 
exemplars such as due process. 
232 
 
analytical dead-ends is provided by Dworkin’s critique of the traditional 
debate around the connections between law and morality. Both of these 
normative contexts provide exemplars for the resolution of social problems 
and disputes, but it is difficult (and perhaps impossible) to evaluate one in 
the language of the other. 
 
Let us grant, for argument’s sake, that law and morality can both provide 
paradigms for the regulation of human social interaction. What then is the 
relationship between these two paradigms? Dworkin13 identifies what he 
claims to be a fatal, and unavoidable, flaw in the usual approach to 
assessing the connections between law and morality. Law it is said, 
constitutes a separate and distinct set of norms to that set constituting 
morality. Given that, how far should we allow morality to inform what the 
law ought to be or how it ought to be applied? This is a common enough 
question if we consider the political and cultural debates that surround the 
moral value of certain legal rules (such as those that criminalise abortion 
or proscribe marriage between same sex couples.) How ought a judge to 
proceed when asked to apply a law that he or she finds to be morally 
repugnant? 
 
The usual way of approaching this question is to adopt one of two 
positions. First, a positivist approach that holds that law and morality are 
completely independent sets of norms. What constitutes the law is 
absolutely determined in a historic sense—it depends on what the 
community in question has accepted as law (which will usually be a matter 
of examining the authority of the source that has posited the laws in 
question, such as a legislature or an appellate court). If an apparently 
unjust law complies with what the relevant community accept as law, then 
it is still, unquestionably, a law. It may not be a ‘good’ law in some sense, 
but it is at least procedurally valid. 
 
                                                 
13 
 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011) 402. 
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An interpretist approach, conversely, does not accept that law and morality 
are totally independent sets of norms. Pursuant to this approach, the law 
includes not only those particular rules that have been enacted by the 
accepted source(s), but also ‘the principles that provide the best moral 
justification for those enacted rules’. 
 
The flaw that Dworkin alleges in this two-systems picture is that it allows 
for no neutral perspective from which to adjudicate between these 
separate systems. He asks how we can resolve the question as to 
whether positivism or interpretivism is a better account of how the two 
systems relate. Is this, itself, a moral question or a legal question? If it is 
neither, can the question then ever be answered to the satisfaction of 
either the interpretist or the positivist? 
 
If we treat the question as legal, he says, and then use legal resources 
such as legislation, case law and adversarial protocols (such as due 
process) to answer that question, then we cannot properly go about doing 
that unless we have a theory of how to read those legal resources. To 
have such a theory assumes that we have made a decision about what 
role morality plays in fixing the content of law (that is, which of those 
resources are actually going to count as law).14 If we do not accept that, 
then we have ‘built positivism in from the start and must not feign surprise 
when positivism emerges at the end’.15 Conversely, if we treat it as a 
moral question, we beg the question from the other perspective (by 
assuming that it is permissible to select the law for our analysis based on 
                                                 
14 
 Because of important juristic maxims such as ‘lex injustia non est lex’ (an unjust law is 
no law), a belief that has a long and entrenched history in jurisprudence, from St 
Augustine to Aquinas to John Finnis and Lon Fuller.  
A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely 
speaking, but rather a perversion of a law … for all it has in the nature of a law 
consists in it being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects, and aims 
at being obeyed by them. 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans, 
1948) 1002 [first published 1265–74]. 
15 
 Dworkin, above n 13, 403. 
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some moral principles). To ask whether our system of morals ought to 
inform our system of laws already assumes that these two sets of norms 
are separate. 
 
If we adopt this form of critique (suggested by Dworkin) of a two silos 
approach to the problem of reconciling legal and moral norms, to comment 
on a purported Kuhnian incommensurability of therapeutic jurisprudence 
and adversarialism, what we have is a similar circularity. Let us grant, for 
argument’s sake, that therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism 
consist of two sets of distinct exemplars. We can then legitimately ask: 
how far ought we to allow the therapeutic exemplars to determine whether 
a particular law or legal process is valid?16 
 
As in the Dworkin scenario, what counts as law from an adversarial 
perspective is an historical question—we simply ask whether any given 
law has been enacted by an authorised source and whether the relevant 
enactment procedure accords with constitutional requirements of due 
process. If it does, even though it might have disastrously anti-therapeutic 
consequences that far outweigh its otherwise demonstrable utility, then it 
is a valid law. If we do not object to that, then we have assumed that 
adversarialism will brook no objections. 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence does not, however, accept that law and therapy 
are independent sets of exemplars (norms). It would assert that the law 
consists of (or more properly ‘ought to consist of’) both the enacted rules 
and adversarially mandated processes, but also the modifications 
(recommended by evidence-based social science data) that allow those 
rules to continue to have their intended effect, while also minimising anti-
therapeutic consequences.17  If we then ask to what extent therapeutic 
                                                 
16 
 Most therapeutic jurisprudence scholars do not yet advocate that a law with anti-
therapeutic consequences is invalid, but merely that recasting that law in order to remove 
the anti-therapeutic consequences would be preferable. 
17 
 Therapeutic jurisprudence generally does not purport to invalidate otherwise valid 
laws. However, it does advocate that there is scope for discretion in both the 
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jurisprudence exemplars ought to inform, modify or value-add to 
adversarial exemplars, we assume that such a question is valid and that 
there is a necessary therapeutic intervention in the adversarial system. 
 
6.3 Softer Incommensurability—The Language of 
Difference and Exclusion 
 
Circularity arises because of the construction, within the group subscribing 
to each paradigm, of what constitutes a valid question within the field or 
discipline. As noted in Chapter 2, Bachelard asserted that all questions 
that arise within a discipline are contingent upon some practitioner(s) 
recognising that a valid question exists in the first place. Validity is 
constructed and, therefore, dependent upon the worldview of the person 
asking it. 
And, irrespective of what one might assume, in the life of a 
science, problems do not arise by themselves. It is precisely this 
that marks out a problem as being of the true scientific spirit: all 
knowledge is in response to a question. If there were no question, 
there would be no scientific knowledge. Nothing proceeds from 
itself. Nothing is given. All is constructed.18 
 
The conceptual links between Bachelard’s epistemic ruptures and Kuhn’s 
paradigm shifts are clear and intended. We can reconcile Bachelard’s 
claim that no disciplinary knowledge is given with Kuhn’s assertion that 
paradigmatic exemplars are basically the given set of benchmarked 
disciplinary statements to which all other work in the discipline must 
accord. The paradigmatic exemplars do not proceed from themselves, 
                                                                                                                                     
interpretation and application of laws, which may amount to an extended statement of 
what that law ‘is’. 
18 
  
Et, quoi qu’on en dise, dans la vie scientifique, les problèmes ne se posent pas 
d’eux-mêmes. C’est précisément ce sens du problème qui donne la marque du 
véritable esprit scientifique. Pour un esprit scientifique, toute connaissance est 
une réponse à une question. S’il n’y a pas eu de question, il ne peut y avoir de 
connaissance scientifique. Rien ne va de soi. Rien n’est donné. Tout est 
construit.  
Gaston Bachelard, La formation de l’esprit scientifique (1934). 
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they are not simply the result of observations of the world around us. The 
exemplars are constructed by, and accepted among, members of the 
discipline. It is this process of construction, and the paradigm-specific 
language that it generates, that gives rise to incommensurability, rather 
than any intrinsic properties of the exemplars themselves.19 
 
Cognisant of the critical role played by language in the identification and 
evolution of disciplinary exemplars, we can identify a softening in the later 
work of Kuhn in respect to incommensurability. It becomes not so much an 
incommensurability (or mutual exclusivity) of content, but rather a problem 
of translation, and therefore, of a meaningful comparative discourse. As 
observed in Chapter 2, Kuhn eventually provided that two theories would 
be incommensurable where there is no ‘language into which at least the 
empirical consequences of both can be translated without loss or 
change’. 20  There can never be such a neutral observation language 
because: 
[i]n the transition from one theory to the next, words change their 
meanings or conditions of applicability in subtle ways. Though 
most of the same signs are used before and after a revolution—
e.g. force, mass, element, compound, cell—the ways in which 
some of them attach to nature has somehow changed.21 
 
At the most general and definitive level, we can see that therapeutic 
jurisprudence practitioners and those who advocate for similar 
realignments of law do, indeed, demarcate their paradigms with apparently 
incommensurable vocabulary. The very commonly used descriptors of 
                                                 
19 
 The exemplars do have some crucial intrinsic properties, that is, their ability to solve 
problems that gave rise to the crisis within the discipline after a period of normal science. 
However, the incommensurability arises when an associated disciplinary language 
evolves around these solutions that excludes or significantly modifies the language of the 
older paradigm. In the Pythagorean example above, the terms ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ 
describe incommensurable constructs. 
20 
 SSR 266. It is this notion of ‘without loss or change’ that is critical. 
21 
 Thomas Kuhn, ‘Reflections on My Critics’ in Imre Lakatos and Andrew Musgrave (eds), 
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970) 270. 
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non-adversarial justice22  and post-adversarial justice seek to define an 
approach to law that, at least at the syntactical level, excludes the 
paramountcy of adversarialism. Even the less exclusionary label of less 
adversarial proceedings, referring to some processes in the Family Court, 
asserts and assumes that adversarial exemplars themselves are not 
unassailable, non-malleable or exclusive of other exemplars. The 
assertion that the proceedings of such a significant and entrenched 
jurisdiction, such as that exercised by the Family Court, is able to operate 
according to a paradigm in which adversarialism is not definitive illustrates 
the organic nature of paradigm vocabularies that Kuhn says ‘change their 
meanings or conditions of applicability in subtle ways’. 
 
Fierce debates about the meaningfulness and validity of terminology 
arising within a new paradigm are a sine qua non during a period of 
disciplinary crisis.23 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that some of the most 
trenchant criticism24  of therapeutic jurisprudence relates to the alleged 
vagueness and arbitrariness of the terms ‘therapeutic’ and ‘anti-
therapeutic’. In advocating for the complete elimination of therapeutic 
jurisprudence from the Family Court jurisdictions in the US, for example, 
Kates argues that the partisan assertion of adversarial counsel that a 
particular mental health expert’s recommendations or opinions would be 
the most ‘therapeutic’ in the circumstances of the case is often simply a 
self-serving attempt to portray their client’s side of the matter in the best 
light. Where counsel does not hold the professional belief that this is true, 
they act unethically, according to Kates. 
                                                 
22 
 In David Wexler’s foreword to the seminal book advocating for non-adversarial 
approaches to law within Australian jurisdictions—Michael King, Arie Freiberg, Becky 
Batagol and Ross Hyams, Non-Adversarial Justice (2009), v—David Wexler notes that 
therapeutic jurisprudence has arisen as a response to, and reaction against the 
‘argument culture, or ‘culture of critique’ that privileges the adversarial system as the 
paradigmatic method for resolving disputes. 
23 
 This means that it is a necessary and indicative sign that the crisis, is in fact, in crisis. 
24 
 Criticism here is used in a broad sense to include both pejorative critique and 
constructive critique. 
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In his trenchant criticism of the drug court jurisdictions in the US, Cohen 
argues that the strongest advocates for drug courts have a ‘thoroughgoing 
contempt for traditional justice’.25 He claims that they use the descriptor 
‘adversarial’ to disparage the traditional court and that they mock the 
language of objective adjudications such as ‘dispassionate, disinterested 
magistrate’ as antiquated. His own characterisation of the drug court judge 
is, in turn, equally as disparaging when he asks whether judges should 
really play the role of ‘confessor, cheerleader and mentor’. The roles and 
functions he describes in these ways are never pondered, he claims, due 
to the widespread ‘euphoria over the drug court revolution’. In the 
therapeutic jurisprudence literature, the judge in a problem-solving court is 
often described as a coach or mentor for the offender. Another judicial 
critic argues that these terms are euphemisms for judges who are really 
just ‘glorified probation officers’.26 
 
Hoffmann claims that the roles of the judge and probation officer are 
mutually exclusive and that to blend them not only makes no practical 
sense (due to the different training required for each role) but because an 
attempt to blend violates basic notions of adversariness. This attitude acts 
to preclude a neutral, comparative language of observation and 
comparison that allows legitimacy to each perspective. One cannot, 
Hoffman implies, ask how much of a coach or a mentor a judge may 
legitimately be. Of course, if these labels and functions are denied to the 
judge working in the therapeutic jurisprudence role, then he or she cannot 
work in that role at all. 
 
Hofmann and Cohen both also make strong criticisms of what they 
perceive to be the paternalistic nature of therapeutic jurisprudence 
reforms. The drug courts, they claim, characterise what they accomplish 
                                                 
25 
 Eric Cohen, ‘The Drug Court Revolution: Do We Want Theory Rather Than Justice to 
Become the Basis of Our Legal System?’, The Weekly Standard, 27 December 1999, 20. 
26 
 Morris B Hoffman, ‘The Drug Court Scandal’ (2000) June North Carolina Law Review  
1477–529.  
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as an imposed solving of the offenders’ problems for them. We ought not 
to be surprised to hear this sort of criticism levelled from within the context 
of a liberal worldview. However, therapeutic jurisprudence advocates 
dispute this assessment. 27  They say that much rests in the use of 
language. They admit that there can be a perception of paternalism in the 
use of phrases such as ‘problem-solving’ and suggest other language. 
According to King, ‘TJ in itself is against paternalism. It stresses that 
paternalism and coercion are anti-therapeutic. This is clear in the writings 
of Winick and Wexler’.28 King cautions against the tendency of language to 
misrepresent what therapeutic jurisprudence attempts to achieve in the 
ways in which the drug treatment courts are sometimes described: 
But some have purported to be applying therapeutic jurisprudence 
in taking a paternalistic approach. Some drug courts (and some 
other problem-solving courts) can provide examples. By asserting 
that these courts solve defendants’ problems they are explicitly 
taking a paternalistic approach … Therapeutic jurisprudence does 
not assume the superiority of the lawyer (or judicial officer), but 
sees the client as the autonomous change or solution agent with 
the lawyer providing advice and support. It is only a corruption of 
the therapeutic jurisprudence approach that leads to the criticisms 
made.29  
                                                 
27 
 A very thorough analysis of the issue of autonomy in therapeutic jurisprudence practice 
is undertaken by Astrid Birgden, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Offender Rights: A 
Normative Stance Is Required’ (2009) 78(1) Revista Juridíca de la Universidad de Puerto 
Rico 43. See also Robert F Schopp, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Integrated Enquiry and 
Instrumental Prescriptions’ (1999) 17(5) Behavior Sciences and the Law 589, 595. 
28 
 In Adrian Evans and Michael King, ‘Reflections on the Connection of Virtue Ethics to 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (2011) 35(3) UNSW Law Journal 717–22, citing
 
Bruce Winick 
and David Wexler, Judging in a Therapeutic Key (2003); Bruce J Winick, ‘On Autonomy: 
Legal and Psychological Perspectives’ (1992) 37 Villanova Law Review 1705. Winick has 
said that: ‘Indeed, the existing body of therapeutic jurisprudence work is anything but 
paternalistic … rather than defending government paternalism, [it] is animated by the 
insight that such paternalism is often anti-therapeutic, and that legal protection for 
individual autonomy can have positive therapeutic value’.  
Bruce Winick, ‘The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (1997) 3 Psychology, 
Public Policy and the Law 192. 
29 
 David B Wexler and Michael S King, Promoting Societal and Juridical Responsivity to 
Rehabilitation: The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Arizona Legal Studies Discussion 
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Among both the advocates and critics of therapeutic jurisprudence, the 
two seminal conceptual and theoretical critiques of (or apologia30 for) the 
movement are those of Roderick and Krumholz 31  and Slobogin, 32 
respectively. Roderick and Krumholz suggest that therapeutic 
jurisprudence may not just be conceptually vague, but self-referential in a 
way reminiscent of the Dworkian critique of the conception of law and 
morality as sets of independent norms. They say: 
It should be noted that defining TJ loosely so that it can lead to 
much empirical study may be tautological. We should not assume 
that TJ, as the study of how law, legal processes, and legal actors 
can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic effects, allows us to jump 
to the statement that the law can function therapeutically. Are we 
defining TJ by the very thing it is hypothesized to explain?33 
 
In identifying some of the key conceptual and empirical challenges faced 
by the therapeutic jurisprudence movement, Roderick and Krumholz do 
                                                                                                                                     
Paper No 10–46 (2011); Michael King, ‘Should Problem Solving Courts be Solution-
Focused Courts?’ (2011) 80 Revista Juridíca de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 1005. 
30 
 ‘Apology’ being used here in the dialectic sense ascribed to the process of 
‘apologetics’. ‘Apologetics’ derives from the Greek apologia, which described the legal 
process of making a systematic theoretical defence of a position by assuming and 
advocating the key weaknesses or faults in the position as a means to suggesting how 
these faults can be repaired or reconciled (such as Plato’s Apology of Socrates). A 
paradigmatic example is GH Hardy’s 1940 essay A Mathematician’s Apology, in which 
Hardy defends the value of the study of pure mathematics as being independent of any 
practical value that it generates. He argues, inter alia, that the ‘uselessness’ of pure 
maths meant it could not be used to create harm (at a time when applied mathematics 
was being used to produce formulae for the production of nuclear weapons). Available 
online at: <http://archive.org/details/AMathematiciansApology>. The Slobogin paper is 
widely recognised within the therapeutic jurisprudence movement as fulfilling this role to a 
certain extent. 
31 
 Dennis Roderick and Susan Krumholz, ‘Much Ado About Nothing? A Critical 
Examination of Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ in MF Miquelon-Weismann (ed) Trends and 
Issues in Scientific Evidence (2007) vol 1, 201. 
32 
 Christopher Slobogin, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder’ (1995) 1 
Psychology, Public Policy and the Law 193. 
33 
 Wexler and King, above n 29, 207. 
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not represent the sort of paradigmatic resistance that is evident from 
Cohen, Kates or Hoffman (or from former High Court Chief Justice 
Anthony Mason that was examined in Chapter 5). In fact, they conclude 
that if therapeutic jurisprudence can meet these challenges, it ‘might have 
its greatest potential as a philosophy’ and could ‘significantly challenge the 
status quo’.34 
 
Despite the tendency (discussed in Chapter 5) of some therapeutic 
jurisprudence scholars to deny that therapeutic jurisprudence constitutes a 
theoretical position,35 let alone a school of jurisprudence, Slobogin warns 
that deliberate vagueness in constructing the language of therapeutic 
jurisprudence could leave it indistinguishable from other forms of 
jurisprudence, such as legal realism, law and economics or feminist 
jurisprudence: 
At its broadest, therapeutic could simply mean beneficial, 
whereas counter- or anti-therapeutic could mean harmful. Defined 
in this way, however, the concept is indistinguishable from any 
other analytical process; all reform of the law and the legal system 
is meant to redress some type of harm or confer some type of 
benefit. Therapeutic jurisprudence would merely be another name 
for figuring out what is best. 
 
If we were to suggest that therapeutic jurisprudence differs from these 
other analytical processes in that it promotes the use of social science 
data to detect and redress harm, then we can identify a body of literature 
                                                 
34 
 Ibid 221–2. 
35 
 However, given that some scholars suggest that it can legitimately claim theory status, 
see Astrid Birgden, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence And Offender Rights: A Normative Stance 
Is Required’ (2009) 78(1) Revista Juridíca de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 43; Nigel 
Stobbs, ‘The Nature of Juristic Paradigms: Exploring the Theoretical and Conceptual 
Relationship Between Adversarialism and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (2011) 4(1) 
Washington University Jurisprudence Review 97; Ken Kress, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
and the Resolution of Value Conflicts: What We Can Realistically Expect, in Practice, 
from Theory’ (1999) 17(5) Behavior Sciences and the Law 555 (who describes 
therapeutic jurisprudence’s normative context as a hybrid theory of consequentialist and 
deontological positions concerned with maximising well-being, autonomy and other right: 
at 14). 
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and critique that, similarly, questions whether sufficient rigour has been 
used to determine what sorts of such data may be used, and whether 
there is in fact a sound legal basis for its use. 
 
Failure to adopt such rigour, according to some commentators, may lead 
to unfairness and uncertainty in judicial processes. Rathus asserts that the 
increasing trend of judges within the Family Court of Australia to take 
judicial notice of social science data when managing difficult cases with 
elements of substance abuse, domestic violence and interpersonal conflict 
means that these judges are necessarily selective in which data they 
access, choose to be informed by and apply. 36  Rathus highlights the 
potential dangers of judges referring to, and potentially perhaps relying on, 
what they perceive to be authoritative ‘social science data’ in a survey of 
some recent cases before the Family Court. She notes that: 
[t]wo separate … areas of social science are those addressing the 
impacts of shared parenting time and family violence … research 
in these fields has changed considerably since the 1990s. There 
is now wide acceptance of a range of assumptions or concepts 
but some of the social science literature referred to by judges is 
highly specialised. Despite quite regular use of the literature at 
trial level and a growing jurisprudence regarding this at appellate 
level it is suggested that the cases continue to demonstrate a lack 
of clarity and consistency in approach.37 
 
Roderick and Krumholz (citing Gerring) warn generally against the 
conflation of vague or colloquial definitions in social science at a much 
more general level.38 Gerring argues that the process by which a concept 
is defined is just as important, in terms of how it is applied, as the content 
of the definition. He observes that authors and decision makers 
necessarily make lexical and semantic choices about how they phrase 
their views and assessments. We cannot communicate a concept to a 
                                                 
36 
 Zoe Rathus, ‘A Call for Clarity in the Use of Social Science Research in Family Law 
Decision-Making’ (2012) 26(2) Australian Journal of Family Law 81. 
37 
 Rathus, above n 36, 94. 
38 
 John Gerring, ‘What Makes a Concept Good? A Critical Framework for Understanding 
Concept Formation in the Social Sciences’ (1999) 31 Polity 357, cited in Roderick and 
Krumholz, above n 31, 207. 
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literate audience without putting a label on the concept. This means, 
according to Gerring, that authors are engaged, whether they realise it or 
not, in a ‘perpetual interpretive battle’.39 
 
In an assertion strongly reminiscent of the Kuhnian ethos, Gerring then 
reminds us of Weber’s claims that we (as researchers and academics) 
seek to comprehend reality through a perpetual reconstruction of social 
science concepts:  
The history of the social sciences is a continuous process passing 
from the attempt to order reality analytically through the 
construction of concepts the dissolution of the analytical 
constructs so constructed through the shift and expansion of the 
scientific horizon and the reformulation anew of those concepts. 
The greatest advances in the sphere of social sciences are 
substantively tied up with the shift in practical cultural problems 
and take the guise of a critique of concept-construction.40 
 
There is certainly evidence in the therapeutic jurisprudence literature of a 
‘reformulation anew’ of some existing concepts (as was discussed in the 
previous chapter). If we grant, however, the sense of Gerring’s observation 
that practitioners and researchers within an emerging paradigm ‘make 
lexical and semantic choices about how they phrase their views and 
assessments’, then it seems reasonable to suggest that they will build a 
lexicon that contains unique ‘labels’ to refer to what may be unique 
concepts. 
 
The extent to which this unique lexicon gives rise to Kuhnian 
incommensurability is then likely to be best detected in the attitudes that 
the next generation of practitioners within that emerging paradigm view 
their lexicon, a phenomenon that will be considered further in the next 
section.41 
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 Ibid 359. 
40 
 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (1949) 105–6. 
41 
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6.4 Transference of the Constructed Vocabulary of the 
Paradigm 
 
According to Kuhn, what distinguishes the topics of research and practice 
between paradigms is best illustrated by what is common to these topics 
within a given paradigm. Writing about his experiences as a science 
teacher, Kuhn said that he came to realise that what created and 
sustained the consensus within a discipline was what it taught and how it 
was taught. 42  Science teaching, he claimed, is mainly concerned with 
exemplary problems and definitive solutions that students are expected to 
apply to new or novel fact situations. 43  This is a process readily 
recognisable to legal academics, who are accustomed to drilling law 
students in the use of generic problem-solving methods (such as IRAC) 
until it becomes their prime directive.44 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Kuhn’s beliefs about how knowledge is 
transferred within a discipline (and especially to students) are based 
largely on an ostensive exploration of concepts. In this he reflects, and 
makes express reference to, the Wittgenstein tradition, 45  most clearly 
articulated in Philosophical Investigations. The philosophy of language for 
most of the age of modernity has held that concepts can be defined by 
identification of the set of necessary and sufficient properties that a 
particular object must have in order for it to be an instance of the concept 
so defined. Wittgenstein argued that, on the contrary, such definitions are 
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almost certainly impossible. Such lists of properties, he said, apply at most 
to subsets of objects that are instances of that concept. 
 
It is probably impossible, for example, to list a set of necessary and 
sufficient properties that an object must have to qualify as an instance of 
the concept of ‘a chair’. We can compile such lists of properties that are 
common to subsets of that concept (such as ‘stool’, ‘couch’ or ‘car seat’), 
which then form a network that ultimately links them all, such as 
distinguishing facial features that might link members of a given human 
family. So, Wittgenstein asserts, objects or instances of a given concept 
may possess little more than a ‘family resemblance’.46 Such an analysis 
creates, when extended to the objects and concepts of scientific 
disciplines, an obvious tension with scientific realism, and for our 
purposes, with any attempt to definitively describe and delineate either 
adversarialism or any alternative paradigm of law that can be neatly 
packaged and transmitted between generations of lawyers. 
 
Kuhn illustrated his position on the transmission and acquisition of sets of 
similar concepts by reference to a child learning to identify waterfowl.47 
The child is taught by an adult who is able to classify birds as waterfowl 
that certain birds are ducks, geese or swans by looking at examples of 
each bird. Although the child initially makes some mistakes in classifying 
birds into these subgroups, he eventually learns to classify any new bird 
pointed out to him into the same categories as the teacher. Kuhn points 
out the ‘primary pedagogic tool is ostentsion’. Although a shared inductive 
process such as ‘all swans are white’ might be at play, he says, the 
process may be equivalent rather than identical for the adult and the child. 
 
The critical feature of this similarity in how the teacher and student learn to 
classify, however, is that although both agree on the correct classification 
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of any new instance, they do not necessarily possess identical conceptual 
frameworks. Each may have some differences in the properties that they 
consider to be necessary or sufficient for inclusion in each subcategory, 
but these never clash in practice. For the learning process to be said to be 
successful, to the extent that it is an ostensive learning method, all that is 
needed is for the child to recognise a set of properties that allow an 
identical taxonomy to that of the teacher. Kuhn claimed that even 
advanced scientific concepts are acquired in the same ostensive context. 
 
When the student is confronted with a previously unencountered puzzle in 
their professional work, they look for a way to see it as being like a 
previously encountered puzzle or within a category they have learned to 
construct during ostensive learning experiences. Kuhn concludes that: 
[t]he resultant ability to see a variety of situations as like each 
other … is, I think, the main thing a student acquires by doing 
exemplary problems.48 
 
According to Wittgenstein, testing our beliefs in relation to a particular 
phenomenon or process only makes sense where the testing can be done 
against a background and framework of beliefs that are no longer open to 
testing. He claims that: 
the questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact 
that some of our propositions are exempt from doubt … are, as it 
were, like hinges on which those turn.49 
Unlike traditional epistemologists or philosophers of science, however, 
Wittgenstein does not hold that these foundational beliefs are unchanging 
or that they are logically necessary conditions for anything we want to 
purport as a belief ‘about’ any phenomena in our field of study. He claims 
that these foundational beliefs are analagous to the bed and banks of a 
stream that dictate the direction and dynamics of how the waters in the 
stream flow. These phsyical features of the stream erode and shift over 
time but, given that these proceses take a very long time, to the 
contemporary observer, they are static. What counts for the contemporary 
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observers (practitioners of a given discipline), however, is the 
indubiatibility of these phsyical features in practice—so ‘it belongs to the 
logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not 
doubted’.50 Observational beliefs or hypotheses (or claims to knowledge) 
that dipsute or discount these foundational beliefs are not, according to 
Wittgenstein, knowledge at all. Further, doubt about something only 
makes sense in the context of a framework that is itself not subject to any 
doubt. He asserts that ‘doubt itself presupposes certainty’.51 
 
A paradigm is not, by analogy, open to doubt because it is composed of 
the exemplars that provide the frame of reference in which doubt 
(hypothesis testing) can occur. When a practitioner claims to know certain 
things within a discipline that operates pursuant to an extant paradigm (to 
merge the positions of Kuhn and Wittgenstein), they are ‘really 
enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which [they] affirm without 
special testing; propositions that is, which have a peculiar logical role in 
the system of our empirical propositions’. 52  This is a useful way to 
conceive of the nature of incommensurability, especially in relation to 
juristic paradigms. The practitioners within a given paradigm do not 
consider their exemplars to be in need of any special testing. They are a 
priori and given. The purported exemplars of some other asserted 
paradigm are, to these same practitioners, necessarily in need of special 
testing. 
 
Hence the vociferous claims of Hoffman, Cohen and others above that the 
adjudicatory functions of judicial officers need no defence or special 
explanation, but that we must start with the assumption that non-
adjudicatory roles are not permissible. Thus, from the persepctive of the 
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language used by therapeutic jurisprudence advocates and critics, the 
foundations for an extant incommensurability are apparent.53 
 
6.5 The Key Differences—Are They Paradigmatic? 
 
If therapeutic jurisprudence constructs exemplars for legal practice that 
are different to those provided by adversarialism, then there are 
paradigmatic differences between the two, in the Kuhnian sense. This is 
so even if the therapeutic exemplar merely adds to or amends an existing 
adversarial exemplar. Thus, for example, adoption of a rule that prescribes 
that a core adversarial practice should be amended for therapeutic effect, 
where existing due process and legal rights are not compromised, would 
be to amend (and, therefore, change) an extant exemplar. 
 
As observed in the previous chapter, therapeutic jurisprudence sees itself, 
first and foremost, as a practical and applied force. It also sees itself as 
developing processes and functions that are different, better and more 
effective than those that seem perennially unable to solve some 
fundamental weaknesses in the legal system. In his foreword to Winick 
and Wexler’s classic volume on what it means to be a therapeutic 
jurisprudence practitioner (Judging in a Therapeutic Key), Dressel claims 
that the movement consists of practical contributions to an ‘evolving 
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judicial role’.54 Every generation has, according to Dressel, some judges 
who come to the conclusion that there are better ways to dispense justice, 
and that there must be more to the role of the judge than ‘finding the truth 
and deciding between two positions’. He notes that judges in many 
jurisdictions are becoming problem solvers and that they are now less 
likely to hand over to someone else the questions of why in relation to 
behaviour. 
 
Freiberg identifies the transformed role of the judge as the single most 
important difference between a problem-solving court and an adversarial 
court: 
In problem-oriented courts … in which the principles of 
therapeutic jurisprudence are employed, the role of the judicial 
officer is pivotal. Much turns on her or his personality, the depth of 
involvement in the case, the continuing supervision and the direct 
engagement with the defendant in court, rather than through legal 
counsel. Because the judge is no longer seen as an impartial 
arbitrator of the facts or a dispassionate and disinterested 
imposer of sentences, a considerable burden is placed on the 
holder of this position.55 
 
At first blush, one could hardly conceive of functions more 
paradigmatically different to that of an adversarial judge as those related to 
an individual judge’s ‘personality’ who is ‘no longer seen as an impartial 
arbitrator’. The differences between traditional courts and problem-
oriented court are summarised in the following table, often extracted in the 
therapeutic jurisprudence literature.56 I have modified and added some 
fields to the table to reflect some of the most current trends and findings in 
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the literature. Those that I suggest are most indicative of paradigmatic 
difference are highlighted. 
 
Table 6.1: Updated table of transformed and traditional court 
processes 
Traditional Process Transformed Process 
Dispute resolution Problem-solving dispute avoidance 
Legal outcome Therapeutic outcome 
Adversarial process Collaborative process 
Claim or case oriented People, solutions oriented 
Rights based Interest or needs based 
Emphasis based on 
adjudication 
Emphasis placed on non-
adjudication 
and alternative dispute 
resolution 
Judge as arbiter Judge as coach, mentor and 
mentor 
Backward looking, retributive Forward looking, rehabilitative 
Precedent based Planning based 
Few participants and 
Stakeholders 
Wide range of participants and 
stakeholders 
Individualistic Interdependent 
Legalistic Common-sensical, evidence based 
Formal Informal 
Removed from the community Embedded in the community57 
Efficient Effective 
 
Critics leave no doubt that, at least from their perspective, these 
differences are paradigmatic. Hoffman makes the following claims in 
relation to what Warren refers to as the ‘transformed’ processes applied by 
judges in the problem-solving courts, and of the drug courts in particular: 
Suffice it to say that, if they are intended to free judges not only 
from the constraints of the separation-of-powers doctrine but even 
from the limits of our own expertise, they are dangerous ideas 
indeed. I cannot imagine a more dangerous branch than an 
unrestrained judiciary full of amateur psychiatrists poised to ‘do 
good’ rather than to apply the law. 
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While some influential therapeutic jurisprudence advocates claim, for the 
movement, ownership of the ‘underlying philosophy’ that informs the 
problem-solving courts, they acknowledge that the degree to which a 
particular judge incorporates and applies therapeutic principles in their 
court depends largely on the ‘training, character and motivation’ of that 
individual judge. 58  This inevitability in the intensity of approach and 
application of therapeutic techniques and principles, however, is seen as a 
strength in that it is an indication that judges are thinking about the 
individual person appearing before them as an individual, and not as a 
member of a certain class. There is no significant reason, they add, why 
authoritative determinations of therapeutic jurisprudence best practice 
should not be developed to promote consistency where it is required. 
 
To attempt to identify a complete, discrete set of therapeutic jurisprudence 
exemplars would be, to some extent, a speculative exercise. This is not to 
say that such exemplars do not exist. The argument here is that they 
certainly do exist, but they exist mostly as modifications of existing 
adversarial exemplars. Kuhn acknowledges that ‘although the world does 
not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist afterward works in a 
different world’.59 What he means is that as a paradigm shifts, practitioners 
use different filters to sort and classify their observations and to test data. 
 
Nevertheless, we can identify attempts to prescribe therapeutic exemplars 
across a range of law and justice fields. Birgden, for example, suggests a 
normative framework for offender rehabilitation that places an increased 
emphasis on individual autonomy in the process of balancing offender and 
community rights.60 She concludes that we ought to balance justice and 
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therapeutic principles such that community rights should not automatically 
trump offender rights. This is a position that, if adopted, would be a 
significant modification to the traditional approach to offender 
management. She argues, inter alia, that ‘if offenders reject rehabilitation, 
based on an informed decision, then this decision should be respected’. 
She makes this suggestion based on a growing body of therapeutic 
jurisprudence work in this field.61 
 
Other therapeutic jurisprudence practitioners advocate ethical exemplars 
that would change our idea of what it means to be an ethical lawyer. 
Evans and King offer advice ‘for those practicing lawyers for whom 
therapeutic jurisprudence may become a central motivation to practice law 
… reflecting on the moral advantages that virtue ethics can offer such 
practitioners in their daily decision making’. These authors suggest that a 
virtuous orientation would require that a therapeutic jurisprudence 
practitioner, supported by an ethic of care, is ethically obliged to first ‘know 
themselves’ before advising their client of not only the legal consequences 
of any particular course of action, but of ‘all the possible effects for 
themselves and others’ arising from the various legal options, and to 
suggest those options that best promotes the client’s best interest while 
minimising the ‘negative side effects on other people’.62 This requirement 
of emotion intelligence and self-awareness is a strong enough thread in 
therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship and practice that it certainly 
approaches exemplar status.63 
 
Daicoff also highlights the differing roles potentially played by personal 
values and personal morality in adversarial as opposed to non-adversarial 
practice. This inevitably arises in discussions about a less objective focus 
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in the role of the lawyer or judge. Daicoff uses the analogy of an auto 
mechanic who is paid by a client to fix their car. The mechanic does not 
bother to ask the owner about whether they intend to use the car for any 
immoral purposes. The mechanic will not ask, suggests Daicoff:  
‘You mean you are going to take this car, as soon as I fix it, drive 
across the country and abandon your wife, taking the family car 
with you at a time when your wife is nine months pregnant and 
needs the car to get to the hospital?’  
‘Well, in that case I refuse to fix your car’.  
In an analogous position, she suggests, many or most lawyers would just 
fix the car without considering any moral dimension. 64  This valuing of 
objectivity has earned praise for the profession generally when it has led 
to important civil reform (such as was the case in the US in the 1960s) but 
condemnation when it requires them to defend unpopular clients or 
causes. Pursuant to an adversarial paradigm, this sort of objectivity may 
seem axiomatic. 
 
Daicoff’s research strongly suggests that the personality types for lawyers 
who succeed in contemporary litigation weigh against any move for 
lawyers to infuse some of their personal values and beliefs into the way in 
which they interact with and represent clients. She makes a carefully 
constructed and evidence-based argument that this same mismatch of the 
personality types associated with a traditional adversarial legal education 
and ethos applies to those lawyers who propose to act within an ‘ethic of 
care’ and also to ‘collaborative problem-solving, empathetic listening, and 
a more holistic approach to client representation’.65 
 
Boldt and Singer compare the court conduct and style of judging of 
problem-solving judges to more traditional (adversarial) models of judicial 
behaviour. They contend that the judges who serve in the problem-solving 
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courts ‘have largely repudiated the classical judicial virtues of restraint, 
disinterest and modesty in favour of a more activist and therapeutic 
stance’.66 These authors note that the traditional adversarial rests on two 
central pillars (in criminal proceedings at least): namely, the use of neutral 
detached decision makers and formal (binding) rules of procedure. In that 
context, the interests of the accused are generally seen to be adverse to 
those of the state and vice versa—and so the tripartite structure comprised 
of an accused, a prosecution and a neutral decision maker creates an 
unstable frame in the sense that it collapses into a two-against-one model 
once a decision is made. To maintain an appearance of legitimacy once 
this collapse occurs, neutrality and formality are relied upon to prevent the 
appearance of some alliance between the judge and the winning party. 
 
Boldt and Singer neatly articulate why these adversarial pillars of neutrality 
and formality must represent paradigmatically different exemplars to those 
that inform the operation of a drug court (for example). They observe that: 
In drug treatment courts by contrast, the stabilizing influence of 
judicial neutrality and formal rules of procedure are diminished 
precisely because the interests of the defendant are now seen as 
consonant with those of the State. The notion that the judge is 
bound to adopt a neutral position in the resolution of a conflict, is 
replaced in these courts by a role conception in which the judge is 
a partisan aiming to cure the offender of his addiction … the judge 
is the leader of the offender’s treatment team … performing a 
therapeutic function on his or her behalf.67 
If we assume the legitimacy of a therapeutic court, then in assessing 
whether such a therapeutic function is successful, further paradigmatic 
differences are apparent. As previously discussed, the emphasis in a 
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problem-solving court is placed more on effectiveness than efficiency or 
due process. As Casey has pointed out,68  treatment is not judged by 
whether it is fair, or deserved, or proportional. When a child is immunised, 
it makes no sense to ask whether the pain experienced as a result of the 
injection is somehow deserved. What we do expect is that the vaccine is 
effective in preventing the disease. ‘Ideas of liability, fault, guilt and 
fairness’, suggests Casey, ‘are irrelevant in a treatment regime’. 
 
Adversarial exemplars are not, of course, fully displaced or replaced as 
these therapeutic exemplars make their way into the core of the 
disciplinary matrix. If an offender in a drug court does not comply 
significantly with the treatment regime, a decision is likely to be made that 
they should be removed from the program, and this is largely an 
adversarial process given that the offender is likely to resist it (probably 
with some adversarial advocacy from their legal representatives).69 
 
Many of the problem-solving courts, in the common law jurisdictions, 
derive their constitutional legitimacy from the enabling legislation that 
creates and regulates them. In the public mind, at least, this provides an 
aura of legitimacy at the popular level. These courts do not seem to attract 
significant levels of public criticism. Those who appear before them seem 
to submit to their jurisdiction. For this reason, claims Casey and others, 
popular and perhaps some professional allegiance is owed ‘not to the 
problem-solving court per se, but to traditional respect for the institution of 
the judiciary’.70 
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Perhaps the greatest indication of the potential paradigmatic tension 
between some adversarial and therapeutic exemplars is the level of fear, 
and sometimes of distrust, that seems to characterise the concern of the 
judicial critics of therapeutic jurisprudence in general, and of the problem-
solving courts in particular. Casey acknowledges this context of fear when 
he notes that: 
 A state mandated treatment program has a tendency to yield 
disastrous results when mixed with a punishment theory. The 
problem-solving courts present an even more audacious 
experiment [than the juvenile courts]: a state sanctioned treatment 
model within a punitive model. Thus the objective potential for 
illegitimacy runs higher for the drug treatment courts than for the 
juvenile courts. 
However, conceding the ‘political intractability of the types of social 
problems addressed by problem-solving courts’, Casey 71  and other 
commentators,72 acknowledge that illegitimacy can lead to change. This 
morphing of illegitimacy to pragmatic acceptance over time is at the heart 
of Kuhnian paradigm shift. 
 
Although I have identified paradigmatic differences between 
adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence in this section, that does not 
establish that there is a paradigm shift in progress. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, such a shift is unlikely to be definitively identified and assessed 
until well after it has occurred. The recasting of illegitimacy as pragmatic 
and necessary adaptation is not something that occurs quickly. This is a 
reality that we can intuit from Freiberg’s use of the phrase ‘pragmatic 
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incrementalism’, which generated the analysis in this thesis. Given that 
there is strong evidence of an ongoing recasting of what may once have 
been seen as illegitimate court practices as pragmatic increments towards 
the solving of seemingly intractable problems, we now go on to assess the 
effect of that recasting. 
 
6.6 Is the Current Tension Between the Two Models 
Indicative of Paradigmatic Shift? 
 
Given that some of the key differences between adversarialism and 
therapeutic jurisprudence appear to be exemplary in the Kuhnian sense, 
and therefore, paradigmatic, the final question to consider in this chapter is 
whether those differences are manifesting themselves to such a degree, 
within the practice of law, that we can conclude that a paradigm shift is 
underway. 
 
Hoffmann represents the most strident dissenting voice in the resistance to 
the problem-solving jurisdiction and to therapeutic jurisprudence in 
general.73 On the one hand, the problems of over-incarceration, of the 
relationship between endemic social problems and of unassailed 
recidivism cannot be denied. They are the very sorts of issues that Kuhn 
would identify as intractable problems that indicate a discipline in crisis. 
They can only be evidence of a paradigm shift, however, if the methods 
used to solve them are considered to be legitimate. Hoffman, as discussed 
in Chapter 5, does not accept the legitimacy of these ‘new’ methods. He 
opines that there are very good reasons why we do not organise court lists 
so that we have specialist judges presiding over sex offences or burglary 
matters or homicides. To do so would act to concentrate the natural 
tendency of judges to vary in their perceptions of certain sorts of crime. 
We would not want, for example, a judge who is particularly punitive in his 
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personal attitudes to drug use to be solely tasked with the sentencing of 
drug offenders, according to Hoffman. 
 
The nature and quality of such dissent and opposition to therapeutic 
jurisprudence is the best evidence that it is viewed as, or at least as part 
of, a shift in paradigm and not just some tinkering with the parameters of 
adversarial process. Importantly, the advocates and practitioners of 
therapeutic jurisprudence provide the best evidence of the existence of 
therapeutic exemplars, but the perception that these exemplars stand in 
opposition to some current adversarial exemplars is almost entirely that of 
the critics. As discussed above, the strongest critics of therapeutic 
jurisprudence see it as a threat, not as a viable alternative or as the 
complementary addition to the judicial repertoire in the way that advocates 
such as Wexler, King, Hora and many others envision. 
 
One of the clearest indications of a Kuhnian paradigm shift (as discussed 
in Chapter 2) is a movement in the weight of scholarship from one 
paradigm to another. As a new paradigm gains momentum, more 
practitioners begin to work with it and to advocate for it. More younger 
practitioners, especially, commence their careers accepting the exemplars 
of the new paradigm as a given. More university courses devote space in 
the syllabus and curriculum for it, and the scholarly journals devote more 
publishing and editorial emphasis to it. The critical mass of therapeutic 
jurisprudence scholarship, research, practice, publications and 
collaborative dissemination is, as highlighted in Chapter 5, considerable.74 
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In the alternative (non-Kuhnian) rule- and evidence-based approach to 
disciplinary change, consensus persists to the extent that practitioners 
remain rational. To decide between two differing approaches or 
explanations, one simply examines the available evidence. The evidence 
may not be conclusive, but so long as the practitioners remain rational, 
they can debate among themselves the extent of the gaps in evidence 
according to the same criteria. Knowledge, under the latter regime, is 
cumulative. There is a dearth of this sort of analysis of the relationship 
between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence in the literature. 
 
A recurring theme in the post-/non-adversarial literature relates to the 
effectiveness of the justice system and, in particular, the effectiveness of 
the courts. Communities have a right and an expectation, so the argument 
goes, that courts will be fair and impartial, independent and efficient. 
However, they also need to be effective; effective in the sense that they 
are not just an end in themselves but also a means to an end. This theme 
questions whether the calling to account of criminal offenders ought to 
have a measurable effect on crime rates and recidivism. If they do not, 
then criminal courts can be seen as little more than a revolving gateway to 
incarceration.75 
 
Within the rubric of an adversarial court system, conversely, courts are 
almost exclusively evaluated and assessed in terms of their efficiency. 
This is a clear reflection, as suggested in Chapter 3, of the close links 
between the liberal economic and political worldview and adversarial legal 
processes. Clearance rates are the gold standard for benchmarking courts 
within the annual reports for the various court jurisdictions in Australia. The 
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Supreme Court of Queensland, for example, contains data related to ‘the 
court’s performance over the last year’, which the Chief Justice reminds us 
was ‘developed on the basis of the requirements of the Commonwealth 
Productivity Commission76 in relation to its annual “Report on Government 
Services”’. 77  The report then observes that according to these 
requirements and benchmarks both divisions of the court (being the trial 
and appeal divisions) performed satisfactorily. This conclusion is based 
solely upon statistics detailing the caseload, clearance rates and 
disposable times of matters coming before the courts. There is also a 
collection of data in relation to budgetary details, the up-take of 
technology, judicial professional development activities and the work of the 
Supreme Court library. 
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I have argued elsewhere78 that we can identify the following formal criteria 
by which courts are evaluated across Australian jurisdictions: 
 disposition of caseload 
 workload (usually tabulated as civil and criminal matters heard by 
the court) 
 length of time matters take to reach judgment; number of judgments 
delivered 
 timing between hearing and delivery of reserved judgments 
 sitting times of individual judges 
 issuing of practice directions 
 numbers of case appraisals, mediations, case supervisions, judicial 
reviews and applications heard 
 developments in court and registry processes and administrative 
procedures 
 training undertaken by judges and court staff 
 information technology, equipment and facility improvements and 
expenditure. 
 
These authors identify some initiatives designed to take a more qualitative 
snapshot of mainstream court functioning, including the International 
Framework for Court Excellence, which claims to represent a ‘framework 
of values, concepts, and tools by which courts worldwide can voluntarily 
assess and improve the quality of justice and court administration they 
deliver’. 79  However, an examination of the evaluative criteria in this 
document (and similar publications) are still primarily concerned with 
principles of administrative and economic efficiency, procedural fairness 
and due process as reported by users of the courts. They do not attempt 
to assess whether the court is achieving any broader social, political or 
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cultural outcomes. My fellow researcher and I found this to be unsurprising 
given that these broader outcomes are the raison d’être of the Indigenous 
courts and indeed of the problem-solving and specialist courts in general: 
If we conceive of the specialist courts as a subset of the overall 
jurisdiction of the mainstream courts, which are specifically tasked 
with addressing issues such as recidivism, attendance rates, 
rehabilitation and lifestyle problem-solving, then we might expect 
these courts to have more specialised and carefully delineated 
outcomes-based objectives.80 
 
Efficiency and effectiveness are often conflated, by virtue of emphasising 
clearance rate efficiency to the extent of ignoring effectiveness. For 
example, barrister Peter Faris QC, in an article commenting upon the 
expansion in jurisdiction of the Koori Court system from the Magistrates’ 
Courts into the County Court, asserts that: 
Victoria has opted to spend money on a touchy, feely criminal 
court designed to give soft justice to Aboriginal … offenders. This 
is a stupid waste of money. … The new court is supposed to be 
based upon the success of the Koori Magistrates Court, which 
disposes of 150 Aborigines a year in six courts—an average of 
one a fortnight … We now have a form of reverse discrimination, 
defined by racial characteristics and to be applied by the justice 
system.81 
Faris argues that the existence of Indigenous courts constitutes an 
unacceptable legal dualism and a breach of the Rule of Law, which is 
reminiscent of the objections of some of the judicial critics of therapeutic 
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jurisprudence cited above. This dualism is invalid, he claims, because the 
clear implication of the specialised courts is that Indigenous offenders will 
receive sentences that are more lenient in comparison to non-Indigenous 
offenders in similar cases. 82  We ought not to conflate issues of 
jurisprudence with more pragmatic issues of economics and efficiency. 
Arguments about efficiency and effectiveness need to be distinct from 
arguments about jurisprudence and political ideology.83  
 
In a response to the Faris criticism, then Victorian Attorney-General Rob 
Hulls adopted a different evaluative perspective, asserting first that the 
Koori Court has in fact been very successful in reducing recidivism rates 
among Aboriginal offenders in Victoria.84 Hulls suggests that this is mainly 
due to the presence of elders and respected persons in the Court. Hulls 
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further asserts that sentences handed down by the Koori Court are not 
more lenient, and that a cost-benefit analysis of the courts must take into 
account any reduction in costs due to lower recidivism rates (such as the 
need for fewer prison beds).  
 
Thus, we must conceive of the value of the Koori Court, Hulls argues, in 
terms of its role in combating the over-representation of Aboriginal people 
within the criminal justice system, separately to the question of costs and 
judicial workloads.85 This is the context in which a shift in exemplars, and 
hence in a juristic paradigm, is most likely to be detected. We are not likely 
to find an adversarial exemplar that requires an assessment of the 
comparative representation of particular demographics or racial groups 
within the justice system. That is not to say that a justice system acting 
according to an adversarial paradigm must ignore such considerations, but 
they are never a measure of validity. 
 
Marchetti and Daley also emphasise the different exemplars that are at 
play at the heart of problem-solving and other specialist courts in their 
study of these courts across Australian jurisdictions. They make reference 
to the extent to which a court can empower communities (in this case 
Indigenous communities) to ‘bend and change’ mainstream law by 
acknowledging and allowing the expression of Indigenous methods of 
social control. They say: 
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With the political aspiration to change Indigenous-white justice 
relations, Indigenous sentencing courts, and Indigenous justice 
practices generally, are concerned with group based change in 
social relations (a form of political transformation), not merely 
change in an individual.86 
 
In the mainstream court system, claims Hulls, offenders ‘can hide behind 
their lawyers’, whereas, in the Koori Court, as in most Indigenous 
sentencing tribunals, offenders must speak for themselves and answer 
questions on why they committed an offence. They are forced to take full 
accountability for their actions in a way that is far more confronting than 
the mainstream court process. This is, in large part, a function of the 
interventionist role and style of the judge in these specialist jurisdictions. 
 
Within the criminal justice system there are obvious elephants in the room 
that point to a crisis in public policy, which in turn point to a disciplinary 
crisis. The results of a failure to recognise paradigmatic alternatives, as 
such, are stark. For example, incarceration levels have clearly reached 
crisis levels in some major jurisdictions. Adversarial sentencing, reduced 
to the application of grids, is simply formulaic and incommensurable with a 
therapeutic approach. Judge Merrit, in dissenting in the US Court of 
Appeals, Sixth Circuit matter of US v Jeross, observes that: 
This is another drug case in which our system of criminal law has 
imprisoned for many years two more lives and torn up two more 
families by grossly excessive sentences imposed in the ‘War on 
Drugs’ … which is the advent of our irrational set of sentencing 
guidelines that judges apply by rote on a daily basis … These 
sentencing guidelines hold that mitigating factors like family ties, 
mental illness, education, and the likelihood of rehabilitation are 
simply ‘not relevant’ in the sentencing process. Judges’ minds are 
closed down and sentences ratcheted up by applying convoluted 
conversion formulas like the one just recited in the majority 
opinion.87   
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In the criminal jurisdiction, therapeutic jurisprudence advocates certainly 
see therapeutic principles as belonging within the legal disciplinary core. 
Wexler asserts that factors of procedural fairness and due process must 
always be tempered by an understanding and application of psychological 
data in relation to an offender’s readiness for rehabilitation and that a 
failure to do so often leads to a ‘defiance effect’ and consequently 
increased levels of offending and recidivism.88 Wexler goes on to conclude 
that: 
there comes a time—and we now seem to be well past it—where 
outcome is as important as process. The public will not and 
should not regard the court system with satisfaction and 
perceived fairness unless the incarcerative crisis is tackled and 
the rehabilitative challenge is met.89 
 
Not everyone agrees that a problem-solving ethos is a valid way of 
reducing incarceration rates, however. In responding to claims that 
problem-solving courts are a threat to judicial independence in that they 
require such judges to stray from the role of the neutral arbiter, Burke 
makes the point that it is possible for judges to be both practitioners of due 
process and problem solvers.90 He says, in response to the suggestion 
that a judge must be either one or the other: 
False choices like this represent a tyranny of limited thought and 
an unnecessary limit on the ability of judges to perform the work 
today’s society and its problems require.91 
 
Regardless of whether we agree with the divergent opinions of critics such 
as Hoffman or the reconciliatory assertions of Burke (and others), this 
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jurisprudential analysis and debate about the validity of the judicial role in 
jurisdictions that have already experienced evolution beyond a simple 
application of adversarial norms and procedures is strong evidence of a 
shifting paradigm.92 
 
Given that, arguably, the most obvious implication of Kuhn’s proposed 
structure of scientific revolutions is that they take place over a relatively 
long period, during which the exemplars of the new paradigm become 
entrenched in the discourse and language of the discipline,93 we ought to 
be able to identify longitudinal trends towards a non-adversarial paradigm 
if a shift is underway. Those trends need not necessarily consist of body of 
successfully completed experiments or trials according to Kuhn, who says 
that ‘[t]he success of a paradigm is … largely a promise of success 
discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples’.94 
 
Burke traces the evolution of the modern problem-solving court from the 
convening of the first juvenile court in Chicago in the early 1900s. In this 
court, the judicial role and some rules of evidence and due process were 
displaced on the grounds that they were thought to hinder an approach 
that was in the best interests of the child. Different terminology was used 
to encourage a divergent approach to that used with adult offenders. A 
juvenile was a delinquent rather than a criminal. The delinquent was 
adjudicated rather than judged. The delinquent was held in detention 
rather than imprisoned and if the detention was to be of a significant 
duration, then it was referred to as a school, camp or program. The 
juvenile was said to be committed to these programs rather than being 
sentenced to a punishment.95  
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Describing the qualities needed in a judge of the Juvenile Court in those 
times, Judge Julian Mack wrote in 1909: 
He [sic] must be able to understand the boys’ point of view and 
ideas of justice; he must be willing and patient enough to search 
out the underlying causes of the trouble and to formulate the plan 
by which, through the cooperation, ofttimes, of many agencies, 
the cure may be effected.96 
Mack’s discussion, penned over a century ago, is not dissimilar to 
common sentiments and beliefs about the nature of problem-solving 
courts today and expressly reflects some of the transformed processes set 
out in Table 6.1. He asserts that the role of the juvenile court judge is not 
to determine whether the young boy or girl has committed a ‘specific 
wrong’, but to determine ‘what is he [sic]’ and how he has become what he 
is, and what can best be done, in both the interests of the child and of the 
state, to save him ‘from a downward career’.97 
 
The paternalistic nature of these early juvenile courts led to an 
unacceptable amount of arbitrariness, in that the sorts of orders and 
programs dished out by individual judges depended largely on their 
individual sense of what their role ought to be (in many cases, as de facto 
parents). In the latter half of the 20th century (post the decision of the US 
Supreme Court in In re Gault),98 many of the due process rights that had 
been removed for the purposes of juvenile proceedings were restored.99 
Juvenile court judges were then required to, and to a large extent did, 
reconcile the divergent requirements of due process and problem solving. 
Burke concludes that the role of the judge is changing and that the line of 
demarcation between adjudication and problem solving remains blurred. 
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However, he insists that if courts are tasked with fostering closer 
relationships with communities and with addressing previously intractable 
problems, that articulating the different requirements of due process and 
problem solving is a variation on the ‘tyranny of “or” … [which is] viral and 
destructive’.100 
 
If we accept the evidence of problem-solving judges and practitioners such 
as Burke that due process and problem solving are reconcilable, then the 
question remains as to which context dominates the disciplinary core in 
terms of providing exemplars. Burke cites a letter from a drug court judge 
in upstate New York to Chief Justice Kaye in which she notes: 
I for one … attest to the revolution in the criminal justice system 
with the advent of the drug treatment court and domestic violence 
court. Today we do it a lot better than it was done yesterday … I 
am a local judge positively affecting the lives of many people in 
my community. A great blessing I cherish.101 
 
We can, then, identify some examples of significant longitudinal trends in 
relation to the tension between adversarial and therapeutic forces in both 
jurisprudence and in legal practice. In the case of the American juvenile 
courts, it seems as though there was a period of about 50 years in which 
the operating philosophy of the courts (and of the judges who comprised 
them) accorded to something very much akin to a therapeutic paradigm 
(even to the exclusion of some core due process exemplars). The 
Supreme Court in In re Gault paired back the displacement of the 
constitutional requirements for due process and the usual laws of 
evidence, but did not in any way invalidate those therapeutic principles 
and practices that were consistent with these requirements. 
 
There is ample evidence that therapeutic exemplars are becoming more 
formalised and evidence-based, and that they are having a significant 
effect on how entities such as the problem-solving courts are evaluated. 
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The Centre for Court Innovation, for example, has published a detailed set 
of what it calls ‘universal performance indicators for problem solving 
courts’.102 The Centre intends these performance indicators as potentially 
useable by all problem-solving courts, albeit in ways that are suited to their 
particular methods. However, it is of interest that these performance 
indicators are also meant for ‘conventional courts that wish to document 
their problem-solving activity’. 
 
In terms of demonstrating incommensurability with adversarial exemplars, 
and of some evidence of a possible shift in paradigm, the Centre 
acknowledges that although problem-solving courts will work to address 
the problems of individuals, they should also seek a broader effect ‘both 
within the justice system and in the broader community’.103 Courts are 
expected, according to these indicators, to educate key players about the 
nature of relevant health and behavioural problems (including drug abuse, 
mental illness and domestic violence). Pursuant to an adversarial 
paradigm, this could well be seen as an attempt by courts to exceed their 
adjudicative mandate. If we consider this expanded role in the light of the 
further expectation that problem-solving courts should seek to be more 
than mere boutiques that do not affect significant numbers of cases within 
a jurisdiction,104 the expansion of influence as a formal expression of intent 
is obvious. 
 
Worldviews change slowly and incrementally. Consequently, paradigms 
generally change very slowly. Whether paradigms change incrementally is 
a question of perspective. To practitioners working during a period of crisis 
and revolution, it probably appears that the way they work is changing 
incrementally. What they see appears to be the promise of doing things in 
a better way. Advocates of the existing paradigm will usually see no need 
for such a promise, believing that the current paradigm is optimal and that 
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any change is incremental fine-tuning. When aligned with a powerful and 
pervasive worldview, it may appear, to these conservative advocates that 
a shifting paradigm is just pragmatic incrementalism, the end result of 
which will be ideological stasis based on practical perfection. The neo-
liberal worldview 105  is so pervasive in our political, economic and 
intellectual life that some social scientists claim that we have reached the 
end of history. Political economist Francis Fukuyama notoriously claims 
that: 
[w]hat we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, 
or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the 
end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government.106 
This sort of fundamentalist hubris, which makes explicit claims about the 
linking of a neo-liberal political paradigm with the natural order, is of 
obvious appeal to the conservative thread in law and jurisprudence. In 
fact, the very nature of a written constitution guarantees that the 
relationship is reciprocal; that is, that law is linked to the liberal worldview 
in the very coercive fabric of the Rule of Law. 
 
Kagan has examined this link in some analytical depth by studying the 
extent to which an adversarial culture is ingrained in American social and 
political history, claiming that: 
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[t]he rhetoric of law is deeply rooted in American consciousness, 
and has been so embedded since the founding of the country, as 
captured by John Adam’s oft quoted description of the American 
polity as a government of law, not of men.107 
Kagan identifies the roots of adversarial legalism as the:  
political traditions and legal arrangements that provide incentives 
to resort to adversarial legal weapons … [and] from the relative 
absence of institutions that effectively channel contending parties 
and groups into less expensive and more efficient ways of 
resolving disputes.  
He claims, not that the prevailing political culture explicitly focuses citizens 
toward adversarial legalism, but that it denies citizens other remedies or 
mechanisms for influence or policy implementation. He asserts that the 
current political culture;  
demands comprehensive government protections … [while at the 
same time] mistrust[ing] government power [resulting in] 
fragment[ed] political authority [that must be held] accountable 
through lawsuits and judicial review.108  
This does sound significantly comparable to the style of administrative law 
and of government regulation, accountability and oversight in the liberal 
democracies, including Australia. The exponential growth of the tribunal 
system as a means of obtaining redress against public authorities is some 
evidence of this as in an increasing reliance on sanctions among 
regulatory bodies.109 
 
Granted, the overall role of the adversarial trial is not exclusively about 
picking a winner or giving legal resolution to a dispute—other 
elements/purposes are part of the paradigm. It serves, for example, some 
symbolic and cathartic functions (as Duff has recently 
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explained),110reducing stresses and tensions in a community or group 
through demonstrations and communications of justice being done. The 
important ritual nature of the adversarial trial, based on the relevant 
cultural norms of the particular jurisdiction, is perhaps best reflected in the 
use of juries in Western liberal democracies and common law countries.111 
 
Despite the express reservations of some of therapeutic jurisprudence’s 
strongest advocates about the dangers of appearing to threaten the 
primacy of existing adversarial principles and rules, it could well be that in 
order for therapeutic jurisprudence to prosper and to influence the wider 
juristic model to the extent that these same advocates hope for, rather 
than to be limited to what Freiberg earlier referred to as ‘pragmatic 
instrumentalism’, it needs to be perceived as being integrated with an 
alternative and coherent paradigm. The major theoretical risk of denying it 
paradigm status is that its core messages will be lost by being 
marginalised and located in the conceptual fringe, rather than in the 
jurisprudential core of exemplar-producing principles and values.112 Legal 
theory and jurisprudential principle that arise within the adversarial 
paradigm tend to take some key concepts and procedures as so much 
connected to the core skeleton of principle that they are unassailable, and 
therefore, assumed. This accords with Kuhn’s conception of the paradigm. 
 
However, if the paradigm itself is left unchallenged, and is valued for its 
very stasis and conservatism as is arguably the case with the law, then the 
focus of legal scholars, theorists and reformers will be predominantly on 
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further defining and refining those concepts that are taken for granted 
(such as rights, property, due process, ownership and criminal 
responsibility). Historically, the most influential writings of jurists (meaning 
that which is most likely to be cited in courts) is doctrinal analysis (really a 
subset of the first principles analysis that characterises work within the 
humanities) or what is sometimes referred to as ‘analytical jurisprudence’. 
The emergence of a greater citation of therapeutic jurisprudence-related 
research and writing, discussed earlier in this chapter, is evidence of an 
emerging shift. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
A period of crisis, indicative of a paradigm shift, is not necessarily 
characterised by chaos, in-fighting and hand-wringing about the inability of 
a discipline to do its job. Although a few of the chronic, intractable 
problems of communal human living that we expect the law to provide us 
with tools for addressing remain sources of fierce academic and public 
debate, our legal system seems to be functioning. The most obvious and 
important indication of a paradigm in shift, according to Kuhn, is evidence 
of a socio-cultural discontinuity within the discipline itself, largely 
represented by a divergent language. 
 
The development of an alternative paradigm is fundamentally a heuristic 
process in that it involves experience-based change. Heuristic methods 
are useful for accelerating the search for solutions to paradigm problems. 
They do this by avoiding the sort of exhaustive hypothesis-testing method 
of evaluating all possible alternative approaches, by using less formal 
methods such as informed or ‘educated’ guesses, intuitive judgments or 
common-sense best estimates. Although a changing disciplinary language 
based on a developing set of changed heuristics, which reflects a 
changing worldview, are necessary indicia of a shifting paradigm, they are 
not sufficient. Advocacy and promotion of the new paradigm are required. 
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Mathematician George Pólya wrote of the necessity of coupling rhetorical 
persuasion based on a passionate commitment to a particular worldview 
with a set of practical heuristics for solving persistent problems within a 
discipline as the only way to truly resolve the ‘logical gaps’ between 
competing fundamental directions within that discipline.113 
Proponents of a new system can convince their audience only by 
first winning their intellectual sympathy for a doctrine they have 
not yet grasped. Those who listen sympathetically will discover for 
themselves what they would otherwise never have understood. 
Such an acceptance is a heuristic process, a self-modifying act, 
and to this extent a conversion. It produces disciples forming a 
school, the members of which are separated for the time being by 
a logical gap from those outside it. They think differently, speak a 
different language, live in a different world, and at least one of the 
two schools is excluded to this extent for the time being (whether 
rightly or wrongly) from the community of science … 
Demonstration must be supplemented, therefore, by forms of 
persuasion which can induce a conversion. The refusal to enter 
on the opponent’s way of arguing must be justified by making it 
appear altogether unreasonable.114 
Innovative processes and practices associated (to varying degrees) with 
the therapeutic jurisprudence movement that have been discussed in this 
chapter do seem to delineate a body of scholars and practitioners who, in 
Pólya’s words, ‘think differently’, ‘speak a different language’ and to some 
extent ‘live in a different world’ to the legal mainstream. There is also no 
doubt that some strong critics of therapeutic jurisprudence seek to have it 
excluded from the community of jurists on the basis of these differences. 
 
However, the lines of conceptual demarcation are blurred thanks to a 
spectrum of modified language. How are we to assess, for example, 
innovations with somewhat conceptually ambiguous descriptions, such as 
the proceedings within the Family Court of Australia, referred to as ‘less 
adversarial proceedings’115 or ‘a significantly less adversarial approach’,116 
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as compared to innovations that are expressly labelled as ‘non-adversarial 
justice’? The answer could be that we do not need to comprehensively 
assess this spectrum in contemporary academic discourse. Kuhn 
acknowledges that the history of a discipline will always seem more 
revolutionary to the historian, who can often have the benefit of centuries 
to look back on, than to the everyday practitioner working in smaller 
pragmatic increments to solve the puzzles of the day.117 
 
If adversarialism is too vague in meaning, future historians of law would 
not be able to identify a time at which it had been replaced.118 Any moment 
in time that we point to and say, ‘This is where the adversarial paradigm 
was replaced with the therapeutic paradigm (or with a non-adversarial 
paradigm)’, would be a purely arbitrary exercise and would at best be a 
matter of convention or of pragmatic consensus. It could be that this is the 
way that a juristic paradigm must change: that one fades out as another 
ascends by reference to both the weight of practitioner consensus and 
what is happening in practice.119 The universal performance indicators for 
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problem-solving courts devised by the Centre for Court Innovation is 
evidence of more formalised changes to practice. 
 
Kuhn claimed that paradigm debates are not really concerned with the 
current relative problem-solving strengths of each paradigm (although in 
the literature that is what is focused on) but more about which paradigm is 
more likely to resolve future problems, and in that sense they have an 
element of faith to it. Pythagorean mathematicians were unable to explain 
irrational numbers in the language of existing mathematics, but by 
assuming that irrational numbers existed (an act of faith), they were able 
to use them to solve practical problems. Kuhn further claimed that for a 
paradigm to succeed, there must be some advocates and practitioners 
who have both faith and the ability to apply it, and also take the risk of it 
being wrong. Many initial supporters of the paradigm may be attracted to it 
for the wrong reasons.120 However, the longer it refuses to go away and 
the more critical mass it accumulates, the more likely it is to prevail. 
 
A practitioner who resists the new paradigm once it has been accepted is 
not necessarily unreasonable or illogical, he simply is not a practitioner of 
that profession anymore (not a scientist, as Kuhn puts it). We are a long 
way from that level of incommensurability yet, but certainly we can say 
that the typical problem-solving court lawyer and judge would appear to an 
outside observer as very different sorts of practitioners to the lawyer and 
judge in an adversarial court. 
 
The tipping point for a paradigm shift does not necessarily occur when a 
particular amount of evidence of proof has been generated. Acceptance 
and application by a body of stakeholders who are schooled in the new 
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paradigm is necessary.121 Kuhn asserted that the transfer of allegiance 
from one paradigm to another is a ‘conversion experience that cannot be 
forced’.122 Lawyers and judges who have spent a long career working 
within the adversarial paradigm may well resist the assertion that a 
therapeutic paradigm is required, not based on some belief that specialist 
courts do not work, but that these courts are merely variations within the 
adversarial system and that all problems can, therefore, be dealt with by 
the adversarial courts. 
 
As for the current nature of the debate between adherents of 
adversarialism and those proposing the mainstream application of 
therapeutic jurisprudence, it is difficult (although not impossible) to 
precisely identify advocates for a strong adversarialism. On the surface of 
the literature, there is almost an absence of theoretical debate between 
the two conceptual areas due perhaps to a reluctance of some 
professionals to be identified too strongly with either perspective. 
 
There are those who do vigorously criticise therapeutic jurisprudence on 
doctrinal, ethical and constitutional grounds, and if we conceive of those 
practitioners and academics who actively resist the adoption of therapeutic 
jurisprudence principles (rather than just express scepticism or who are 
not prepared to commit), then a paradigm debate can be identified. Since 
academics, judges and practitioners advocating both paradigms are 
obviously intelligent and articulate people, it should be relatively easy for 
members of either group to understand what members of the other group 
are suggesting (making use of the meta benchmarking language that 
Kuhn allowed for). However, the absence of any significant theoretical (as 
opposed to doctrinal legal) debate in the literature may indicate that there 
is a lack of willingness to engage on a fundamental level. 
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Therapeutic jurisprudence advocates seem to often publish quite lucid 
explanations of their core beliefs and hypotheses, but a fairly common 
critical response seems to be that these beliefs and hypotheses are too 
vague and simplistic. Likewise, critics seem to issue blanket statements 
that therapeutic jurisprudence assertions are contrary to due process 
and/or impermissibly paternalistic (with the intention that such statements 
act as conversation stoppers). Conversely, critics of the adversarial 
paradigm are prone to fixate on certain weaknesses in the current system 
of litigation and conclude that purported therapeutic refinements or 
alternatives to those impugned processes are neither contrary to due 
process nor paternalistic. 123  Such polarising and contradictory views, 
especially in the absence of a meaningful theoretical discourse, are what 
Kuhn would have considered to be strong evidence that we really are 
dealing with competing paradigms. The anticipated theoretical discourse 
usually takes place after the paradigm shift. 
 
If we grant that a research community (which is intrinsically linked to a 
specialist profession) consists of the practitioners of a specialty, bound 
together by common elements in their education (and their 
academic/professional) apprenticeship, who consider themselves as 
responsible for the pursuit of a set of shared goals, including the training of 
their successors, communication within that community should not be 
characterised by misunderstandings and vague generalisations. 
 
As discussed previously, the deep pragmatic conservatism in the practice 
of law is clearly reflected in the theoretical adversarial paradigm. The 
adversarial system operates pursuant to an, at times tacit, assumption that 
there is a legal solution to every dispute, or request for judicial 
adjudication, or determination brought before it. The system cannot be 
seen as unable to deal with any particular fact situation, however novel or 
intractable it may seem. To allow that the law cannot solve a problem is to 
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raise the ugly spectre of the ‘pulling one thread argument’, in which the 
anomaly is then reproduced for similar (but not necessarily identical) fact 
scenarios and the core of legal principle and public confidence in the 
administration of efficient, objective and infallible justice is undermined. 
The overwhelming focus on rules and the perpetuation of the assumption, 
or myth, that they are derived from necessary and core theoretical 
principles is both the great strength and weakness of the adversarial 
system. It is a strength in that it promotes certainty and confidence, a 
weakness in that it can tend to delegitimise divergent views or critiques. 
An overemphasis on the certainty of outcome that an adversarial trial or 
hearing is supposed to provide ignores the aggregating body of data that 
shows that many legal processes do not work.124 
 
Burke reminds us that traditions of judicial neutrality, independence and 
objectivity and detachment are ‘bedrock’, but that ‘if judges wear blinders 
that shield them from seeing the resources and outcomes of courts, they 
cannot be effective in modern society’. He says that it is unfortunate, 
however, that this is exactly what some judicial ethicists and ‘traditional 
allies of judicial independence’ want from judges. This equates to, Burke 
claims, neutrality to the point of isolation from becoming familiar or working 
with the resources of the problem-solving court. 125  This is certainly a 
reflection, at least in part, of a belief by some practitioners that adversarial 
processes and therapeutic processes are incommensurable. That is what 
Kuhnian incommensurability amounts to—a sociological phenomenon 
among some of those within a field that prevents or inhibits 
communication. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
 
In answer to Freiberg’s question of whether problem-oriented courts and 
the therapeutic jurisprudence movement have moved beyond the 
experimental mode and into the mainstream of justice I believe that this 
thesis demonstrates that it has. At least, this is so in the sense that the 
problem-solving ethos has generated genuine and productive debate 
among the judiciary and legal practitioners practicing in mainstream 
courts. This much, at least, is clear, based on the analysis of the current 
state of the relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic 
jurisprudence undertaken in chapters 5 and 6. Further, based on this 
same analysis, Freiberg was right to suggest that there are those within 
the non-adversarial legal community who indicate that a paradigm shift is 
underway. The object of this thesis has been, as Freiberg suggested, to 
give this claim of paradigm shift a serious consideration while being 
appropriately ‘sceptical about such a sweeping claim’. 
 
The place of therapeutic jurisprudence within a mooted paradigm shift is 
as much a matter of ontology, of settling on an agreed scope for 
therapeutic jurisprudence, as of looking for particular evidence of a shift. I 
concluded in Chapter 5 that there is reasonable evidence to support 
claims that therapeutic jurisprudence may constitute a Kuhnian paradigm 
in any of three ontological categories (that is, as a distinct juristic model, 
as part of a wider therapeutic or non-adversarial paradigm or as a discrete 
problem-solving paradigm). However, the drive to mainstream therapeutic 
jurisprudence, I concluded, is more about adding to the existing set of 
disciplinary exemplars, and refining some of those already in existence, 
than providing a definitive set of exemplars. 
 
The identification of express disciplinary exemplars that stand as 
benchmarks against which particular legal rules, processes and roles can 
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be assessed as valid is the key to delineating a paradigm according to 
Kuhn. This is a critical finding of Chapter 2, which was applied to 
therapeutic jurisprudence in Chapter 5, where I considered the three 
ontological categories in depth. The exemplars are the solutions to 
problems and issues for the practitioner that cannot be solved by simply 
moving around and applying the existing rules or exemplars. Clear 
evidence is presented in chapters 5 and 6 (and indeed throughout the 
thesis) that processes and fora that are deeply influenced by therapeutic 
jurisprudence (such as the problem-solving courts) owe their existence to 
attempts to address puzzles (such as recidivism linked to drug addiction) 
that have become Kuhnian problems for the criminal justice system. As 
Kuhn says, by studying these exemplars and by practicing with them, the 
members of the corresponding community learn their trade. Momentum in 
the inclusion of therapeutic exemplars in legal education was illustrated in 
chapters 3, 5 and 6. It is hard to ignore the position of peak bodies such as 
the Australian Institute for Judicial Administration that concludes that: 
[t]herapeutic jurisprudence is one of the most significant 
developments in the justice system. It [has] wide-ranging 
implications for judging, legal practice, court administration, 
corrections, legal institutions and processes generally and for 
legal and judicial education.1 
 
Freckelton’s characterisation of therapeutic jurisprudence (foreshadowed 
in Chapter 1) as being within its maturation phase resonates throughout a 
contemporary therapeutic jurisprudence literature that now does more 
than seek to simply make ad hoc and isolated recommendations about 
how mainstream judges and courts can be less anti-therapeutic. In my 
analysis of how therapeutic jurisprudence sees itself in Chapter 5, I noted 
Wexler’s hope that lawyers and researchers might use therapeutic 
jurisprudence principles as a vehicle for fundamental, transformative 
societal change, and as a means of critiquing the ‘roots of the law’. Given 
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the fundamental concern of the therapeutic jurisprudence method for not 
usurping due process, but rather for complementing it as a means for 
transformative change, we ought not to be surprised that the evidence 
suggests, as discussed in Chapter 5, that the role of the judge is 
malleable. 
 
This malleability has probably always been a feature of the adversarial 
system, as was demonstrated in Chapter 4. Even a process as 
quintessentially adversarial as the trial by ordeal does not stand up to 
scrutiny as a tightly objective mechanism that simply adjudicates strict 
rights and obligations. Maitland’s historic study of the recorded ordeal 
outcomes found only one case in which the ordeal did not acquit the 
accused. This was largely the work of the clergy, who saw the process as 
more of a political and social tool than an adjudication. Adversarialism 
clothes itself in objectivity, but in practice is often tolerant of innovations 
that allow for a consideration of extra-legal factors, so long as such 
innovations do not claim paradigmatic status for themselves. Malleability 
within the adversarial paradigm is tolerated because, as Kuhn suggests, 
formal rules are often held up as sacrosanct within a discipline but mutual 
understandings among practitioners about what it means to work in a 
given discipline is what truly defines it. These shared disciplinary 
understandings form the tacit knowledge of a discipline. 
 
These sorts of mutual understandings among practitioners within a field is 
what Kuhn eventually came to mean by a paradigm. We can recall from 
the tracing of Kuhn’s evolving view of the paradigm in Chapter 2, his 
ultimate position that paradigm ‘stands for the entire constellation of 
beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given 
community’.2 This thesis had some work to do in establishing that it was 
valid to extend the concept of the Kuhnian paradigm to disciplines outside 
of the natural sciences. In Chapter 3, I undertook this work, especially in 
relation to establishing that juristic models and legal systems could be 
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governed by Kuhnian paradigms. There, I explained that although Kuhn’s 
earlier work seemed to suggest that he considered disciplines outside of 
the hard sciences to not be governed by paradigms, this eventually 
collapsed into an assumption that researchers and practitioners in the 
social sciences and humanities would have no need for, nor interest in, a 
history of disciplinary change that focused on commonalities with science. 
That has turned out to be a significantly misplaced assumption on Kuhn’s 
part. We saw in Chapter 3 that it is in fact the humanities and the social 
sciences that have most keenly pursued and applied the concept of the 
paradigm shift to their fields. 
 
Kuhn himself acknowledged that differences in methodology were 
secondary to similarities in worldview and the ways in which disciplines 
educate their new members and rely on orthodoxy to preserve order within 
the discipline. The linking of elements of a liberal worldview to tenets of 
traditional adversarial practice in law was undertaken in Chapter 3, with 
the conclusion that if we posit a juristic model in order to make explicit 
some rules that have evolved in the common law jurisdictions to try and 
reduce complex social and legal problems to contests between relatively 
simple propositions, rights and values, a paradigm readily emerges. 
 
Although there are issues of incommensurability between adversarialism 
and therapeutic jurisprudence (as discussed in Chapter 6), these issues, 
to some extent, drive the integration and mainstreaming process rather 
than prevent it. When confronted by Kuhnian problems, rather than by 
mere puzzles, the adversarial paradigm has adopted some non-
adversarial exemplars. The adversarial disciplinary matrix exists within a 
normatively malleable environment. Wexler articulates that reality in this 
way: 
But for TJ judging to thrive outside the problem-solving court 
arena, a TJ-friendly legal landscape is necessary. A useful 
heuristic is to think of TJ professional practices and techniques as 
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a ‘liquid’, and to think of the governing legal rules and legal 
procedures—the pertinent legal landscape—as ‘bottles.’3 
 
The reticence among some therapeutic jurisprudence scholars and 
practitioners to engage with the idea that therapeutic jurisprudence could 
be conceived of, or evolve into, a theory or philosophy might seem to 
weigh against it ever being seen by its leading thinkers as a paradigm of 
anything. However, this is probably based on a misconception of what a 
paradigm is. Birgden, a leading therapeutic jurisprudence practitioner in 
the field of offender management, expressly calls for something like a set 
of therapeutic exemplars by asserting that: 
[t]herapeutic jurisprudence can provide the framework to balance 
justice and therapeutic principles. However, it can only provide 
the framework if it takes a normative stance, particularly in 
relation to offender autonomy. In order to take a normative stance, 
therapeutic jurisprudence needs to identify itself as a legal 
philosophy.  
Schopp warns that if therapeutic jurisprudence is to continue to pursue an 
agenda of using social science data to promote reform in the operation of 
mainstream courts, then it: 
must provide further normative arguments regarding the manner 
in which legal institutions ought to pursue psychological well-
being when that value conflicts with other important values.4 
 
Wexler’s view on the normative dimension reflects the Kuhnian conception 
of a disciplinary matrix evolving as a reaction to practitioner intuitions in 
the face of seemingly intractable problems. New exemplars develop 
organically, not as some rigidly formulated or inflexible prescriptions. He 
observes that: 
[w]hen we propose ‘TJ-friendly’ legal processes, we obviously 
enter into a discussion of the ‘normative’ notion of therapeutic 
jurisprudence … the normative aspect of TJ is still being ‘worked 
out.’ It will thus likely emerge as the horse after the cart, a result I 
                                                 
3 
 David Wexler, ‘New Wine in New Bottles: The Need to Sketch a Therapeutic 
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regard as appropriate. To set a normative stage too early would 
work to restrict our thinking and options. I feel similarly with regard 
to formulating a tight (as opposed to an ‘intuitive’) definition of the 
term ‘therapeutic’ itself: a tight definition might simply be ignored 
by those who find it unduly narrow, rendering a proposed 
definition irrelevant; worse yet, if others were to take the tight 
definition seriously, that acceptance might prematurely restrict our 
thinking and creativity.5 
 
There is little doubt that therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to do more than 
simply study and influence the effects of law on the well-being of those 
affected by it. Its wider agenda, according to some, is (or ought to be) to 
provide benchmarks against which legal rules and processes ought to be 
measured, and to motivate actual reforms to these rules and processes.6 If 
we were to accept that ‘motivate’ in this sense may sometimes mean 
‘require’, then these benchmarks take on the quality of paradigmatic 
exemplars. 
 
In Chapter, I noted that even if therapeutic jurisprudence operates to 
simply insert some rules or exemplars within the core of the existing legal 
disciplinary matrix, then it will have succeeded in effecting paradigmatic 
change (albeit by modifying the existing paradigm rather than by replacing 
it). My argument has been that incommensurability is the feature of the 
Kuhnian paradigm shift that gives us the best insights into the relationship 
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between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence. It is a phenomenon 
that still creates a certain amount of unease among scholars, largely 
based on the assertion of Lakatos that, if true, it prevents any observer 
from concluding that a move from one research program (paradigm) to 
another is ever a simple, rational choice. It denies the view that we can 
understand the change from one theory to another without examining the 
social and political history of a discipline, that a simple analysis of the 
respective empirical assertions of each theory can fully explain a change. 
Taken at its strongest (as discussed in Chapter 6), incommensurability of 
paradigms means that a later theory cannot be derived from an earlier 
theory, given that the latter is based on new terminology, new meanings, 
standards and exemplars. There can be no deductive relationship between 
two incommensurable paradigms. However, lawyers and legal scholars 
need have little to fear from that conception of change given the slowness 
of a paradigm shift. As we saw in Chapter 2, a paradigm shift is 
generational. Overwhelmingly, those expected to practice pursuant to a 
particular paradigm will have been educated from within it. The whole 
thrust of Kuhn’s argument is that the idea of some rapid, redefining 
revolution within a field is misleading. 
 
One of Kuhn’s most perspicacious insights is that those involved in a 
revolution need not conceive of themselves as revolutionaries, and neither 
should their critics. We need to complement this insight with his 
observation that disciplinary revolutions are nonlinear and can emerge as 
interesting fluctuations in the otherwise noisy context of the ordinary work 
being carried out in the background. Law has a very noisy background, 
largely because its myriad operations and processes are crucial to the 
existence and functioning of a liberal democracy. 
 
Once the exemplars are in place, says Kuhn, then ‘[w]ork under the 
paradigm can be conducted in no other way, and to desert the paradigm is 
to cease practicing the science at all’.7 We saw in Chapter 5 criticisms of 
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some judges opposed to drug courts, and to therapeutic jurisprudence in 
particular, claiming that the role of the therapeutic judge involves work that 
is not properly that of a judge. Although there was some significant 
evidence of the emergence of therapeutic exemplars and their movement 
towards the core of the disciplinary matrix, we seem to be a long way yet 
from seeing a core dominated by therapeutic exemplars. The core may 
never, in fact, be dominated by them. Although many academic papers 
make use of the concept of paradigm shift to some extent, and Kuhn is 
often cited as some sort of license for the revisionism of the citer, there is 
no doubt that the language and conceptual framework of the Kuhnian 
paradigm shift is an invaluable way to conceive of the relationship 
between differing worldviews and methodological frameworks within a 
professional and academic discipline.8 
 
The value of the Kuhnian conception of the paradigm to this thesis is not 
that it provides any ‘algorithm for theory choice’ (it does not provide a 
method for deciding whether an adversarial or therapeutic legal paradigm 
is to be preferred), but that it greatly assists in framing the extent of the 
tension between two significantly different juristic models. Only if that 
tension is properly framed and contextualised can we then explore the 
ways in which the tension can be resolved. The thrust of the thesis is that 
the tension constitutes the interplay of two different and competing 
Kuhnian paradigms. Whether those paradigms are articulated as an 
adversarial paradigm competing with a therapeutic/non-
adversarial/comprehensive law is of no great import. It seems unlikely that 
we will see some blended model of court system in which some courts 
operate according to purely adversarial principles and some according 
only to therapeutic jurisprudence principles. If, as the thesis argues, 
therapeutic jurisprudence is positioning to paradigmatically change 
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adversarialism, then some core elements of the adversarial paradigm will 
be replaced. 
 
If this reasoning is accurate, then we are likely to see, in coming years, 
that adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence do not have a common 
language or reference point. For that reason, as Kuhn would suggest, 
therefore, there is no point in therapeutic jurisprudence advocates 
attempting to ‘convert’ adversarialists (such as Mason or Hoffman). The 
way to install a therapeutic jurisprudence paradigm would be by enthusing 
the next generation of jurists with its theory and methods (although, 
according to Kuhn, this is rarely an explicit strategy). 
 
Jurists may be recognising that the law is emerging from a very long 
period of normal science and entering a time of crisis in the Kuhnian 
sense. Far from spending their time questioning the limits or validity of 
their paradigm, most practitioners during a period of normal science are 
actually trying to force nature (what they observe and experience) to fit 
their paradigm—and if that was not the case, most of the routine functions 
of the discipline could not continue. 
 
I accept Kuhn’s view (and that of most 21st-century scholars) that we 
cannot really characterise the legal world that we are observing 
independently of the theory we have about that world. As a social science, 
a humanity or at least a discipline outside the natural sciences, we do not 
need to extend the Kuhnian analysis or analogy to the extent of 
considering the claim that succeeding paradigms do not represent 
worldviews that are incrementally closer to the structure of the actual 
world. There is no need to conceive of successive juristic models as 
somehow getting closer to some ideal. Our juristic models are not really 
moving us towards anything in particular (so we need to be careful about 
on what it is we base claims of progression with respect to juristic models). 
We can say, though, that we have models that are organic and better 
adapted to contemporary conditions or beliefs about what we want the 
model to provide us with—perhaps a coherent theoretical framework for a 
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therapy-oriented court system. After all, Kuhn characterises a paradigm as 
a coherent system of concepts that brings order to the overall discipline 
and that rectifies the critical mass of anomalies that has accumulated 
during the period of crisis. It may well be that we are seeing more than just 
a shift in some sort of paradigmatic lens. 
 
Kuhn suggests that when paradigms change, there are usually significant 
shifts in the criteria determining the legitimacy both of problems and of 
proposed solutions. This is the real tension that I believe Freiberg 
identified in his posited distinction between paradigm shift and pragmatic 
incrementalism. It highlights why it would be difficult to decide whether to 
select an adversarial or a therapeutic paradigm on which to base a legal 
system or any significant component of a legal system. Such a choice 
could not be made by applying what Kuhn referred to as the criteria of 
normal science.9 
 
Kuhn asserted that when ‘two disciplinary schools disagree about what is 
a problem and what is a solution, they will inevitably talk through each 
other when debating the relative merits of their respective paradigms’. This 
is often manifested (as explored in detail in Chapter 6) in circular 
arguments where each position satisfies its own posited criteria. If 
adversarialism cannot acknowledge that a problem-solving court is ‘a 
court’ then it risks throwing the baby out with the bath water.10 
 
Further, Kuhn consistently warns us in SSR that no paradigm is complete, 
in the sense that it never resolves all the problems it proposes—and which 
particular problems are left unresolved will differ between paradigms. 
Therefore, when comparing two posited paradigms such as adversarialism 
and therapeutic jurisprudence, we inevitably have to ask the question of 
which problems are more important to solve. The answer to that question 
                                                 
9 
 SSR 167.  
10 
 Kuhn observes that ‘[i]n the partially circular arguments that regularly result each 
paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and to 
fall short of a few of those dictated by its “opponent”‘: SSR 168. 
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must come from outside of the paradigm and perhaps from outside the 
discipline itself. It could well be, for example, that the problem of drug-
related offending and subsequent endemic recidivism is one for which 
public health policy demands a solution. Drug courts may argue that they 
are more effective in addressing that problem, but the choice as to how 
courts ought to deal with it will probably be made by stakeholders outside 
of the court system. Kuhn concludes that this ‘it is this recourse to external 
criteria that most obviously makes paradigm debates revolutionary’.11 
 
Apart from the dangers of not recognising that juristic thought may be in a 
time of crisis or revolution related to a conceptual paradigm shift away 
from adversarialism, which was alluded to throughout the thesis, there is 
also the concern that failure to accept the criticisms of the advocates of 
therapeutic jurisprudence, or to academically marginalise them, may lead 
to what Harold Bloom refers to as ‘the anxiety of influence’.12 Bloom’s 
central thesis, when applied to law, would be that lawyers and judges are 
restricted in exercising their intuition and lateral, creative approaches by 
the ambiguous relationship they necessarily posses with respect to 
established adversarial theory and its exemplar practitioners (generally 
judges of the superior and appellate courts). 
 
Granted, many lawyers, judges and legal academics are capable of 
learning from experience and conceiving of incrementally novel 
approaches to seemingly intractable problems in the justice system, but 
these newer approaches will always be tempered by varying degrees of 
respect and reverence for the express and implied theoretical positions of 
past and existing luminaries in the field. This is the ‘influence’ that Bloom 
says gives rise to the ‘anxiety’. The greater that sense of respect (and 
perhaps fear), the more derivative and conforming will be the newer 
                                                 
11 
 Ibid. 
12 
 H Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (1973). Bloom’s theory is 
fundamentally a revisionary or ‘antithetical’ approach to literary criticism, but which has 
obvious implications for many fields of human endeavour, especially those of a more 
conservative nature. 
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approaches. My fear is that if challenges to the adversarial paradigm are 
not, themselves, seen as paradigmatic juristic models, then the 
innovations suggested by therapeutic jurisprudence will sacrifice real 
change for what Freiberg calls mere ‘pragmatic instrumentalism’. 
